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ANSWER 



SECOND SERIES OF LETTERS 



ADDRESSED TO 



TRINITARIANS AND CALVINISTS. 



BY HEN R Y W ARE , D. D. 

Hollis Professor of Divinity in the University at Cambridge. 



Jl 

CAMBRIDGE : 

PUBLISHED BY HILLIARD AND MRTCALF. 
Sold also by Cummings & HUliard, Boston. 

1822. 



CONTENTS. 



LETTER I. p. I— 16. 

Occasion of the present publication. State of the controversy. Manner of con- 
ducting it. Charge of inconsistency] answered. Agreement between some 
orthodox and infidel writers. Another charge of inconsistency answered. 
Statement of the question at issue on the subject of depravity corrected. 

LETTER II. 17—25. 

Traits of early character not consistent with depravity. Appeal to experience 
by the orthodox— defective — partial. 

I LETTER III. 26—36. 
Depravity not innate, natural, &c. Universality of sin. In what sense. Both 
sin and virtue appear early. Neither of them implies an entire change of na- 
ture. Both are in the same degree spontaneous. Virtuous dispositions not 
more easily eradicated than vicious. In what sense it is certain that every 
child born into the world will be a sinner. As certain that, in the same sense, 
it will be a saint. 

LETTER IV. 37—44. 

Misrepresentation of the unitarian method of reasoning. Evasion of the point at 
issue. Depravity not shown to be consistent with the moral character of God. 

LETTER V. 44—64. 

Native depravity not consistent with moral agency. Preparatory considerations. 
Improper and deceptive use of terms. In what sinfulness consists. How an 
innocent being may become a sinner. Definition of a moral agent. Course 
pursued by Dr. Woods. Adam's transgression. Quotation from Dr. Em- 
mons. 

LETTER VI. 65—79. 

Unfounded charge noticed. Equivocal use of words. Difference between human 
nature and individual personal character. Exceptionable manner of conduct- 
ing the discussion. What it is to follow nature, 



iv 



LETTER VII. 79—97. 

Charge of inconsistency considered. Propensity to sin implies no guilt. Guilt 
consists, in yielding to it. Proper ground of blame or ill desert. Consistent 
with a constitution fitted to be wrought upon by temptation. Consistent with 
the divine foreknowledge. 

LETTER VIII. 98—114. 

Practical importance of the question respecting depravity. Moral influence and 
tendency of the orthodox doctrine correctly stated by Dr. Woods. Moral 
tendency of the opposite doctrine. An incorrect representation of dangerous 
moral tendency noticed. Unitarian method of addressing men. Orthodox 
method. 

LETTER IX. 115—143. 

Election. Statement of the doctrine by Dr. Channing defended. Charge 
against Wesley considered. Dr. Woods' reasoning examined. Distinctions 
between Foreknowledge and Predetermination — between physical and moral 
events — between certainty and necessity. Cases of Paul and Mary Magda- 
lene. Appointment to means and privileges — not to holiness and salvation. 
Inconclusive reasoning, and inconsistency. Another instance. Doctrine of 
Election and Philosophical necessity entirely distinct. 

LETTER X. 144—151. 

Atonement. Analogy of God's government in the present life. Civil govern- 
ment. Dr. Woods' objections considered. Moral influence of the two sys- 
tems. Reasoning in the Letters to Trinitarians &c. incorrectly stated. 

LETTER XI. 151—163. 

Divine influence. Love of Christ. Inconclusive reasoning. What is due from 
the Orthodox and Unitarians to each other. 



LETTERS, &c. 



LETTER I. 

Occasion of the present publication. State of the controversy. Manner 
of conducting it. Charge of inconsistency answered. Agreement 
between some orthodox and infidel writers. Another charge of incon- 
sistency answered. Statement of the question at issue on the subject 
of depravity corrected. 

When 1 published, nearly two years ago, " Let- 
ters addressed to Trinitarians and Calvinists," it 
was my hope not to bye called upon to pursue any 
further the discussions, in which they were em- 
ployed. Bur the Reply of Dr. Woods to those 
Letters, which is now before the public, has ren- 
dered it proper for me, I think, to offer some 
further thoughts on the several subjects of discus- 
sion, and remarks on his manner of treating them. 
I shall accordingly address to you a few additional 
Letters, in which I hope to be able to satisfy you, 
that the state of the controversy is not changed, and 
that the great points at issue between us remain, 
as they stood before. My opponent had doubt- 
less good reason to felicitate himself as he does, 
(p. 6) 66 on the benefit he could derive from the 
frankness," (he might have added, perhaps, 
want of controversial skill and caution) of the 
person, with whom he was contending. Though I 
1 



2 

trust to b,e able to show, that the benefit is to him- 
self only, as an accomplished disputant, and not, as 
he flatters himself, to the cause he maintains. 
That will be found to derive less advantage from 
the circumstance, than he seems to promise himself. 

I think it necessary, in the outset, to remind you 
of the state of the controversy, because you are 
otherwise in danger of losing sight of the points at 
issue, and of having your attention directed to sub- 
ordinate circumstances, which are so apt, in the 
course of discussion, to be allowed to take their 
place. For this purpose I must call your attention 
to the origin and progress of the discussion. 

The occasion, in w r hich it originated, was a 
Discourse delivered by Dr. Channing at the ordi- 
nation of the Rev. Mr. Spferks at Baltimore, in 
May 1819. A part of that Discourse, in which 
the doctrines of Calvinism were spoken of, was 
attacked by Dr. Woods, who complained that the 
doctrines referred to were misrepresented, pro- 
fessing at the same time to give a correct statement 
of them, as they are now held in this country by 
those, who assume for their system the title of 
Orthodoxy ; and undertaking also to defend them, 
as constituting the true system of Christianity, 
agreeing with our experience, and clearly taught 
by Revelation. 

The important points of doctrine, you will recol- 
lect, which he maintained in a series of Letters 
addressed to Unitarians, were, The total depravity 
of human nature, particular personal election, atone- 
ment by the death of Christ, and the necessity of 



s 



special divine influence in producing holiness. 
Those Letters were published in the spring of 
1820. In the month of August of the same year, 
the writer of these pages attempted an answer to 
them in Letters addressed to Trinitarians and 
Calvinists. In those letters he endeavoured to 
show, that the doctrines of orthodoxy, as stated by 
Dr. Woods, were not taught in the bible, were not 
supported by experience, and could not be recon- 
ciled with the moral character of God. The writer, 
at the same time, took occasion to state distinctly, 
his own particular views upon each of the several 
subjects in controversy. 

In the book which furnishes my apology for 
addressing you once more in these Letters, Dr. 
Woods has appeared again in defence of the doc- 
trines maintained in his former publication, and in 
reply to the objections, which I had urged against 
them. With what degree of success, you will be able 
to judge, after having read what he has written, 
and what I have now to allege in answer. 

Nothing will be found, I am persuaded, which, 
upon a fair examination, will be thought to affect 
the evidence of any one of the main articles in the 
scheme of scriptural divinity, which I endeavoured 
to support in my Letters. The reader, who gives 
himself the trouble to make the necessary compari- 
son of passages referred to, will perceive, without 
the aid of these pages, that although Dr. Woods has 
been able to fasten some apparent inconsistencies and 
absurdities, and perhaps you will think after all that 
can be said ; some real ones upon his antagonist ; they 



4/ 

are yet of such a nature, as not to affect at all the 
truth of the points at issue, but only the conclusive- 
ness of my reasoning upon them, or still more fre- 
quently, the propriety of some term or phrase which 
I have employed. They serve to show, not the 
weakness of the cause, but that its strength has not 
been fully displayed ; not that the Unitarian doc- 
trines are incapable of a fair support, but that the 
best support has not been given them, of which 
they are capable. 

It accordingly makes a part of my present design 
to show, that whatever advantage Dr. Woods may 
seem to have obtained in detecting apparent incon- 
sistencies in the explanation and defence of the 
Unitarian doctrines, the evidence of the doctrines 
is not affected. 

But I hope also to do more than this. I hope to 
satisfy you, and I think I shall be able to do it,* 
that the inconsistencies so ingeniously detected and 
so faithfully displayed, are, in general, if not in 
every instance, apparent only ; and that they vail 
disappear upon a fair presentation of the true 
meaning of the passages, from a comparison of 
which they were drawn. 

I mean not by this to intimate any unfair or 
dishonorable intentions in Dr. Woods. I will not 
allow myself to believe him capable of any inten- 
tional argumentative unfairness. I only mean, that 
in the discussion of religious or moral subjects for 
popular use, one can hardly employ words with 
such philosophical exactness, and so constantly 
guard against objection, that metaphysical subtilty 



5 

shall not be able to bring together expressions, which 
seem to be irreconcileable with each other. And there 
is sertainly, at first view, something extremely im- 
posing, and apt to make a strong impression, in an 
array of inconsistencies and contradictions, spread 
before one in strong relief and in broad characters. 
Our first thought is, that little reliance is to be 
placed on a writer, who so exposes himself. Yet, 
in reality, there is nothing, perhaps, upon which 
we have less reason to depend. For suppose, all 
that can be asked, the inconsistency to be as great 
in reality, as it seems to be ; what does it prove? — 
not that the cause is a bad one, but only that it is 
unskilfully or carelessly managed ; — not that the 
doctrine is false, but that the evidence of its truth 
has been less successfully stated than it might have 
been. But we are not usually required to admit so 
much as this. Such is the imperfection of language, 
and such the real difficulty of some subjects of 
speculation, that, as I have before observed* it is 
scarcely possible for words to be used with such 
accuracy and precision, and with such care, that 
a vigilant and acute antagonist shall not be able 
to discover inconsistencies, which may be so 
presented, as to seem of considerable importance. 
I could illustrate this* by a hundred instances 
taken from the sacred writers, where we are 
constantly called to reconcile apparent contra- 
dictions ; and where, by the fairest modes of inter- 
pretation, we are able to do it with entire satisfac- 
tion, without prejudice either to the writer or the 
doctrine. It would have been no difficult task to 



6 



discover apparent inconsistencies in the book, 
which I had occasion to notice in my former Let- 
ters. But had I pursued that course, the author 
would doubtless have charged me, and I know not 
how I could have repelled the charge, with a dispo- 
sition to cavil, rather than reason ; and would prob- 
ably have been able to show, that a little more 
patient and impartial attention to the subject, or a 
little more argumentative fairness, would have pre- 
sented to me a meaning, that implied no absurdity, 
and was chargeable with no contradiction. 

With these preliminary remarks, I now invite 
your attention to the several charges of inconsis- 
tency, to which, in the book before me, I am rep- 
resented to have exposed myself, in my statements of 
the Unitarian doctrine, and reasonings respecting it. 

The first that I shall notice is contained in the 
passage in pp. 13 to 17 inclusive, and refers to 
p. 26 in the Letters to Trinitarians and Calvinists, 
compared with pp. 20, 31 and 41, of the same.* 
Upon looking at these several passages with a ref- 
erence to the alleged inconsistency, my first thought 
was, that I might safely leave the subject without 
any explanatory remarks, only requesting you to 
read the whole of the several passages attentively ; 
assured that you could not fail to perceive, that it 
only offers a remarkable instance of an appearance 
of inconsistency produced by a dexterous juxta- 
position of separate passages, where a careful 
examination of the subject only is needed to show f 
that no real inconsistency exists. 

I refer always to the pages of the octavo edition of the Letters. 



7 

But lest there should be any readers, who may 
not have the patience to recur to passages and 
their connexion, and make the requisite examina- 
tion, or may not have the means of doing it, or 
may be insensible of the need of doing it, not 
aware how liable a fair and honourable disputant, 
of peculiar talents, turn of mind, and habits of 
speculation may be to impose upon himself and 
thus upon his reader by his own ingenuity ; it 
seems necessary for me to take the labour upon 
myself by showing where the fallacy lies in the 
present case, and in several others which fol- 
low. 

The inconsistency with which I am charged (Dr. 
Woods' Reply, p. 16) amounts to this, and this 
only, though it is again and again brought to view, 
and placed in different points of light, viz. That 
while in the formal statement of the doctrine, which 
I meant to maintain respecting the natural state of 
man, I assert, that man is by nature free from all 
moral corruption, as well as destitute of positive 
holiness, by nature no more inclined to sin than to 
virtue, and equally capable in the ordinary use of 
his faculties, and with the common assistance afforded 
him, of either; yet, in discussing the subject, I 
several times say what implies, that by their natural 
birth men become moral, have a moral disposition or 
character, which is good or holy in such a sense, as 
to entitle them to the Saviour's complacency, and 
make them heirs of his kingdom. 

Now, by reading the whole passage and apply- 
ing the principles of interpretation, which we 



8 



usually apply^ when we discover an apparent con- 
tradiction between two sentences of a writer of any 
character for common sense and consistency ; you 
will be satisfied, that had my ingenious friend as 
faithfully taxed his ingenuity to ascertain the real 
meaning of the writer in the passage before him, 
as he has done to detect and present to view an 
alleged inconsistency, he would have saved me, 
himself, and the reader some waste of labour and 
time. For, notwithstanding what is so repeatedly 
insinuated, that he was at a loss what my real opinion 
was, and what was the position, that I meant to 
maintain, he will not — he cannot deny, that in the 
direct statement of my opinion on the subject, there 
is no ambiguity, no room for any reader to be at a 
loss, what is the precise position, which I meant to 
maintain. It is, as I have before stated, That man 
is by nature, that is, as he is born into the world, 
equally free from sin and destitute of holiness, no 
more inclined to vice than to virtue, and equally 
capable, in the ordinary use of his faculties, and with 
the common assistance afforded him, of either. And 
this position, you will recollect, is maintained in 
opposition to the doctrine of orthodoxy on the same 
subject, which is, u That man is by nature, that is, 
as he is bom into the tvgld, totally depraved, inclined 
only to evil, and wholly incapable of any good incli- 
nation or motion, until such inclination or motion is 
produced by an irresistible act of the spirit of God" 
Now, in support of my own position, and in 
opposition to that of orthodoxy, among other argu- 
ments, I took occasion to apply that, which is drawn 



9 



from the earliest indications of character in children. 
But in speaking of the innocence, gentleness, kind- 
ness, and love of truth in children, am I to be 
charged with asserting or implying, that they are 
holy by nature, in contradiction to the express 
assertion at the head of the argument ? Consider 
only what the nature of the argument required. 
Dr. Woods' position is, that human beings come 
into existence totally devraved, inclined only to evil. 
If this be the truth, the earliest indications of char- 
acter in children ought to be evil only, unmingled 
wickedness, sin without alloy. My position, on 
the other hand, is, that human beings come into 
existence innocent, and without any greater bias to 
sin than to holiness ; not inclined to holiness only, 
nor did I say to holiness morf than to sin. If this 
be the truth, the earliest indications of character 
will be of a mixed nature ; and at an early period, as 
soon indeed as the child becomes capable of moral 
action, we shall be likely to find in its dispositions 
and in its character as much of that which is good, 
as of that which is evil. This, I endeavoured to 
show, is in fact the case, and that our doctrine is 
fully, confirmed by experience. I confined myself, 
indeed, chiefly to the mention of amiable traits and 
virtuous tendencies ; because those of an opposite 
nature, not being questioned by the orthodox, it was 
unnecessary to mention. 

Now, as it was the object of my argument to 
show, that whatever early indications there are of 
bad dispositions or bad tendencies, they are to be 
attributed to other causes, and furnish no proof of 
2 



10 



original native depravity ; when I had occasion to 
speak of good dispositions, and good tendencies, 
common courtesy, one would have thought, should 
have saved me from the charge of asserting or im- 
plying, original native holiness, even although it had 
not been, as it had, expressly disclaimed. My real 
meaning must have been perfectly obvious to every 
reader. It was what the argument required, viz. 
that the early indications of what is good in children 
proves, not that they are holy by nature, but only, 
that they are not totally depraved, since, if they 
were, none of those indications could have existed. 
With this explanation in your mind, read the passage, 
which I have referred to, and you will perceive, 
that all appearance of inconsistency has vanished. 

But I have not yet done with the passage. In my 
former publication, I had mentioned as proofs, that 
the nature of man is not totally depraved, that inno- 
cence, simplicity, and purity are characteristics of 
early life ; that veracity, kindness, good will, flow 
from the natural feelings, and that the infant mind 
early discovers affection, attachment, gratitude 
toward those from whom it receives kindness. The 
correctness of this statement of the characteristics 
of early life, far from being denied by Dr. Woods, 
is expressly admitted. "These," he says, after 
quoting them, " are charming names, and I am sen- 
sible that charming qualities of human nature are 
denoted by themP But are innocence, purity, 
veracity, kindness, gratitude and good will, qualities 
that denote a nature totally depraved, inclined only 
to evil? What then must be the qualities, that 



11 



shall denote a nature free from depravity ? Will 
you say, the opposite qualities, impurity, deceit, 
unkindness, ingratitude, ill-will ? I had not asserted, 
nor was it implied in any thing I did assert, that 
either or all of these were sufficient alone to consti- 
tute a holy man, or, that nothing more than these 
was required ; but I did suppose that they made a 
part, and an important part of that character, which 
constitutes conformity to the moral law, and renders 
him to whom it belongs holy, and acceptible to God. 

Nor did I think of comparing these qualities, as 
Dr. Woods has done, (p. 13) with u beauty of com- 
plexion and features, sprightliness of temper, and 
activity of limbs." I knew, indeed, that Hume, 
Godwin, and others, w 7 ho hold some philosophical 
opinions in common with the orthodox, do, on the 
ground of those opinions and as their legitimate 
consequence, confound together physical and moral 
qualities, and assert, that there is as much good 
desert in a well formed body, as in a well regulated 
mind or heart ; and upon the same principle, that 
there is no more guilt or blame- worthiness in the mur- 
derer, than in the instrument with which he perpe- 
trates the bloody deed. But I had always supposed, 
that when the Orthodox were charged with these 
opinions, as the legitimate tendency of their doctrine 
of human nature, and necessarily connected with it, 
they would deny the charge, and consider it as a 
slanderous misrepresentation. And I am at once 
surprised and sorry to meet with expressions in the 
book before me, which expose the author to the 
charge in a manner, which I do not perceive how 



12 



he is to repel. For if there is no more good desert 
in innocence, veracity, gratitude and kindness, than 
in personal beauty, there can be no more guilt in 
falsehood, ingratitude, or cruelty, than in personal 
deformity ; and he who asserts this need not hesitate 
to go the length of Godwin, — that the murderer is 
no more to be blamed than the dagger. 

A charge of inconsistency of a similar nature 
occurs, 35) which, by turning to the passage in 
my Letters, to which it refers, you will perceive has 
as little foundation as the other. 

In proof of the general position, which I have 
before repeated, viz. that mankind come into the 
world innocent and pure, objects of the complacency 
of the Creator, and no more inclined by nature to sin 
than to holiness ; no more disposed to hate and dis- 
obey, than to love and obey their Maker \ I had urged 
the manner in which little children are spoken of by 
our Saviour and by St. Paul. Suffer little children 
to come unto me— for of such is the kingdom of God. 
Except ye be converted and become as little children 
4/>c. I asked, if they were depraved, destitute of 
holiness, averse from all good, inclined to evil only, 
enemies of God, subjects of his wrath, justly liable 
to all punishments, could our Saviour declare respect- 
ing them, of such is the kingdom of God ? In this 
sentence the acute and vigilant eye of Dr. Woods 
has fixed itself on the unlucky phrase destitute of 
holiness, as implying a contradiction to what I had 
elsewhere said, and what my scheme every where 
implies, that men do not possess by birth that character 



13 



of personal holiness, and positive virtue, which is 
necessary to their being christians &c. 

Now I am ready to admit, if you will insist in 
contradiction to the whole tenor of this passage, in 
which it stands, and to the main position, which I 
had so often repeated, and stated so explicitly, that 
I must have used the word holiness here in its 
technical sense, the charge of inconsistency will lie 
against me. And what is the consequence ? Only 
this, that I have used a phrase, which expresses a 
meaning, that I did not intend to express, and which 
every reader, not excepting Dr. Woods himself, 
perceives that I did not intend. In the sense, there- 
fore, whether proper or not, in which it was evi- 
dently used, no contradiction or inconsistency is 
implied. 

So far as the alleged contradiction consists in the 
representation of little children as belonging to the 
kingdom of God, I shall not be held answerable for 
the propriety of the terms, as I only use the words, 
that were used by our Saviour. Nor do I perceive 
what is gained or lost by Dr. Woods in adopting the 
interpretation of Rosenmuller, and understanding 
the text to mean, not that children belong to the 
kingdom of God, but that members of Christ's 
kingdom must be like little children. For upon this 
interpretation, equally with the other, little children 
are supposed to have some qualites, which are essen- 
tial to those, who are to become christians. They 
have then some good qualities — are not totally 
depraved — are not inclined only to evil. 



14 



Dr. Woods, however, endeavours to prove, that 
our Saviour's recommendation of children as objects 
of imitation to his disciples does not imply (p. 37) 
"that children possess any moral excellence or 
goodness, like that excellence or goodness of chris- 
tians, which is meant to be set forth by the 
comparison because christians are in a similar 
manner, for the purpose of illustration, likened 
to sheep, lambs, doves ; and it is asked, " do 
sheep, lambs, and doves possess moral excel- 
lence ?" They are compared also, it is said, " to 
salt, light, and the branches of a vine." But to the 
whole reasoning and appeal in this passage, specious 
as it seems at first view, a single consideration may 
be opposed, which will suffice to show, that it has 
no weight. It is this, that every such illustration 
by a comparison is to be interpreted according to 
the nature of the subject in discussion and of the 
object of comparison. When christians are com- 
pared to a vine &c. we are very certain, that it can- 
not refer to any intellectual or moral quality in the 
vine, because a vine is in its nature incapable of such a 
quality ; but are we hence to infer, that there is no 
reference to moral qualities, when a child is the subject 
of comparison, who is capable of such qualities? 
Some degree of presumption at least, that moral 
qualities were referred to, one would think was to 
be drawn from the very circumstance, that a subject 
was made choice of for the illustration, which w T as 
capable of moral qualities. And we should be con- 
firmed in the opinion, that it certainly w as so, if, as 
in the present case, the whole transaction clearly 



15 



indicated, that moral, and only moral qualities were 
in the mind of the speaker. Dr. Woods, however, 
is of a different opinion. He thinks they are not 
moral, but natural qualities. And he says, (p. 40) 
" The plain truth is, that the amiable natural qual- 
ities, which distinguish little children, are made use 
of to illustrate the amiable moral qualities, which 
ought to belong to christians." You will here 
doubtless wish with me to learn, what are the 
names of those moral qualities of christians, which 
are said to resemble, and are represented by the 
natural qualities of children. The amiable natural 
qualities, which, it is not denied, belong to children, 
are innocence, purity, veracity, kindness, gratitude, 
&c. You will wish to know what are the amiable 
moral qualities of christians, which these represent, 
and whether they are known by other names than 
innocence, purity, veracity, &c. You will think it 
also a singular concession in one, who professes to 
maintain the doctrine of total native depravity, that 
the qualities above mentioned are the natural qual- 
ities of children ; that beings by nature destitute of 
all good, and inclined only to evil, are yet by nature 
kind, grateful, pure, innocent, and true ; i. e. have 
the very qualities which, in christians, are moral 
qualities. 

It is important for me here to call your attention 
to an incorrectness in Dr. Woods' statement of the 
question at issue on the subject of depravity ; 
because it is a circumstance, by which the reasoning 
in this and the following chapters is materially 
affected. He says, (p. 13) " The real question is ? 



16 



whether holy love to God and man is the first moral 
affection, which human beings generally exercise, 
after they become moral agents, and are expressly 
informed what God requires of them." Now this is 
so far from being the real question, that it has made 
no part of the question between us. It has neither been 
asserted nor denied ; nor do I know, that the affir- 
mative is maintained by any one. The real question 
at issue is a different one. It is not, whether the 
first moral affection be generally holy, but whether 
it be always unholy ; not whether holy love to God 
and men be the invariable or general characteristic 
of our first affections ; but whether our first affec- 
tions and inclinations be evil, and evil only. You 
perceive the wide difference of these questions. 
With the former I have no concern. The latter 
was opposed in my former letters, as being supported 
neither by scripture nor experience ; and it is the 
only point to which Dr. Woods' defence ought now 
to have been directed. Why he has chosen to direct 
it to another point, about which there has been no 
controversy, he will doubtless be able to say. It is 
sometimes the policy of inferior combatants to carry 
the w r ar into a quarter, where there is no opposition. 
But such a motive and design cannot be attributed 
in the present case. 



17 

LETTER II. 

Traits of early character not consistent Vvith depravity. Appeal tt) 
experience by the orthodox — defective — partial. 

I have but few remarks to make on what I find 
in the second chapter of the book before me. One, 
however, that occurs upon reading the first sentence, 
is of some importance, and may be applied to several 
other passages. It is asserted, that it had been 
shown in the preceding chapter, " That those amia- 
ble qualities, which are really characteristic of early 
life, and which had been mentioned as indications 
of moral purity, are in fact of such a nature, that 
they may consist with depravity, and so cannot 
afford any argument at all against the common 
orthodox doctrine.*' The fallacy contained in this 
sentence, arising partly from the loose and equivocal 
use of the term depravity, and partly from a degree 
of uncertainty as to what is meant by the common 
orthodox doctrine, I apprehend is not immediately 
perceived by readers generally. 

Now what Dr. Woods has shown is in fact only 
this, that the amiable qualities, admitted to be 
characteristic of early life, are not inconsistent with 
the existence of qualities of an opposite nature at an 
equally early period. This, Unitarians have not 
denied. It is expressly admitted in all my reason- 
ing upon the subject. But if this is the sense in 
which he uses the word depravity in this place, and 
nothing more is meant ; it has no relation to the 
orthodox doctrine of depravity. That doctrine relates 
not to the acquired character of children, but to theii 

o 



lo 



nature, and expresses not what they actually are by 
practice, but what they are supposed to be, as they 
come into being previous to practice. Orthodox deprav- 
ity is " an innate moral depravity, all without excep- 
tion being by nature unlike and opposed to God, and 
all their affections and actions wholly wrong, adverse 
to the character and glory of God." But has Dr. 
Woods shown or attempted to show r , that the amiable 
qualities really characteristic of early life are con- 
sistent with depravity in this sense ? Has he shown 
that innocence, purity, veracity, kind affections are 
consistent with a nature inclined only to evil, and 
with affections and actions wholly wrong f 

But an appeal is made to the experience of 
parents and christian ministers, as to the character 
and disposition of young children ; and it is asked 
(p. 43) " whether, at two or three years old, they 
show a heart to love God supremely. Or if then 
supposed not capable of having correct knowledge 
of God and their duty, whether at four, five, six, or 
ten they generally show a disposition to love and 
worship God, or signs of cheerful, willing obedi- 
ence." It were sufficient to reply here, that this 
statement presents a wrong view of the question at 
issue, which is not whether we are by nature wholly 
or even prevailingly disposed to good ; but whether, 
as the orthodox doctrine of depravity teaches, we 
are ivholly inclined to evil, and all our affections and 
actions by nature wrong, and opposed to God and 
his law. It is enough, therefore, if I can prove, 
not that children are naturally disposed to love God 
supremely, but that they do not hate him supremely : 



19 



or that there is not satisfactory evidence that they 
do so hate him ; or even that they are not more 
disposed by nature to hate, than to love God, to 
disobey, than to obey his laws. All, therefore, 
that is said in this chapter of the character of chil- 
dren, may be admitted without prejudice to the 
argument. AH the indications of depravity, which 
are there arrayed together, prove only what Unita- 
rians have as little disposition to deny as the ortho- 
dox. I mean, that children have an animal as well 
as an intellectual nature ; passions and appetites to 
allure, mislead, and endanger virtue as w T ell, as 
reason and conscience to guide and restrain ; a sen- 
sual as well as a moral constitution, by which they 
are early exposed to temptation, surrounded with 
dangers, and liable to fall into sin. But we affirm, 
that these appetites, passions, and natural affections 
are not in themselves sinful. They do not consti- 
tute him a sinner in whom they exist. They lead 
not to sin only, but are the source and the elements 
of our virtues as well as our vices. They are not 
extinguished in the best of men. 

But there is further a defect in the appeal to 
experience, which renders entirely inconclusive any 
arguments that are drawn from it. A part only of 
her report on the subject has been stated, and I 
must now be allowed to supply the omission, and 
fill up the report, by stating what has been withheld. 
The experience then of every parent and instructer 
(p. 44) " who labours in earnest to teach children 
the things of religion, and to induce them to keep 
the divine commands, undoubtedly does find some 



20 



of their inclinations mighty obstacles to his success.' 5 
But lie is a most unfortunate parent, who has not 
also found in his children something to facilitate his 
success ; some docility, reasonableness, and tender- 
ness of conscience. If he has represented God to 
them, as he appears in his works, and is revealed in 
his word, in all the moral beauty and grandeur of 
his character, kind and merciful as well as holy and 
just; the benefactor and friend, as well as the 
righteous judge of men ; he has at least as often 
found them ready to love and obey, as to hate and 
disobey the Author of their being. 

But any conclusions drawn from what can be 
said on either side, as to the natural disposition to 
love God, will be to little purpose, for want of a 
conception or idea of God, upon which the argu- 
ment is to proceed, that is common to us both ; 
since it is not the word God, but the idea annexed 
to that word, that is the subject of consideration. 
By the Unitarian it will be regarded as no proof of 
native depravity, if, instead of admiring and loving, 
the child is shocked at the character and attributes 
of God, as they would be presented to its mind in a 
statement of the Calvinistic doctrine. On the other 
hand, by the Calvinist, it will be regarded as no 
proof of aright disposition and good moral tendency, 
though the child should approve and love God as soon 
as it is made acquainted with his character, as he is 
represented by the Unitarian doctrine. The reason 
in each case is obvious. The great question at issue 
between us is, whether this or that is the true repre- 
sentation of the divine character. We must have 



21 



recourse, therefore, to other topics of reasoning, and 
to other marks of a right or wrong moral dispo- 
sition and early tendency. And I know not how 7 a 
fairer view of the subject is to be presented, than by 
a comparison of what is said by Dr. Woods 
(pp. 45, 46) respecting the disposition of children to 
falsehood, pride, envy, wrath, revenge, selfishness, 
with what was said by me, in my former publication, 
of the early manifestations of the opposite disposi- 
tions and opposite traits of character ; bearing in 
mind, as you proceed in the comparison, the design 
of the argument on each side. On my side it was 
to prove, not that man is by nature holy, but only 
that he is innocent, not totally depraved, and not 
more inclined by nature to vice than to virtue. On 
the part of Dr. Woods, it was to establish the doc- 
trine of universal and total native depravity ; the 
inclinations^ affections, and actions by nature wholly 
wrong. Yet, though he declares this universal, 
unconquerable bias to the pleasures of sin (p. 44) to 
be a truth written as with a sunbeam ; he has in 
proof of it merely stated the existence of those dis- 
positions and passions in young children, which no 
Unitarian will deny ; and has neither shown them 
to be universal, nor offered a single consideration to 
prove, that dispositions and passions of an opposite 
kind do not also exist as early, as generally, and 
with as much practical effect. If then I have 
shown, (and it is expressly admitted by Dr. Woods 
that I have,) that amiable dispositions, veracity, 
kindness, good will, are characteristics of early life, 
I have proved all that I proposed, and all that my 



22 



scheme of doctrine required ; whereas his showing, 
that there is also, on the other hand, much of false- 
hood, wrath, envy, selfishness, in the actual 
character, mingled with their good qualities and 
good dispositions, is no proof of the orthodox doc- 
trine. That doctrine, as stated by himself, required 
him to show, that those bad passions and disposi- 
tions, of which he has given so vivid a picture, 
were immixt, and that the other qualities did not 
exist. 

Dr. Woods expresses his assent to the opinion of 
a late distinguished divine, grounded on his perso- 
nal experience in the education of children ; who, 
in a strain of bold and powerful, but loose declama- 
tion, asserts, " that in thirty years of attentive 
and anxious watchfulness of the conduct of thou- 
sands of children, committed to his care, he has 
seen not one, whose native character was virtuous, 
or whom he could pronounce free from the evil 
attributes he had just mentioned." Those attri- 
butes, from which, among the thousands that had 
passed under his observation, he had been able to 
witness not a single exemption, were these. They 
were, u rebellious, disobedient, unkind, wrathful, 
and revengeful. All were proud, ambitious, vain, 
and universally selfish. All of them were destitute 
of piety to God. They neither love, fear, nor obey 
him ; neither admire his divine excellence, nor 
are thankful for his unceasing loving kindness, and 
though taught these duties from the commencement 
of their childhood, yet can be persuaded to perform 
them by no species of instruction hitherto de- 



23 



vised."* Such is the black picture of the youthful 
character given us by one of our most distinguished 
orthodox divines, and which meets the unqualified 
approbation of Dr. Woods. 

An argument drawn from personal experience is 
most properly and satisfactorily answered by an 
appeal to experience. And in no case, I should 
think, could the appeal be more safely made, than 
in the present. Every one has had more or less 
opportunity of witnessing the conduct and the dis- 
positions of children. Let the reader take a delib- 
erate view of the youthful character drawn above, 
and compare it with his own experience. Let him 
say, whether, from all that he has observed in 
families and schools, rebellion and disobedience 
have seemed to him to be the prevailing state of 
things, and unkindness, wrath, and revenge, the 
constant and universal disposition. Or whether he 
has sometimes seen examples of obedience and 
submission to authority ; and a friendly and oblig- 
ing disposition toward each other, manifested in a 
readiness to do each other kind offices, to forgive 
wrongs, to forget injuries, and to be at peace. 
Has he found pride, vanity, ambition, and selfish- 
ness so to predominate, as never to have met with 
one humble and modest youth ; nor one who was 
ready in any case to make a sacrifice of his own 
convenience, or his personal feelings or interest or 
gratification to perform a friendly or benevolent 
act? Has he seen not one instance of early piety, 
not one who could be brought by faithful early 

* Dwight's Theology, Vol. ii. p. 8. 



m 

instruction to Jove or fear or obey the Author of 
his being, to admire his character, or be grateful 
for his blessings ? 

The writer, who now addresses you, cannot 
speak of thousands, that have been intrusted to his 
care ; but he has, for a large part of his life, been 
concerned in the education of children and youth, 
and his experience has been widely different from 
that of the author just quoted. He has had occa- 
sion, as every parent and instructer must have, to 
experience much of the difficulty of giving the 
young a right direction, and keeping them in the 
right way. Yet, with all the strength of the pas- 
sions and appetites, and all the influence of external 
temptation, amidst much to lament and condemn, he 
has seen much also to approve and to inspire hope ; 
and though none are without fault, a very small 
proportion of those, that have fallen under his 
notice, have deserved the character given in the 
above quotation indiscriminately to all. It is not a 
little surprising that so sound and clear a mind as 
that of this author, should not have been led to a 
different conclusion, as to the source of the deprav- 
ity of which he complains, supposing his account 
of it not to have been exaggerated. We see in it 
a melancholy instance of the power of a system to 
mislead and pervert even the most powerful and 
upright mind. He had just before asserted, that 
6£ children in the morning of life are unquestionably 
amiable,— more so in many respects, than at any 
future period." How natural then would it have 
seemed, were there no system to stand in the way 



25 



of the conclusion, to have attributed the high 
degree of human depravity discovered at a later 
period, less to nature, and more to education ; and 
to have thought, that the amiable qualities, which 
appeared at first, rather than the unamiable ones, 
which took their place afterward, were the true 
characteristics of human nature. If, from being 
amiable and well disposed at first, children become 
otherwise or less so under the hand of instruction 
and discipline, it would certainly seem natural for 
parents and teachers to inquire how far so remark- 
able a fact is chargeable to nature, and how far it 
may be attributed to fault or defect in the mode in 
which their moral education is conducted. If they 
" find it impossible," as alleged, " to persuade their 
children to love, fear, or obey God, to admire his 
divine excellence, or to be thankful for his unceas- 
ing loving-kindness," they are certainly called upon 
to examine most seriously, whether the cause of it 
is not to be found in the representations, which 
have been given them of the character and govern- 
ment of God. 

4 



26 



LETTER III. 

Depravity not innate, natural, &c. Universality of sin. In what sense. 
Both sin and virtue appear early. Neither of them implies an entire 
change of nature. Both are in the same degree spontaneous. Virtuous 
dispositions not more easily eradicated than vicious. In what sense it 
is certain that every child born into the world will be a sinner. As 
certain that, in the same sense, it will be a saint. 

I am now to call your attention to the discussion 
in the third chapter, relative to the sense in which 
the words native, innate, natural, hereditary, are 
used when applied to human depravity, and to the 
propriety of their use. For illustration of the subject, 
examples are taken by Dr. Woods from several other 
dispositions, affections, or traits of character, to 
which the term natural is usually applied ; such as 
"the social principle, pity, natural affection, strength 
of mind, imagination, mental imbecility, peculiarities 
of natural taste, bodily diseases, resemblance of 
children to parents," &c. I have no occasion either 
to assent to the observations made upon these in 
this chapter, nor to call in question their correctness. 
It will be sufficient for me to show, as I expect to 
do to your entire satisfaction, that in their applica- 
tion to moral depravity, our author has failed of 
proving that to be in a similar sense innate or nat- 
ural. He has only proved, that certain passions and 
affections, and certain powers make a part of our 
natural constitution, which are the source and foun- 
dation both of virtue and vice, of sin and holiness. 

1. " The universality of sin" is the first circum- 
stance to which the comparison is applied, as a 
proof that it is natural. " All are sinners, every 



27 



child of Adam has sinned." This is true in the 
sense in which the phrase, all have sinned, is used 
by the apostle. But it is not true in the sense in 
which it is used as a proof of native depravity ; viz. 
as implying a character. There is no man that 
doth good and sinneth not." (Ecc. vii. 20.) Yet 
there may be those who were never habitual sinners. 
But with what propriety is he denominated a sin- 
ner, who has committed but a single transgression, 
or whose acts of disobedience have been few and 
seldom ; while his general disposition, and the 
general conduct of his life has been pure ? Will 
any pretend that a single deed of justice will 
entitle him to the character of an honest man, who 
is habitually unjust in his dealings? Yet no reason 
can be assigned, why a single sin should constitute 
a sinner, any more than a single act of virtue 
should give the character of a virtuous man. When 
it is said, 66 there is no man that doeth good and 
sinneth not," the meaning is, that there is no man, 
who is not a sinner in such a sense, as to need 
repentance and forgiveness, although the general 
course of his life were innocent and virtuous, and 
his general temper and disposition right. Now I 
may with the same truth assert, that every human 
being has something good in his character, as that 
every one has something faulty ; and that every 
child, as soon as it is capable of moral action, has 
some right affections and virtuous inclinations, as 
that it has some that are wrong and sinful ; and 
the former will furnish the same proof that he is 
holy by nature, as the latter does, that he is sinful 



28 



by nature. But neither one nor the other is 
proved. All that can be inferred is, that it has 
by nature that, which renders it capable of becom- 
ing either holy or sinful. 

2. Not more conclusive is the argument next 
attempted to be drawn from the fact, that " the 
indications of depravity appear early." Admit 
that they appear as early as can be alleged. Ad- 
mit, as stated p. 52, " that incipient exercises of 
sinful affection are among the earliest things, which 
our memory can recal in ourselves, or which we 
are able to observe in others ; w what will it prove 
to the purpose for which it is alleged, if the other 
things, among which these incipient exercises ap- 
pear, are affections of the opposite character ? 
Now I have shown, and Dr. Woods will not deny, 
that kind affections, gratitude, regard to truth, 
appear as early, as any sinful affections can be 
discerned. For the same reason also, that we may 
think it probable (p. 53) "that sinful affections 
exist in a lower degree earlier than they become 
visible, we have a right to infer, that the amiable 
and virtuous affections are in being in an incipient 
state at a period prior to that, in which we are 
able to trace their exercise and mark their effects. 
If then, native original depravity is proved by the 
one, it cannot be denied, that native original holi- 
ness is proved by the other. 

3. Another circumstance distinguishing that 
which is innate, or belonging to man from the first, 
and which is applied to depravity (p. 53) is, " that 
it cannot be traced to any change in the constitu- 



29 



tion of bis nature subsequent to his birth." And 
the whole reasoning of Dr. Woods on tbe subject 
proceeds upon the supposition, either that I had 
asserted, or that the doctrine which I advanced did 
imply, such a change. You will therefore be not a 
little surprised to find, that no such change in the 
constitution of our nature is either asserted or 
implied in all that I have said ; and especially 
when you perceive, as you cannot fail to do, that 
the very difficulty, which is so elaborately dis- 
played through two or three pages, lies not against 
the unitarian doctrine, but is actually chargeable 
upon the orthodox in its full force, and with all the 
absurdities which he has endeavoured to fix upon 
it. For it is a fundamental article of the orthodox 
doctrine, that the nature of every human being is 
wholly corrupt, and that all, who ever become 
holy, become so by an entire change of their nature. 
Now is there any greater difficulty or absurdity in 
the supposition of a change of nature from holy to 
sinful, than from sinful to holy ? And might not the 
one be accounted for and explained upon the same 
principles, which would serve to account for and 
explain the other? The latter of these makes a 
part of the orthodox faith ; but according to the 
unitarian doctrine, neither of them is to be accounted 
for or explained. 

The doctrine, which I have before stated, as I 
supposed, too distinctly to be misunderstood, is, 
that men are born into the world neither holy nor 
sinful, but with those faculties, affections, and 
principles, by which they are capable of becoming 



30 



either ; and that no change in the constitution of 
our nature is necessary, in order to their becom- 
ing either the one or the other. What we have 
actually to account for is, not a change of nature 
from original holiness to universal sinfulness, as 
you might be led to suppose from Dr. Woods' 
manner of discussing the subject; but the infinite 
variety of character, that soon appears in be- 
ings, who, at their birth, and for some time 
afterward, are apparently so nearly alike. We 
have to account for the fact, constantly presented 
to our observation, that those, between whom, 
in infancy, there is so exact a resemblance, as 
to their intellectual and moral state; as soon as 
they begin to use their faculties, should become so 
widely separated from each other, and distinguished 
by an endless diversity in the passions, affections, 
and dispositions, which mark their character. That 
the good and bad qualities are found so early to 
prevail, together and apart, in every different 
proportion and combination that can be imagined ; 
gentleness and cruelty, pride and humility, the 
selfish and the social feelings, sensuality, and spiri- 
tual-mindedness, the fear of God and sense of duty, 
and regardlesness of the will and authority of God. 
Now to account for this variety, beginning to dis- 
cover itself so early, increasing as the field of 
activity enlarges, as the relations of life multiply, 
as reason gains strength, as knowledge is extended, 
and as the passions and appetites assume new 
appearances ; we think it sufficient to assert the 
activity and freedom of man. By this is meant, 



Ol 

that in every action of life, after moral agency 
commences by the exercise of those faculties, on 
which it depends, he has the power of making 
either a right or wrong choice ; and that according 
as he exercises that power and uses the freedom 
it implies, he actually becomes better or worse, 
the good or bad dispositions are strengthened and 
gain an ascendancy, and the good or bad tendencies 
prevail. It is to this inherent activity, and freedom 
of choice in its direction, that we attribute the 
difference of conduct of persons in similar circum- 
stances, and the difference of character formed 
under similar discipline. This, and this only, we 
think, will account for all the phenomena of human 
action, and all the varieties in the human character. 
Without denying the influence of motives, or im- 
pairing their value, and the importance of enforcing 
those, by which men ought to be governed, we 
thus account for the fact, otherwise inexplicable, 
that the same motives have not the same influence 
over all minds, nor over the same mind at all times. 
This we attribute to a power, which the mind itself 
has, of obeying or resisting any motive that is pre- 
sented. 

But how is this variety of conduct and character 
to be explained upon the orthodox supposition of 
total native depravity ? Beings wholly corrupt by 
nature, inclined only to evil, all whose affections and 
actions are wrong, can exhibit none of this variety. 
The first good thought or right affection, — a single 
virtuous action or resolution must indicate an entire 
change of nature, and then every thought, and 



32 



affection and action must be holy. For, as by the 
supposition, a corrupt nature can produce no good 
thought or action, so a holy nature can produce no 
evil thought or action. Every individual of man- 
kind, accordingly, must be either wholly good or 
wholly bad ; entirely holy or entirely sinful ; right 
in every affection, thought, and action, or wrong in 
every thought, affection, and action. I ask whether 
observation and experience confirm this description, 
and teach us that such is the character of man ; 
or whether they do not present a race of beings, 
the best of whom are not without sin, and the 
worst of whom, we are not sure, are wholly des- 
titute of every good quality, and strangers to every 
good thought, affection, and action. 

The whole discussion (pp. 53 — 57) would have 
been spared, had Dr. Woods understood the single 
phrase, to which he so many times refers, in the 
sense, in which a slight attention to the whole 
passage in which it stands, and the whole scope of 
my reasoning, must have shown him, was the sense, 
in which it was used by me. It is scarcely possible, 
I think, for an intelligent and attentive reader not 
to perceive, that in asserting, as I did, (p. 27) 
" that veracity is the general character of children, 
until the disposition and tendency of nature has 
been changed by education, example, and circum- 
stances," I must have meant something quite differ- 
ent from that " universal change in the moral con- 
stitution of man," (p. 54) " change in the constitution 
of his nature," (p. 53) " change in our nature," (p. 
56) which is the whole foundation of the argument in 



33 



those pages, and without which the whole is to no 
purpose. 

If the expressions which I made use of require 
the interpretation which is put upon them, I can 
only lament having made so careless and incorrect 
a use of language ; but on the other hand, if the 
words themselves fairly admit, and the whole 
passage in connexion requires a different interpre- 
tation, I cannot but regret that my opponent should 
waste so much reasoning, grounded on a false inter- 
pretation. 

4. A fourth reason is assigned (p. 57) u for 
considering man's depravity natural/' viz. that it 
is spontaneous, like the animal appetites, gratitude, 
compassion, &c. which 6i require no laborious dis- 
cipline to produce them. Corrupt affections, it is 
said, are excited in children as soon as the occa- 
sions for exercising them occur. The feeling of 
pride, ill will, and revenge shows itself spontane- 
ously in their looks and actions." But do not good 
affections also, such as kindness, gratitude, and 
humility arise as spontaneously, as early, and as 
often? I am persuaded that the experience of 
every parent will answer, that they do. With 
what propriety then can the former be alleged as 
proofs of natural depravity, rather than the latter 
of natural holiness ? Why are not the amiable 
qualities as clear indications of something good in 
our nature, as the opposite unamiable ones of 
something bad ? That it is spontaneous, " that it 
arises of its own accord, before they have consid- 
ered whether it is good or bad ; is as just a reason 
5 



34 



for saying, that it takes away the immorality 
and blame-worthiness of what is bad, as that it 
destroys the virtue, or impairs the merit of what 
is good. 

5. A similar and equally satisfactory reply may be 
made to the next proof, " that moral evil in man is 
natural or innate, viz. that it is hard to be eradi- 
cated, and resists powerful means of overcoming 
it." For, the same may be said with equal truth of 
the good affections and principles of our nature, 
which are the foundation and the defence of virtue. 
If vicious propensities are not easily cured, and bad 
habits not easily corrected ; so neither is it easy, 
in many instances, to eradicate virtuous principles ; 
and they even triumph over the united influence of 
strong temptation, powerful motive, and bad exam- 
ple. Such is sometimes the natural love of truth, 
that no temptation of interest, and no motive of 
fear are sufficient to overcome it. Such the sense 
of justice, as effectually to resist selfishness. Such 
the power of natural modesty, as to impose a 
restraint on the strongest propensities, and to pre- 
serve innocence and purity in the midst of tempta- 
tion. If frequent and melancholy instances occur of 
children, who, with the advantages of good instruc- 
tion and good example, have yielded to temptation, 
resisted all motives to virtue, and all efforts to save 
them, and abandoned themselves to vice ; we have 
seen others, on the other hand, that have maintained 
a virtuous course, amidst strong temptations ; and, 
in spite of bad instruction and bad example, have 
preserved their purity^ piety, and fidelity uncor- 



35 



rupted. I cheerfully join in the appeal to expe- 
rience on this subject, confident that her report 
will be fatal to the orthodox doctrine of depravity, 
if we shall be as ready to listen to that part of it, 
which relates to what is amiable and virtuous, as 
to that which states the corrupt and vicious tenden- 
cies and propensities of early life. 

6. To the reasoning on pp. 59, 60, grounded on 
" the certainty that every child born into the world 
will be a sinner," whence it is inferred, that this 
certainty must have its foundation in the consti- 
tution of human nature, and not in any thing acci- 
dental to man ; the reply is short and complete. 
The fallacy lies, in the first place, in the sense in 
w r hich the word sinner is used, and in the second 
place, in a part only of the truth, and not the whole 
being expressed. If the word sinner is here used, 
as the designation of a character, and it be intended by 
the use of this term to assert, that the prevailing dis- 
position, the affections, thoughts, and actions univer- 
sally will be sinful, the assertion is not true. It is 
far from being an acknowledged fact, that all men 
are sinners in that sense, or that any one individual 
child will certainly be a sinner in the same sense. 
The argument proceeds on the assumption of the 
very point in controversy. But if it be only meant, 
that we can with certainty predict concerning any 
child that is born into the world, that it will commit 
sin, or will have some sinful affection, which may 
be said to constitute him a sinner in a certain sense* 
though his character be generally virtuous, then the 
argument is wholly fallacious. Because, as I ob- 
served in the second place, but a part of the truth is 



36, 



thus presented. It is as certain, that every child 
that is born into the world will have some good 
affections, as that it will have those, that are sinful ; 
and it may be predicted with the same confidence, 
that it will practise some virtue, as that it will com- 
mit some sin. It is accordingly, like each of the other 
arguments, of no more avail to establish the doctrine 
of natural depravity, than it is to establish that of 
original and innate holiness. 

In the concluding paragraph of this chapter it is 
admitted by Dr. Woods, as it had been virtually 
before, that kindness, gratitude, love of truth, and 
other things of a like kind are, as I had represented 
them to be, natural properties of man ; and it is 
implied that they are admitted to be natural in the 
same sense, and for as good reasons, as depravity is 
natural ; for he says, " when those reasons are 
given, we may see, whether the reasons, which 
prove them to be natural, are stronger than those, 
which prove human depravity to be so." My 
answer is, that it has not been pretended, that they 
are stronger. It is enough for my purpose if they 
are as strong. It establishes all that I have wished 
to maintain in opposition to the orthodox faith, viz. 
that neither virtue nor vice is innate ; that man is 
neither sinful nor holy by nature; that he is exclusively 
inclined neither to vice nor virtue, but is by nature 
equally capable of either. If, as the paragraph before 
us would seem to imply, all that the orthodox wish to 
prove is, that sin is natural to man in the same sense 
that holiness is, there need be no controversy on the 
subject ; and all that has been written might have 
been spared. 



am 
Of 

LETTER IV. 

Misrepresentation of the unitarian method of reasoning. Evasion of the 
point at issue. Depravity not shown to be consistent with the moral 
character of God. 

I now request you to proceed with me in the 
examination of the fourth chapter of the book before 
me, which is intended to show the consistency of the 
orthodox^ doctrine of depravity with the moral attri- 
butes of God. The author introduces his views of 
the proper method of reasoning on the subject, by a 
complaint, which it is necessary for me to notice, 
in order to remove the false impression, which 
might otherwise be received, as to the method of 
reasoning pursued by unitarians. Now I am not 
aware, that it is maintained by any unitarian, much 
less that it is, as is implied p. 62, " a common prin- 
ciple with unitarians, that a difficulty, which they 
are not able to solve, is to be considered as suffi- 
cient to disprove a doctrine supported by clear and 
conclusive evidence." If it be so, Dr. Woods will 
be able to refer to the book and page, where the 
assertion is to be found ; and he ought to have done 
it, when he ventured to make so extraordinary a 
charge. But he will be able to support the charge 
only by resorting to such remote inferences, as will 
enable one to prove any thing from any writing. 
The plain fact is, that the method of reasoning, 
stated by our author, to be that, which should be 
adopted upon this, as well as physical subjects, is 
precisely that, which unitarians have uniformly 
pursued, and on which they have entirely relied. 
They have always rested the question respecting the 



38 



doctrine of depravity, where Dr. Woods says it 
ought to be placed, on the evidence of observation, 
experience, and the word of God. " Whatever God 
has declared, and observation and experience teach,* 
must be unhesitatingly admitted as certain truth." 
But in ascertaining what is taught by observation 
and experience, there is room for inquiry, discussion, 
and diversity of opinion. It is not a single uncon- 
nected fact or phenomenon, that is to decide the 
question, the existence of which is to be determined 
by a concurrent testimony, and where there is no 
room for disagreement. On the contrary, so exten- 
sive, various, and complicated are they, that the 
great difficulty is to settle the question, what obser- 
vation and experience do teach. Nor have we any 
better reason for thinking, that it may be easily and 
hastily decided, in all cases, " what God has 
declared by revelation." The revelation of God 
is conveyed to us in human language, in itself 
imperfect, and liable to be misunderstood and 
misinterpreted ; communicated by imperfect men ; 
connected with history and a variety of other cir- 
cumstances, from which it is to be separated ; 
transmitted to us through a long succession of ages, 
and by means of books, which have been translated 
from one language into another of a very different 
construction, and in which it is sometimes not easy 
to be satisfied, that the same meaning is conveyed, 
as is expressed in the original. From these con- 
siderations, and others which might be added, it 
happens, that the question, what God has declared 
by revelation, is one that is not to be answered by 



• 



39 



adducing a single, clear, and decisive declaration. 
The answer is to be furnished by an extensive 
and close investigation. It is sometimes to be drawn 
from a comparison of passages, between which ap- 
parent contradiction is to be reconciled ; sometimes 
it is to be found in the application of rules and prin- 
ciples of interpretation to bold and uncommon 
figures; sometimes by eliciting the meaning con- 
veyed in references and allusions to things, of which 
we can now have but imperfect knowledge ; and not 
seldom are we required to choose betwgen different 
interpretations, where a slight balance of evidence 
only for one in preference to the other must decide 
the choice. 

It happens accordingly, that in making up our 
opinion what the doctrine of revelation is on some 
important points, its consistency with other doctrines, 
which are clear and admit of no doubt, must con- 
stitute a part of the ground upon which we proceed. 
This I believe is allowed on all sides to be fair and 
necessary. It is distinctly recognized to be so by 
Dr. Woods himself. Speaking of another important 
doctrine Of religion, (p. 163) he says, " I consider it 
to be one of those plain truths of revelation, which 
ought to limit and regulate our conceptions of other 
subjects, and / make it a rule" he adds, " not to 
admit any views of any other doctrine, inconsistent 
with this" Dr. Woods then admits, that in the 
case to which he refers, and I presume he will not 
say that the principle is limited to that case, the 
consistency of a doctrine proposed with another 
unquestionable doctrine of religion makes a part of 



40 



the ground upon which the doctrine itself is to be 
received. As the moral character of God then is 
an established point, about which there is no ques- 
tion, the consistency of the doctrine of depravity 
with the moral character of God must make a part 
of the argument, by which depravity is to be proved 
as a matter of fact. It is evident, therefore, that it 
can never be so proved as a matter of fact by any 
other mode of reasoning, that its consistency with 
the moral character of God can be assumed upon 
that ground* as not needing any further proof. 

With these remarks I now refer you to what is 
said in my second Letter to Trinitarians and Cal- 
vinists, and in connexion with it to the sixteen first 
pages in the fourth chapter of Dr. Woods' reply. 
You will be able then to estimate the elaborate 
argument in those pages, grounded wholly on a 
misinterpretation of the meaning of a single sen- 
tence, and which it is evident Dr. Woods himself 
suspected at least to be a misinterpretation, and 
which a fair view T of it in connexion with the whole 
argument in which it stands, would have shown him 
was so unquestionably. 

Towards the close of the chapter, Dr. Woods 
proceeds to offer some direct arguments to prove 
the consistency of native depravity with the moral 
perfections of God. But I shall endeavour to 
show, that all he has said is liable to one of the 
two following objections, viz. It either assumes 
for the argument that, which requires to be first 
proved ; or it proceeds by a palpable evasion of 
the point at issue. Thus it cannot be necessary for 



me to multiply words in order to show you, that, 
(p. 79) instead of leaving the naked statement of 
several suppositions, on the grounds of which it is 
asserted, that the doctrines in question may be 
reconciled with each other ; it behoved him to offer 
some proof of the several points, which he affirms if 
proved, will show, that the orthodox doctrine of 
depravity is consistent with the justice, wisdom, and 
goodness of God. For a single example, as a specimen 
of the whole, when he had said, " that man's native 
depravity is not in the least inconsistent with divine 
justice, if it be so, that man, notwithstanding his 
native depravity, never suffers more, than what he 
truly deserves for his own personal sins ; v he was 
bound to prove that, according to our natural notions 
of justice, a being created with a nature totally 
depraved, inclined only to evil, and incapable of 
having a good thought, affection, or inclination 
without an influence of the spirit of God, which is 
not granted to him, and which he can do nothing 
to obtain, and is punished with eternal misery for 
his sins committed under these circumstances, yet 
suffers no more than he truly deserves. He has 
prudently forborne to attempt this ; and the argu- 
ment is accordingly without force, being built on 
an unsupported supposition. 

Instead of this, assuming, (p. 81) "that native 
depravity is to be explained upon the same principle 
as the existence of moral evil, and that the proper 
answer to the question how either of them is con- 
sistent with the moral perfection of God, is the 
same all that is said in the subsequent pages is 
6 



42 



applicable to the question, whether the existence of 
moral evil be reconcileable with the moral perfections 
of God, but not to the question, whether the same 
moral evil, having its source in natural depravity, can 
be so reconciled. This is a manifest evasion of the 
point at issue ; and it is rendered complete by the 
author's constantly confounding together the begin- 
ning of sin, and its source and origin, as if they meant 
the same thing. Thus it is asked, (p. 83) " How 
does it appear that the moral perfection of God 
must necessarily preclude the existence of sin at the 
commencement of his moral agency ?" and again it 
is said, " when we assert that man is a sinner, or 
begins to sin as soon as he is a moral agent, we no 
more attribute sin to the immediate agency of God, 
than those do, who assert that sin begins at any 
subsequent time." 

Now the question at issue is not, as is here implied, 
at tvhat time, whether earlier or later, the com- 
mencement of sin may be consistent with the moral 
perfections of God ; but whether its originating in 
a nature wholly corrupt, in natural affections wholly 
wrong, and an inclination only* to evil, in connexion 
with the other doctrines of Calvinism, which subject 
him to wrath and eternal misery for possessing such 
a nature, be consistent with the moral attributes of 

God. Not a word, that you find in the chapter 
before us, reaches to this point ; nothing, therefore, 

which the sur-ject of the chapter required and gave 

us a right to expect. 

He, who will reconcile the orthodox doctrine of 

depravity with the moral character of God, must 



43 



show, that it is consistent with the justice and 
goodness of God, to bring into existence a race of 
beings capable of high degrees of enjoyment and 
suffering ; on account of the sin of the first of the 
race, to punish all the succeeding generations by 
creating them, not as he was created, holy, pure, 
with right affections, and inclined to good ; but 
totally corrupt, inclined only to evil, every affec- 
tion WTong, naturally hating him who made them, 
and all that is good, and utterly incapable of think- 
ing or feeling otherwise than they do think and feel, 
until a total change of their nature is effected by a 
mighty influence of the spirit of God ; to obtain which 
influence and consequent change of nature, they 
are incapable of contributing in any degree by any 
effort they can make. That this influence is actu- 
ally exercised upon some, producing an entire 
change in their disposition and will, causing them 
to love supremely what they before hated supreme- 
ly, but exercised in a perfectly arbitrary manner, 
not on account of any thing in them, or any thing 
they had done or could do to deserve to be thus 
distinguished from the rest of their race, who are 
suffered to remain, as they were first made, unholy 
and sinful, and to perish ; but by a sovereign act 
of election, according to which it was predeter- 
mined before they were brought into being thus to 
deliver them, and to leave the rest to hopeless, 
remediless and endless woe. 

If it is your opinion, that Dr. Woods has shown 
this in the chapter before us, you will be satisfied 
that he has done all, that he was required to do. 



44 



Otherwise you will perceive that he has yet before 
him a task, which he will find it not easy to accom- 
plish even to his own satisfaction. 



LETTER V. 

Native depravity not consistent with moral agency. Preparatory consid* 
erations. Improper and deceptive use of terms. In what sinfulness con- 
sists. How an innocent being may become a sinner. Definition of a 
moral agent. Course pursued by Dr. Woods. Adam's transgression. 
Quotation from Dr. Emmons. 

The question proposed in the Vth Chapter, viz. 
a Whether native depravity be consistent with 
moral agency," is one that is involved in greater 
difficulty, than almost any other that belongs to the 
calvinistic controversy. I shall prepare the way 
for what I „have to advance on this subject by 
attempting to correct a manner of speaking, which 
is very common, but which, I think, is calculated 
to introduce confusion, and wholly to mislead the 
mind. What I refer to is the manner in which the 
terms sin and holiness, sinners and saints, regen- 
erate and unregenerate, are used by theological 
writers. They are employed in theological dis- 
cussions in such a manner, as to convey no true 
ideas ; so as to express nothing to which we find 
any thing in existence answering. Your impression 
taken from the common use of these terms is, that 
sin and holiness are not only opposites, but oppo- 
sites in such a sense, that they can never exist 
together in the same person. And in conformity 
with this distinction, that all mankind are divided 



45 



into two classes, perfectly distinct and entirely 
separate from each other, viz. saints and sinners, 
the righteous and the wicked ; the former wholly 
righteous, the latter totally wicked. But you find 
no such beings actually existing. You meet with 
nothing in your intercourse with the wcrld, answer- 
ing to the images, that books have presented to 
your mind. None, on the one hand, appear to 
be so totally corrupt, as to be utterly destitute of 
right affections and good feelings, to have no sense 
of justice, benevolence, or truth, and to perform no 
good actions. On the other hand, in the best men 
you discover faults and defects oS character. None 
are so pure and perfect, that you see in them noth- 
ing to censure, no expression of the passions or 
affections, and no indulgence of the appetites, 
which is sinful in kind, or excessive and unreason- 
able, and therefore criminal, in degree. In each 
individual with whom you have any intercourse, 
from childhood to old age, you discover, not a single 
unvaried hue of moral character, but a mixture, 
in various proportions, of qualities exceedingly dif- 
ferent from each other. In none are the virtues 
or vices found to exist in the highest degree, or in 
the same degree at all times. Often the character 
of men, whatever its prevalent cast, is seen to 
undergo considerable changes, to be apparently 
unfixt and vacillating, the moral principle, sense 
of duty, fear of God, power of conscience, or what- 
ever you call that restraining and regulating prin- 
ciple, which should influence and govern the whole 
conduct of life, operating more effectually at one 
time than at another. 



46 



Now in all this, our experience is certainly very 
different from what we should expect it to be, if 
the orthodox use of the terms in question were 
correct; if, for example, all human beings were 
sinners, or holy, in the sense in which these 
terms are applied ; and it is by reasoning from 
those terms 9 as if the sense in which they are used 
was the true sense, that we are led to false con- 
clusions, and often from not perceiving this first 
error, are unable to discover where the fallacy 
lies, which has led us to those that follow. 

It may help us somewhat to recover ourselves, 
to recollect, that this use of the terms in question 
had its origin in the very system, which it is thus 
brought to support. It was not observation and 
experience, that first suggested the separation of 
mankind into two classes, so entirely distinct, and 
opposite to each other in a moral view, to be desig- 
nated by terms understood as expressing such entire 
opposition. The terms, indeed, are taken from the 
sacred writings, where they are used in a popular 
sense ; but it was that system of theology, of which 
the doctrine of total depravity and irresistible 
grace make a part, that suggested their application 
in a strict and literal sense. 

Now in order to discover the fallacy by which 
we have been misled, we must pursue the opposite 
course. We must begin with facts, as observation 
and experience present them. What we perceive 
in ourselves and witness in all about us is, not a 
single and unshaded character, but a mixture of 
qualities, dispositions and tendencies. In endeav- 



47 



ouring to trace these to their source, we shall find 
their proximate cause in several parts of our sen- 
sual, intellectual and moral constitution. Thus we 
find in ourselves, and in all human beings, passions 
and appetites and affections, that are continually 
prompting to activity. These have all some real or 
supposed good toward which they are directed ; 
and all of them have external objects answering 
to them, and suitable for them. Reason is also 
given us to be the guide of our conduct, to enable 
us to distinguish what is right and wrong in conduct, 
and to know what may be done with innocence and 
safety, and what is to be avoided as criminal and 
hurtful. And, when reason has performed her ofiice 
as a monitor beforehand, conscience is implanted 
within us, as a faithful censor, to approve or con- 
demn us afterward, according as we shall have 
obeyed or disregarded her direction. 

Now in the simple possession of no part of our 
physical or moral constitution is there any merit or 
guilt, any thing to deserve praise or blame. Pas- 
sions and appetites that are the strongest, are 
innocent as a part of our make, and we only incur 
guilt, when we follow their impulse in disobedience 
to the laws God has imposed in giving us reason, 
and in violation of conscience. This applies to 
every appetite of our animal nature even the 
strongest. To whatever degrees of guilt or misery 
it may lead, the appetite itself is not sinful. It is 
not eradicated in those, who are born to holiness 
and virtue. It exists in the most heavenly minded. 
The reason why it is sinless in him, and not in the 



48 



profligate is, not that it is different in its nature, 
but that it is subjected to restraint and a proper 
direction in its operation. 

It applies also to the strongest passions of the 
human breast ; hope, fear, love, desire, anger and 
hatred. Take any one of them. Let it be that, in 
the exercise of which more guilt, it is probable, is 
actually incurred, than in either of the others. I 
mean anger. In the passion itself there is no sin. 
It becomes sinful only by being voluntarily indulged 
in degree beyond what reason allows and justice 
requires, toward objects by which it is not deserved, 
or longer than is demanded to answer the purpose, 
for which the passion was originally implanted in 
the human breast. The passion is not eradicated 
in the best of men. It is only subjected to the 
restraints and regulations, which reason and con- 
science impose. The mere susceptibility to its 
operation in the good man and the sinner is the 
same. The difference between them consists in its 
being on the one hand duly controled in its exercise, 
or, on the other hand, suffered to break forth with 
intemperate heat, and in all the hurtful forms of 
cruelty and peevishness, rage and revenge. 

The same remarks apply to the principle of 
self-love. Though it may be a fruitful source 
of sin, and does undoubtedly lie at the foundation 
of much of the moral evil that is in the world ; in 
the affection itself there is no guilt. It is as strong 
in the innocent and virtuous, as in the corrupt and 
wicked. It is sinful, only when it becomes an 
exclusive passion ; when it extinguishes the kind 



49 



and benevolent affections, impairs the sense and 
prevents the exercise of justice and humanity, and 
degenerates into pride, avarice or ambition ; 
and leads to the formation of a character and of 
habits, from which the social affections and social 
virtues are excluded. 

To impart a moral character to our conduct, and 
render us praise or blame worthy in it, other parts 
of our nature, besides those that have just been the 
immediate subject of consideration, are to be taken 
into the account. As has before been suggested, 
there must be an understanding to perceive the 
effects of actions and their tendency, and that moral 
discernment, which distinguishes between right and 
wrong. These, as well as the passions, appetites 
and affections, to which it is their office to give the 
right direction, are necessary to constitute a moral 
agent, capable of good or ill dessert, and the proper 
subject of a moral law. 

Now in a practical application of this view of 
our animal, intellectual, and moral nature, in the 
judgment we pass upon ourselves and others, the 
result is, that we blame others, and are conscious 
of deserving blame ourselves, just in proportion as 
in obedience to the passions and appetites, we vio- 
late conscience. For conscience is the immediate 
law of our moral nature. Under whatever dispen- 
sation we live, it is equally the guide and judge of 
our actions. The only difference is in the greater 
or less degree of clearness, in which the rule of life 
and principles of judgment are revealed to us, 
according as we have only the light of nature, or 



50 



have also that of revelation to guide us. Thus, I 
have observed, do we always judge, in estimating 
the degree of good or ill desert in ourselves or 
others. We consider neither an ideot nor a mad- 
man as accountable for his actions, though either of 
them may act under the influence of the strongest 
appetite or the most violent passion ; for this plain 
reason, that being incapable of distinguishing be- 
tween right and wrong, he is not a proper subject 
of moral government. 

These remarks have been intended to "bring us to 
a just view of the nature of sin, and in what guilt 
or ill desert consists. It is not in any thing that is 
born with us, nor even in all, that we are by nature, 
whether appetites, affections, or passions. These 
are all alike in their native state, equally innocent, 
undeserving of either praise or blame, and con- 
sistent with his becoming either a virtuous man or 
a sinner, in whom they originally exist in any 
degree of strength, in which they are ever im- 
planted in the heart of man by the Author of his 
being. 

Upon the ground of these observations, and by a 
similar process, having ascertained what constitutes 
sin, and makes him a sinner, who performs the act; 
let us now proceed to inquire how a human being 
may first become a sinner. Let us suppose such a 
being in the full possession of the whole animal, 
intellectual, and moral constitution of man in its 
mature state. He has by the supposition then 
together with all the natural appetites and the 
passions belonging to man in their usual strength, 



0 



51 



the intellectual and moral powers of our nature in 
their full maturity. Thus constituted, he is placed 
in a situation to bring all his faculties into exer- 
cise ; surrounded by objects suited to the several 
appetites, and in the midst of relations in which 
there is room for all the passions to be called forth. 
Within certain limits, prescribed by reason and 
conscience, the indulgence of every appetite is 
natural and innocent, beyond which it becomes 
sinful. The same is true also, as respects each of 
the passions. It is possible, therefore, that for 
any given time, the directing and controlling power 
of reason and conscience may be preserved, and a 
being thus constituted and so placed by the Creator 
shall retain its innocence, and continue free from 
all moral defect. Yet it is possible also, on the 
other hand, that it may depart from the path of 
virtue and become a sinner, at any moment. For 
he becomes so by a single instance of a voluntary 
violation of known duty in obedience to either of 
the appetites or passions. By the first, though it 
should be the only instance of this nature, he 
becomes a sinner in such a sense, as to need 
repentance, — in the sense in which it may be said 
that all men are sinners, — and in which it is said in 
the sacred writings, that there is no man that doth 
good and sinneth not. 

It is believed that the supposition which has 
now been made is the only one, upon which can be 
solved in a satisfactory manner the great problem of 
the introduction of moral evil into the system ; and 
by which we are to account for the first sin of the 



52 



first man ; whether it were committed soon after 
his creation, or after he had continued long in a 
^state of innocence and moral rectitude. It will 
account also for the rapid increase of moral evil, 
and its spread after it was once introduced into the 
system. The exact balance and right adjustment 
of the several parts of the animal and moral consti- 
tution was then disturbed. One deviation from the 
right path made another more likely to take place, 
because, by a single act of criminal indulgence, the 
power of temptation was increased, and that of 
resistance diminished. The passion or appetite 
that triumphed had gained strength, and the force 
of moral principle was impaired. 

The descendants of the first transgressor, accord- 
ingly, commence their existence under circumstan- 
ces of increased liability to sin, and greater difficulty 
of preserving their innocency, and retaining their 
moral uprightness ; not because of any change of 
their nature from what it was originally, but on 
account of a difference in the external circum- 
stances, under which they come into the world. 
Example is added to the influences w 7 hich existed 
before. Occasions of sin are multiplied, and 
inducements to it are increased and strengthened. 
Hence, though the moral constitution of man were 
by nature the same in all the descendants of Adam, 
that it was originally in him, any individual of his 
posterity will be far more likely, than he was, to 
lose the innocence and moral uprightness in which 
he was created, insomuch that without supposing 
any inherent native depravity, as the cause, there 



53 



may be what we term a moral certainty respecting 
any child that is born into the world, that if it live 
to become a moral and accountable being, it will 
become a sinner ; that is, it will commit sin, de- 
serve punishment, and stand in need of repentance 
and forgiveness. 

But how different is this from his becoming a 
sinner in the orthodox sense of the word, wholly 
inclined to evil, and all his affections and actions 
wrong and sinful ! As I use the word here, and as 
I would be understood in using the phrase, all men 
are sinners ; the meaning is, one who has committed 
sin, who needs divine forgiveness, but whose affec- 
tions and thoughts and actions may yet be generally 
and habitually right. 

By a single voluntary indulgence of a wrong 
affection, according to the scheme for which I con- 
tend, a man becomes a sinner.* A single right 
affection, according to that of my opponents, ren- 
ders him a saint. It will be a question of serious 
import with every one, whose estimate of the 
human character is drawn from observation and 
experience, and not formed upon system and 
hypothesis, whether there ever existed in the world 
a sinner, answering to the orthodox definition of 
the word. 

* Experience has taught me the necessity of guarding against being 
misunderstood. The reader, therefore, who perceives an apparent con- 
tradiction between what is here said, with what he finds on p. 27, is 
requested to read that passage with sufficient attention to perceive, that 
I make a distinction between a habitual sinner and one who, though 
prevailingly virtuous, is so far a sinner as to need pardon, and that it is 
in compliance with usage, and not as being strictly correct, that I apply 
the term in the latter sense. 



54 



With the views, which have now been stated, in 
our minds, let us pass in review the reasoning of 
Dr. Woods in the chapter under consideration, and 
take notice of his exceptions to what I had said on 
the subject in my former publication. 

The inquiry, "whether the orthodox doctrine 
of depravity be inconsistent with moral agency," 
is very properly introduced by the definition of a 
moral agent, which is, that " a moral agent is one 
who acts under a moral law, and is accountable for 
his actions." To this definition, for the purpose 
of the present inquiry, I make no objection. But 
as the doctrine of depravity is charged with being 
inconsistent with moral agency, and it was his 
professed design to meet this charge, it was natur- 
ally to have been expected, that he would proceed 
directly from the definition, to the statement of the 
argument which was to prove, that, thus defined, 
the doctrine of depravity, as held by the orthodox, 
was not inconsistent with it. The course which he 
has actually pursued, however, is somewhat dif- 
ferent. 

His first step is, pp. 86, 87, to represent me, 
in admitting that men are capable of sin, and may 
be actually the subjects of sin, as soon as they are 
moral agents ; and that they are moral agents by 
their natural birth ; as implying all that is neces- 
sary to establish the doctrine of natural depravity.* 

* You will observe that he does not pretend, that it establishes the 
consistency of natural depravity with moral agency, which is the point 
here in question, but only the fact of its existence, that is, that mankind 
are naturally depraved. 



55 



But the slightest attention to my argument, 
when I said what implied, that men are moral 
agents by their birth, will show my meaning to 
have been, that by their natural birth they possess 
the powers and faculties, which are requisite to 
moral agency. How soon they are so far devel- 
oped, and actually come into exercise as to render 
him, who thus possesses them, accountable for his 
actions, it was no part of my design to decide. 
But, if the account which I have just given of the 
manner in which an innocent person may become a 
sinner be correct, you will perceive, that at what- 
ever period it takes place, though its very first act 
should be a sinful one, it will prove nothing respect- 
ing natural depravity. 

I have no hesitation in acceding to what the 
author says in the next paragraph ; that (( men 
must be really as capable of sin at the commence- 
ment of their moral existence, as at any subsequent 
period." They undoubtedly are so ; and for the 
same reason also, they are equally capable of holiness. 

Our author next proceeds (pp. 88, 89) to a rep- 
resentation of the gradual development of the infant 
faculties, and the gradual process by w 7 hich, from 
the smallest beginnings, the children, in whom 
this takes place, become moral and accountable 
beings ; in which, as far as it goes, I fully con- 
cur. " In early childhood," he says, " there 
is a small and almost imperceptible beginning 
of sinful affection, a beginning exactly corres- 
ponding to the feeble dawn of reason and con- 
seience, and the incipient state of moral agency. 



56 



After this, sinful affection and action gradually 
increase with the increasing strength of the intel- 
lectual and moral faculties, till they rise to their 
ultimate state. " This, I observe, expresses in my 
apprehension, as far as it goes, the exact truth. 
It only required, in order to express the whole 
truth, that he should have added, that holy affec- 
tion and virtuous action gradually increase in the 
same manner, and by the same laws. But how will 
the account he has here given consist with the ortho- 
dox doctrine of tbtal native depravity ? If we are by- 
nature totally depraved, inclined wholly to evil,every 
affection and action wrong ; what room is there for 
becoming more and more sinful ? Wholly sinful at 
first, any change to which we were subject, it would 
seem, must be to a less sinful state, since it is im- 
possible it should be to one more so. Besides, all 
this you perceive also relates to the existence of 
natural depravity only, and not to its consistency 
with moral agency. 

The writer next proceeds, by an elaborate dis- 
cussion running through twenty pages, to show, 
not what the question which he had proposed at , 
the head of the chapter required, viz. " that de- 
pravity is not inconsistent with moral agency but 
a very different thing, and one that has no neces- 
sary connexion with it, that is, that in denying 
native depravity, and attempting to account for 
the existence of moral evil without it, I am charge- 
able with the absurdity of making sin the cause of 
itself, accounting for the first act of s^n by a pre- 
ceding sinful act ; or else of referring it to a cause 



57 



not sinful, and thus making holiness the cause of 
sin ; a bad action to flow from a good disposition. 
Whether any such absurdity is involved in my 
manner of accounting for the existence of moral 
evil, and its commencement in the individual sinner, 
I am ready to submit to your judgment, referring 
you only to what I have before said on the subject, 
together with the account which you find in the 
beginning of this Letter; where I endeavour to 
show, in what manner sin may have been first intro- 
duced, and an individual person, originally innocent, 
may become a sinner. If that is admitted to be a 
rational and satisfactory account, the charge which 
I refer to, and the whole passage in which it is con- 
tained, require no further answer. 

But besides that no part of the reasoning, in the 
chapter under consideration, is directed to the 
point, which was formally announced at the begin- 
ning of it, as the subject of inquiry ; the conclusions 
toward which it actually tended, and which it was 
designed to establish, you will perceive, the author 
has completely overthrown in his last paragraph. 
For we there (p. 110) meet with the following con- 
cession, as creditable to the frankness and honesty 
of the writer, as it is fatal to the only argument, 
which is of any weight in support of the main 
doctrine in question. " I frankly acknowledge," 
he says, " that the occurrence of sin in Adam, who 
is admitted on both sides to have been sinless at 
first, does invalidate the argument of the orthodox, 
so far as they have attempted to prove the native 
depravity of man from the naked fact, that they al! 
8 



•58 



commit sin. For if an individual, the parent of our 
race, may change from native innocence to sin, we 
could not by our own reason certainly determine, 
that it would be impossible for the whole race to 
change in like manner." Let me now request you, 
with the passage just quoted fresh in your mind, to 
turn back and reperuse the whole preceding dis- 
cussion. You find a large portion of the chapter is 
employed in exposing the absurdity of the supposi- 
tion, that sin can possibly arise from any thing, but 
a previous sinful disposition. Yet it is admitted 
that Adam had no such previous sinful disposition. 
It is asserted (p. 93) that, " according to the settled 
constitution of human nature, no motives, no exer- 
cise of the mind, no occasions can ever produce a 
new moral disposition or affection, that is to say, 
one which does not in some way already belong to 
the mind." Yet in Adam a new affection and dis- 
position was produced, opposite entirely to any, 
that had existed before. It is again asserted (p. 98) 
that, " if you would account for the origin of moral 
evil in man, you must account for the wrong dispo- 
sition or sinfulness of heart, which is just as evi- 
dently presupposed in every particular act and 
every mode of sinning, as goodness of disposition 
is presupposed in every act of obedience, or as the 
principle of gravitation is presupposed in every 
instance, in which a stone falls to the earth. " My 
position is," he adds, " that men have this sinfulness 
or depravity of heart by nature, and that it is not 
the effect of any change they undergo after their 
birth." But Adam was holy by nature, and yet 



59 



became a sinner. And Dr. Woods has not informed 
us how he came by that previous sinfulness of 
heart, which is so evidently presupposed in the 
first sin he committed. Besides, if goodness, as 
stated above, is presupposed in every act of obe- 
dience, there is, according to Dr. Woods' own 
principles, the same evidence that men are good 
by nature, as that they are sinful by nature, 
that they have naturally right dispositions, as 
that they have those, which are wrong ; for he 
admits some of the virtues to be characteris- 
tics of early life, and here we are told, that good 
actions must proceed and can proceed only from 
good disposition, that the good must exist in nature, 
before it can exist in act, so that, to obey the law, 
by the exercise of kindness, gratitude, and the 
practice of truth, presupposes a goodness of dispo- 
sition, or a right tendency of nature. It as certainly 
presupposes a holy nature, as bad affections or 
actions presuppose a corrupt nature, or as the fall 
of any individual stone presupposes gravity. 

But it is said, (p. 112) " It is as true of Adam, 
as of any other man, that every sinful volition and 
act of his presupposed a sinful disposition, and 
must have arisen from it. And the first existence 
of that sinful disposition in his case is a fact, as 
hard to be accounted for, as the existence of native 
"depravity in his posterity." It is to be presumed 
then, that in Dr. Woods' opinion, it is to be ac- 
counted for in the same way, as far as the circum- 
stances of the case will admit. Nor do I perceive 
any reasonable grounds of objection, or that it can 



60 



be better accounted for in any other way. I can 
see no greater difficulty in the one case, than in the 
other. The only difference is, that God is sup- 
posed to bring all the posterity of Adam into being 
at first with a nature wholly depraved, entirely 
hostile to himself and his laws, and with inclina- 
tions and affections wholly wrong; whereas he 
made Adam at first holy, with a nature and dispo- 
sition tending only to good, but changed his nature 
afterward, and gave him a disposition to evil. 
For according to all the reasoning in this book, and 
several express declarations in the chapter under 
consideration, it is a manifest contradiction, and 
the greatest absurdity possible, to suppose that 
Adam, with a nature entirely holy, could do any 
thing himself to change that nature, or, until it was 
changed, could possibly commit a single sin. For 
a single sin implies a previous sinful disposition. 
To make him a sinner then, after he had been 
created at first holy, must have been an immediate 
act of God. An exertion of the same Almighty 
power is implied in it, as was required in making 
all his descendants originally sinners, that is, with 
a nature wholly depraved. The nature of the one, 
as well as of the other, from which, according to 
the scheme in contemplation, all their sinful acts 
proceeded, must have been the direct work of God. 
Nor can I perceive that either of them is more or 
less consistent, than the other, with the moral 
character and government of God, or with the 
moral agency of man. Yet Dr. Woods seems to 
have a secret thought, or an apprehension that his 



61 



readers may have a thought, that there is a dif- 
ference of some importance ; since he forbears to 
say explicitly of the latter, what he does of the 
former. It is an inference only, though certainly 
one, which it was intended should be made, that 
the change of nature in Adam from holy to sinful 
is as much the direct and sole act of God, as the 
original gift of a corrupt nature to his posterity. 
In coupling them together, however, and joining 
with them the case of " the angels, who kept not 
their first estate/' he chooses to say, " it is an 
ultimate fact in God's empire," although the whole 
preceding reasoning has proceeded upon the 
ground, that as respects the posterity of Adam, it 
is not an ultimate fact, but one which was to be 
accounted for and explained. 

More intrepid and less cautious advocates of the 
orthodox faith have not hesitated to declare explic- 
itly, what Dr. Woods has, with evident reluctance, 
allowed us to infer, respecting the agency of God in 
the first sinful act of the first man. Dr. Emmons, 
one of the ablest, and clearest, and most consistent 
writers, that has appeared on the side of ortho- 
doxy, thus expresses himself. " As all other 
methods to account for the fall of Adam by the 
instrumentality of second causes, are insufficient to 
remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have 
recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that 
God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in 
his first transgression. His first sin was a free 
voluntary exercise, produced by divine operation 
in the view of motives. k Satan placed certain 



62 



motives before his mind, which, by a divine energy, 
took hold of his heart, and led him into sin."* 
Again, u while Adam was placed in such a per- 
fectly holy and happy situation, it is extremely 
difficult to conceive how he should be led into sin 
without the immediate interposition of the Deity. 
It is in vain to attempt to account for the first sin 
of the first man by the instrumentality of second 
causes. And until we are willing to admit the 
interposition of the Supreme first cause, we must 
be content to consider the fall of Adam as an 
unfathomable mystery."! 

What Dr. Emmons has so boldly and distinctly 
said, is, as I have before observed, fully implied in 
what I have quoted from the book before me. It 
is, that the first existence of a sinful disposition in 
Adam, like native depravity in his descendants, is 
to be traced to the same direct, positive, sovereign 
act of creative power. The only difference between 
him and them being this, that a sinful nature was 
given to them at first, but to him after he had for 
some time possessed a sinless nature. " Each to 
be regarded, as an u ultimate fact in God's empire ; 
a fact perfectly consistent with the holiness of his 
character, and with the principles of moral agency" 

By the last part of the sentence just cited, viz. 
" consistent with the principles of moral agency" 
we are reminded of what purported to be the 
subject of discussion. But the chapter has been 
chiefly employed on the metaphysical argument in 

* Sermon x. p. 235. I refer to a volume of .sermons, by Dr. Emmons, 
printed at Wrentham, 1800. 
+ Sermon xii. p. 292. 



63 



support of the fact of native depravity, with scarcely 
an allusion before to its consistency with moral 
agency. Instead of this, the task, which Dr. 
Woods had assigned himself, was, to prove that 
native depravity, in the sense in which it is under- 
stood by the orthodox, and was explained and 
defended in his Letters to unitarians, is not inconsis- 
tent with moral agency, as he had himself defined it, 
viz. " A moral agent is one, who acts under a moral 
law, and is justly accountable for his conduct." 

He was required, then, to show, that a being, 
created with a nature wholly corrupt, inclined 
only to evil, and incapable of any good inclination 
or motion, until such inclination or motion is pro- 
duced by an irresistible act of the spirit of God ; 
incapable of being influenced by any good motive^ 
so as to perform a single good action, until its 
nature is changed, which change can only be 
effected by the immediate agency of God, nothing 
that he can himself do having any tendency to 
produce the change, or to procure its being effect- 
ed ; that such a being is the proper subject of a 
law requiring perfect holiness, and exacting entire 
obedience under the penalty of the most awful 
punishments. He was thus to show, that a being 
may be justly required by its creator to do, what, 
in all the circumstances, in which it is placed, it is 
impossible for it to do ; and that it will be just in 
him to punish it with everlasting misery for not 
doing it. I say, what it is impossible for it to do, 
because Dr. Woods has laboured abundantly to 
show the extreme absurdity of supposing any thing 



64 



good to proceed from a corrupt nature ; 6i and thai 
a wrong disposition, and sinfulness of heart, is as 
evidently presupposed in every particular sinful 
act, as the principle of gravitation is presupposed 
in every instance of a stone falling to the earth." 
Whether this has been done in a satisfactory man- 
ner, and agreeably to those principles of justice, 
which we apply in other cases, the reader will now 
judge. 

The notice, which I have had occasion to take in 
this letter, of passages and sentiments which seem 
not to be very reconcileable with each other, might 
justify me in reciprocating the sympathy so often 
and so tenderly expressed by Dr. Woods. I can- 
not, however, apply to him the remark, which he 
has applied to myself — " It is a little remarkable, 
that in a free investigation &c. he should let fall 
expressions so contrary to his own theory, and so 
consonant to ours." So far am I from thinking it 
remarkable that some such contradictions, as I 
have pointed out, should occur, that I think him 
entitled to great credit for the dexterity with 
which he has managed to avoid them as far as he has 
done. That so much of irreconcilable contradic- 
tion appears, is to be attributed, not to any want 
of acuteness or of care in the writer, but to a radi- 
cal defect in the system. Whoever undertakes to 
support a system in violation of nature and truth, 
nature and truth will be avenged on him, by requir- 
ing him to entangle himself in absurdities and con- 
tradiction, and to adopt language, that is plainly at 
war with the doctrine, which he wishes to support. 



65 



LETTER VI. 

Unfounded charge noticed. Equivocal use of words. Difference between 
human nature and individual personal character. Exceptionable man- 
ner of conducting the discussion. What it is to follow nature. 

In the beginning of Chapter Vlth, I am charged 
by Dr. Woods with having wholly neglected his 
reasoning upon several passages of scripture in his 
Vth Letter to unitarians, and with having satisfied 
myself with repeating the objection, which he had 
there endeavoured to answer. It was certainly not 
my intention to pass over any argument unnoticed, 
on which any reliance was placed ; nor am I aware 
of having done it. Whether I have or not, in the 
present instance, it will be in your power to judge, 
by comparing the passage referred to in Dr. Woods' 
Vth Letter, with the whole of that part of my 
Hid Letter, which relates to it. You will indeed 
find the objection, which he had undertaken to 
answer, repeated ; not, however, as is intimated, 
merely repeated, but accompanied with reasons for 
considering it as an objection, that still remains in 
full force. 

I might be contented to rest the subject as it was 
there left ; but as it is brought into view again, I 
will pursue it further, in order to show, that what 
has now been added by Dr. Woods gives no better 
support to the doctrine, than what he had said before. 

I first call y^ur attention to the reasoning on 
pp. 115, 116, where you might not readily perceive, 
unless reminded of it, that the whole turns upon 
the equivocal use of the phrase human nature. 
It is there used, as if it were a phrase equivalent in 
its import to human character, which is assuming 



66 



the main point in dispute. The great question 
between us is, whether sinfulness is a natural or an 
acquired state, — a character which is born with us, 
or formed in us afterward. Is there no account to 
be given of that variety, which appears in the 
characters of men, but by attributing it " to the 
different circumstances in which they are placed, 
and the different combination of causes under 
which they act, or resorting to the supposition of a 
corresponding difference of original character ?" I 
expect to be able, in its proper place, to show, that 
there is another alternative ; and that beings alike 
by nature, and placed in similar circumstances, as 
to all that is external to them, may yet have an 
inherent principle of activity, in the free exercise of 
which, all that variety of moral character may be 
formed, which appears in the great human family. 
The question here is not, whether human nature is 
the same in all, or as different as the different char- 
acters of men ; but what it is, — whether totally 
inclined to evil,*or originally free from any greater 
inclination to evil than to good. The latter is w 7 hat 
we maintain ; and we account for the variety of 
character which soon appears, not by recurring to 
an original corresponding difference of nature, nor 
by the supposition of a necessary influence of exter- 
nal circumstances, nor yet by that of the direct and 
immediate operation of the spirit if God ; but by a 
principle of intellectual and moral activity in men, 
in the free exercise of which, with different degrees 
of attention, in circumstances in all other respects 
similar, they take different directions, and arrive at 



67 



all that diversity, which we see in the world. We 
are not obliged, therefore, to suppose, that " Pha- 
raoh, Jeroboam, and Judas had originally a moral 
nature as much worse than Moses, David, and 
Paul, as their ultimate characters were worse." 
That their ultimate characters differed so widely, 
is to be attributed to a difference in the use or 
neglect of their several intellectual and moral facul- 
ties, and of the circumstances in which they were 
placed, in which use or neglect they were vol- 
untary, active, and free. Their nature, as moral 
beings, was originally the same. Their nature as 
intellectual beings may, or may not have been the 
same. Probably it was not. Their circumstances, 
as respects the temptations to which they were ex- 
posed, and the motives of conduct, which were 
offered to their minds, may have been the same, 
although probably they were not in reality; and 
yet the moral liberty which each possessed, the 
power of attending or not attending, of choosing or 
refusing, of giving any direction to his activity, at 
every moment, in every stage of his being, under 
every circumstance of action, may have resulted in 
the entirely opposite moral characters, which they 
exhibited at last. With this view of the subject you 
will be able to make a just estimate of the force of 
the singular reply to the question I had proposed, 
by way of appeal from the opinion which Dr. 
Woods had before expressed, "Whether Pharaoh, 
Jeroboam, and Judas were, as he had declared, fair 
examples and representations of human nature." 
His reply is, " Yes, for had they any nature but the 



68 



human ? If they were not examples of human 
nature, of what nature were they examples ? Of 
some nature above or below it ?" Dr. Woods should 
have perceived, that in the whole of this passage, 
and what is connected with it, he is involving him- 
self and his reader in a mist, by confounding human 
nature with human character, and the nature of an 
individual with his acquired character. In all that 
was essential to constitute them human beings, that 
is, in all the common properties of man, Pharaoh, 
Jeroboam, and Judas were undoubtedly fair exam- 
ples of human nature ; but not in any thing, which 
belonged to their distinct personal character. With 
no more propriety can the unprincipled selfishness of 
Judas be mentioned, as a characteristic of human 
nature, than any peculiarity in the form of his body 
or the features of his countenance, by which he was 
personally distinguished. I might with as much 
propriety mention Moses, David and Paul, as exam- 
ples and representatives of human nature ; for, so 
far as moral character is in question, we have 
no more evidence, that they owed theirs to the 
special influence of the spirit of God, than that the 
others owed their opposite characters to a special 
influence. There is the same reason for believing, 
that in becoming pious, holy, and virtuous, they 
were acting according to the nature God had given 
them, as that the others were so in becoming impi- 
ous and unholy. The character of each of them, 
as moral or immoral, holy or sinful, depends on the 
fact, that he acted freely, and that the result was 
the effect of his own free and voluntary agency. 



69 



But I repeat, that the individual and distinctive 
character of neither of them is to be considered, as 
a representative of human nature. They are exam- 
ples of human nature only so far, as respects what 
they are in common with all men. And this ex- 
tends not to their individual character, but is con- 
fined to faculties, passions, and affections, which 
exist alike in all. 

You will be able also to estimate the real value of 
the strain of popular eloquence, which runs through 
some following pages, and is employed in a lively 
description of the manner, in which the sentiments I 
had expressed must affect the use and application of 
historical facts and descriptions, as lessons of general 
instruction. Nothing is more easy, than thus to 
turn an adversary's argument or opinion into ridicule 
by a broad caricature. And I know not how the 
ridicule can in any case be more fairly repelled, 
than by showing, how a similar strain of irony and 
sarcasm may be applied to the opposite sentiment 
on the same subject. 

The occasion of the passage, to which I refer, 
was my maintaining in opposition to an assertion of 
Dr. Woods, that men of the most wicked and 
abandoned character are not to be considered as 
fair representatives of human nature. The reasons 
are, in the first place, that they are exceptions from 
the general character of men, rather than examples 
of it ; and in the next, that their wickedness is no 
part of that nature, which they have in common 
with all ; but what they have acquired, and by 
which, as being personal to them, they have become 



70 



distinguished from all the rest of their race. The 
position maintained by Dr. Woods in opposition to 
this, converts the whole race of men in all ages, 
and of every region of the earth, into one undis- 
tinguished mass of corruption and wickedness. 

Now, if this be the true account of human nature, 
how false, I might say, following the strain, and 
imitating the spirit of Dr. Woods, have been our 
ideas of the characters and actions of men ! and what 
injustice have we done them ! We have been used 
to think with great abhorrence of the character of 
Cain, and to reprobate the envious and cruel spirit, 
by which he was actuated. But with how little 
reason ! His character is but a fair representation 
of every man's, that lives. There is no man on 
earth, who would not have murdered his brother, in 
the same circumstances. There was no peculiar 
envy and malignity in him. Had Abel been placed 
in his situation and he in Abel's, he would have 
been the martyr and Abel the murderer. It was 
a great piece of inadvertency at least in the 
apostle John, and shows how imperfect a knowledge 
he had of the true doctrine respecting human nature, 
to single him out, as he has done, as a remarkable 
example of envy and cruelty. 

How strangely, again, have we been accustomed 
to misconceive, and how deeply have we in our 
thoughts wronged the characters of the unfortunate 
sufferers in the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah ! 
There is not the slightest reason for supposing, that 
they were more wicked, than any other men, who 
have lived at any other place, in any period of the 



71 



World. Every man in the world, unless his nature 
has been totally changed from what it was, as he 
received it from the hand of the Creator, is as bad as 
the worst of them, and is ready to commit the same 
crimes. That Lot himself was exempted from the 
general destruction was not because he was any better 
than his neighbours. It was not on account of any 
thing God saw in him, that he was distinguished 
from them. He was selected by an act of sovereign 
grace from the midst of a society, all of whom were 
equally sinful, equally unworthy of favour, and 
equally deserving of punishment. 

How unreasonable and unjust also have we been, 
in attributing uncommon degrees of depravity to 
those men, whose violence and tyranny have rilled 
the world with misery, and whose pride, and ambi- 
tion, and selfishness have brought ruin and desola- 
tion upon the nations of the earth. The Pharaohs, 
the Jeroboams, and the Neros ought to excite in us 
no peculiar feelings of disapprobation. They were 
no worse, than the very best of those, whom they 
oppressed and destroyed. David and Josiah, pious 
and conscientious as we have thought them, in their 
situation would have been as impious and as cruel ; 
and as great oppressors and destroyers of mankind. 

Let us have a care, too, how we allow ourselves 
to think and to speak of those unfortunate men, 
who, by our sanguinary laws, are consigned to im- 
prisonment or the gallows for their crimes against 
society, such as murder, or robbery, or piracy ; as 
if they were any worse than others ; as if he, who 
yesterday expired on the gallows for the twentieth 



72 



robbery or murder he had committed, was any 
worse, in a moral point of view, than the victims of 
his relentless fury, the jury by whom he was con- 
victed, the judge, who pronounced his condemnation, 
or any one of the legislators, who framed the law, 
under which he suffered. Alas ! the history of those 
wretches informs us, (p. 125) "not only what was 
in those particular men, but what is in human 
nature,— what is in your nature and mine." In the 
last robber that was executed, every man may see 
an exact picture of himself. 

There are exceptions, indeed, of persons, who 
have experienced a saving influence of the spirit of 
God upon their hearts, by which they are become 
holy, and are unlike and separated from the rest of 
the w 7 orld. But they are few, and scarcely requir- 
ing to be mentioned or reckoned in the account. 
At the time of the deluge, it consisted only of eight 
persons— Noah and his family, out of the whole 
population of the world. All the rest were entirely 
and incurably wicked. But great and universal as 
the corruption of the world was, (p. 114) 6 4 we have 
no reason to think it greater at that time, than at 
any subsequent period, whether we consider the 
description of their character, the judgments of 
heaven they suffered, or the circumstances of their 
case." The wickedness of the world then, was a 
fair example of what it is always. In the destruc- 
tion of Sodom, also, three righteous persons were 
saved. These formed the only exception to the 
most abandoned profligacy and corruption of man- 
ners. But we greatly mistake and wrong their 



13 



character, if we think that the Sodomites were by 
any means peculiarly wicked. They were but a fair 
representation of the character of mankind in every 
age, and in every country. The mass of that pop- 
ulation resembled exactly, in a moral view, the mass 
of the population in every other age and country,— 
the most enlightened, refined, and pure. We deceive 
ourselves, if we imagine, that our neighbours and 
friends, and the society by which we are surrounded, 
are any better than those of Noah and Lot. Their 
thoughts, inclinations, and purposes, are as entirely 
bent on evil, as were those of the antediluvians or 
the Sodomites. They need only to be placed in sim- 
ilar circumstances in order to be guilty of the same 
atrocities, which brought down the vengeance of 
heaven upon them. 

And with respect to the few exceptions there 
are to this universal depravity, into what mistakes 
have we fallen ! By a strange neglect of the true 
meaning of the bible, and design of the gospel, we 
have been led to suppose, that he, " who fears God, 
and works righteousness, is accepted of him and 
wherever we have met with men, who seemed to be 
pious, humble, conscientious, faithful in the discharge 
of the duties they owe to God and man, whatever 
speculative opinions they might hold, we have consid- 
ered them as entitled to our charity and good opin- 
ion. But with how little reason ! It is not what men 
do, but what they believe ; not the purity of their 
life, but the soundness of their faith, that will make 
them acceptable to God, and entitle them to the 
fellowship and good opinion of christians. 
10 



74 



Now the true faith, by which the orthodox chris- 
tian is distinguished, is the belief, that all men are 
by nature totally depraved, enemies to God, inclined 
only to evil, incapable of any good till regenerated 
by an influence, in which they have no agency and 
no choice ; that a part of mankind were from eter- 
nity elected to everlasting life ; that an atonement 
was made for those thus elected, without which their 
sins could not have been for given ; that they are 
made holy by the irresistible grace of God, and that 
all the rest of mankind are left to perish, that influ- 
ence being withheld, without which it was impossible 
for them to become holy and be saved. And as this 
is the true christian faith, how absurd to imagine, that 
any one can be a christian, who does not hold it ! 
Those only who do hold it are brought out of dark- 
ness, and have received the true and saving light. 
They are separated from the rest, and like the fami- 
lies of Noah and Lot, in their times, constitute the 
only exception to the universal depravity. The 
rest, however sincere they may be in their endeav- 
ours, and faithful in their exertions, however ami- 
able in their dispositions and blameless in their 
lives, yet being unsound in their faith, are not to be 
distinguished from the corrupt mass ; since with all 
their shining virtues they have no just title to the 
christian name, and if not to the name, surely not 
to the privileges, blessings and hopes of christians, 
holding as they do another gospel. 

I hope the reader will not mistake me, by sup- 
posing that I have meant the few last pages to be 
taken for serious argument. It is with reluctance 
that I have allowed myself so far to violate the 



75 



decorum I had intended to observe, as to adopt a 
strain of levity, which may be thought not perfectly 
becoming the gravity of the subject, and which can 
give very little satisfaction to the serious mind. I 
have resorted to it only to show of how little avail 
that can be on either side of a subject, which may 
so easily be turned to the other. 

I had asked,* " Why the cruelty and obstinacy 
of Pharaoh, rather than the meekness and human- 
ity of Moses ; why the idolatry, and unprincipled 
ambition, and selfishness of Jeroboam, rather than 
the piety, tenderness of conscience, and public 
spirit of Josiah ; why the single wretch who was so 
base and sordid as to sell and betray his master, 
rather than the eleven, who were true and faithful 
to him, should be selected as specimens of the race 
to which they belong, and the great community, of 
which they make a part." To this Dr. Woods 
replies, (p. 127) " that all these vices and iniquities 
are the natural spontaneous growth of human 
nature. They are what the apostle calls the fruits 
of the flesh ; of that flesh, which, according to John 
iii. 6. belongs to us by our natural birth ; while the 
virtues enumerated, are the fruits of the spirit, or 
the effects of that divine influence, by which men 
are delivered from their natural character, and 
made new creatures," &c. This answer, as I shall 
endeavour to show, is grounded on a misunder- 
standing of the phraseology of scripture in the 
passages referred to, and others, in which the same 
terms are employed in a similar manner. 

* Letters to Trinitarians &c. p. 38. 



76 



By attending to the use of the terms flesh and 
spirit, and the phrases, works of the flesh and works 
of the spirit, carnal and fleshly mind, and spiritual 
mind, carnal mindedness or the minding of the flesh, 
and spiritual mindedness or the minding of the spirit, 
as these several forms of expression, and others of 
similar import occur in the New Testament, it will 
he found, that they are employed not to distinguish 
what is natural to man from what is not ; but to 
distinguish one part of the nature and constitution 
of man from another part. Both of them are equally 
natural. There is a fleshly and a spiritual part in 
the human constitution, each of them equally a part 
of his nature, and recognized as such in the sacred 
writings. The one expresses his animal, the other 
his intellectual and moral nature. The former 
consists of the passions and appetites, which, ill 
directed and improperly indulged, lead into all 
sin ; and the latter of reason and conscience, which 
lead to holiness and virtue. The actual personal 
character of each man depends on his following 
either of these opposite parts of his nature. He is 
accordingly a bad or a good man, holy or sinful ; 
not in proportion as he has that, which constitutes 
his animal, or intellectual and moral nature ; but 
as he suffers himself to be guided and cont? oiled by 
the one or the other. The sinner is not one who 
has by nature more than others of that principle, 
from which all corruption and wickedness proceeds ; 
but who suffers himself to be led by it, and enslav- 
ed. The good or holy man, on the other hand, is 
not one, who has less by nature of the animal prin- 



77 



ciple, than others ; but who prefers, and follows the 
spiritual part. Thus the sinner is justly blamed, 
and blames himself, not for what he is by nature, 
but for what he has rendered himself by the abuse 
and perversion of nature ; and the good man is 
approved, and enjoys self- approbation in the con- 
sciousness of having resisted the influence of the 
fleshly, and obeyed the spiritual part of his nature. 

There is accordingly no more propriety in speak- 
ing of sinners, as being in a state of nature, than in 
saying that holy men are in a state of nature. He 
who follows after holiness and righteousness as truly 
follows nature, as he who indulges the sinful affec- 
tions. It is only the lower part of our nature that 
leads to sin ; the higher leads to goodness and 
virtue. The flesh, which prompts us to disobey 
God, is no more a part of our nature, than the 
spirit, which prompts us to obey him ; the passions 
and appetites, which war against the soul, than 
reason and conscience, which exalt and perfect it, 
and bring it to some resemblance of the author of 
its being. I know not, indeed, how a sentiment 
could be uttered, more unworthy of the Author of 
nature, than to assert, that the constitution of his 
moral government and that of his moral creation 
are such, that the vicious man may be said to fol- 
low nature, and that the virtuous man does not ; 
that the former is to be regarded as a fair example 
of what human nature is, and what it leads to, and 
that the latter is not. 

The truth is, and it is a most important one, that 
no man so truly follows nature, as he, who, submit- 



78 



ting to the guidance and control of the higher 
faculties and powers of his constitution, the intel- 
lectual and moral, obeys the God of nature, and 
rises to that elevation of virtue, to which those 
higher principles naturally conduct him. He, on 
the other hand, who rebels against reason, disre- 
gards the voice of conscience, and becomes a volun- 
tary slave to the senses and passions, may, with 
much more propriety, be said to violate, than to 
follow nature. 

Much of our language, and many of the forms of 
expression, which we apply to the good and bad 
conduct of men, is formed upon this idea. We 
speak of acts of cruelty, ingratitude, oppression, as 
unnatural, inhuman, that is, as what nature does 
not lead to nor approve, and what does not belong 
to the human character. A parent, for example, 
who manifests no love for his offspring, but treats it 
with neglect or unkindness, is regarded as unnat- 
ural. We think and speak of him as a monster ; 
not as a specimen of human nature, but as an ex- 
ception to it ; and we accordingly apply to him, 
not the term human, but inhuman. The same 
epithets we universally apply to him, who treats 
with cruelty his slave or his beast. We regard 
him as having divested himself of the attributes of 
humanity, and thus justly forfeited its name and 
privileges. Nor is this use of language confined to 
positive acts. We apply it to any remarkable 
defect of the feelings of tenderness, sympathy and 
compassion ; and we represent him as wanting in 
humanity, that is, in the peculiar attributes of 



79 



human nature, who can see the sufferings of his 
fellow beings without pity, and without a wish to 
relieve them. The crime which Cain committed, 
and those by which the Sodomites were distin- 
guished, have been branded in all ages, and in all 
languages, with the epithet of unnatural. It is only 
in the language of orthodoxy, that they are hon- 
oured with a more flattering title, and one which 
implies their being acts of obedience to the law of 
their nature; and he, by whom they are practised, 
is allowed to have the consoling reflection, that his 
conduct is what nature teaches and prompts. 



LETTER VII. 

Charge of inconsistency considered. Propensity to sin implies no guilt. 
Guilt consists in yielding to it. Proper ground of blame or ill desert. 
Consistent with a constitution fitted to he wrought upon hy tempta» 
tion. Consistent with the divine foreknowledge. 

In the beginning of the Vllth Chapter occurs 
another instance, in which Dr. Woods indulges in 
his favourite mode of conducting the controversy, 
by endeavouring to show that his adversary is 
inconsistent with himself, in some of the expres- 
sions he has employed. With careless readers, 
who look no further than to perceive that there is 
a verbal contradiction in the passages, that are 
brought in comparison together 5 and never give 
themselves the trouble of examining the subject, so 
as to ascertain, whether the apparent contradiction 
be a real one, this will pass for a triumphant 
advantage in the argument ; when a careful exam- 



80 



ination, would not only remove all appearance of 
inconsistency, by making it clear, that the meaning 
of the writer had been mistaken ; but show also 
that although it were real, and as great as it is 
represented, it would be of no importance to the 
argument. 

In the present instance, after stating the alleged 
inconsistency with his usual strength of colouring, 
he subjoins, with a commendable degree of tender- 
ness, " I hope the reader will not attribute these 
contradictions to the fault of Dr. Ware's under- 
standing." 

The import of an expression of this kind is 
perfectly well understood, and I am far from com- 
plaining of it, as conveying an implication, that is 
not warranted by the usage of polemic writers ; 
but it renders it necessary for me to restate the 
case, so that you may be able to judge correctly, 
whether it were the understanding of the writer, 
or that of the reader and commentator, that was, in 
this case, at fault. 

The inconsistency, with which I am charged, is 
this, that having in several places in my Letters 
said, " that men do not possess by their birth that 
character of personal holiness, which is necessary 
to their being christians," I do yet (p. 47) affirm, 
u that those, who are now born into the world in 
christian lands are, as the Ephesians were after 
their conversion to Christianity, saved, quickened, 
fellow citizens of the saints" 

Now, in order to make the passage last quoted 
inconsistent with the others, you will perceive, I 



81 



must be understood, as using the phrases, saved, 
quickened, &c. as expressing, that they were the 
subjects of personal holiness. I request you, there- 
fore, to turn to the page referred to in my Letters. 
You will there find, that I was so far from using 
those phrases in the sense asserted, or in any 
equivocal or uncertain sense ; that I was direct and 
explicit in asserting the contrary. " This language 
of the apostle," I observed, p. 46, u like much of 
that in the epistles, referring to the same subject, 
relates to men, as bodies of men, not as individuals P 
And p. 47. 66 The whole of this refers to the same 
thing ; not to tfie personal condition of individuals 
as such, but to that of the whole body of christians — 
made to sit together in heavenly places, that is, 
to enjoy all the privileges and hopes of christians" 
The question here, as respects the charge of incon- 
sistency, is not whether this is the true meaning of 
that passage of scripture ; but whether it was the 
meaning, in which it was used and applied by me. 
You will accordingly judge, whether, with so dis- 
tinct an exposition of my meaning on the very page 
before him, Dr. Woods was justified in insisting, 
that I did use the phrases in question and apply 
them, as expressing personal holiness. 

I cannot suppose any reply necessary, to the 
strain of irony and sarcasm, which, having been 
indulged through the Vlth Chapter, prevailed in 
the author's mind at the beginning of the VHth. 
I think it sufficient to refer you to those parts of 
my Letters, which are alluded to, in order to your 
being able to judge of its justice. 
11 



8t 

The author says, (p. 135) u I hope Dr. Ware 
will reconsider what he has written respecting a 
propensity to sin, viz. that the propensity itself is 
no sin, and implies no guilt." I have reviewed the 
passage, and find no reason for changing the opin- 
ion, which I there expressed. The sentence, as 
it stands in the quotation, accompanied with Dr. 
Woods' comments, may seem to you exceptionable; 
but if you will turn to the passage in which it 
stands, and read it in connexion with that part of 
the paragraph, which precedes it, I am confident 
you will think it expresses the truth. I think it 
possible, indeed, that in this case, there is no real 
difference of opinion between us on the subject ; 
and that the dispute relates only to the proper 
meaning of a word, and not to the correctness of 
an opinion. Dr. Woods and myself may annex 
different ideas to the word propensity. 

In the sense in which I understand the word, the 
essence of sin does not " consist in propensity, 
inclination, or disposition to sin but in yielding 
to that propensity, — in following the inclination or 
disposition to sin. This may be illustrated by 
examples. A man has a strong propensity to any 
kind of excess. He becomes criminal only in pro- 
portion as he yields to it. If he does not yield to 
it, but preserves temperance and moderation, he 
is reckoned the more meritorious, in proportion to 
the strength of the propensity, which he has had 
the virtue to resist. But according to the princi- 
ple maintained by Dr. Woods, he who feels a 
strong inclination to sin., though he resists it, is 



83 



more guilty than another, who, with less inclination, 
yields to it and commits the sin ; for " the incli- 
nation is the essence of sin, and the only thing 
which makes any outward action or any volition 
sinful." He, for example, who, with a strong 
propensity to intemperance, constantly restrains 
his appetite, is more faulty than his neighbour^ 
who, with a less importunate appetite for the 
intoxicating draught, yet allows himself in habitual 
drunkenness. The man also, who, with great irri- 
tability of temper and strength of passion contin- 
ually prompting him to acts of violence, yet holds 
himself under habitual restraint, and abstains from 
all deeds of violence, is, notwithstanding, upon the 
same principle, more criminal than another, who, 
of a cooler natural temperament, exercises no self- 
government, and allows himself in habitual peevish- 
ness, or cruelty, or violence in the common 
intercourse of life. A deliberate cold-blooded 
murder, also, may imply less guilt than a hom- 
icide committed under the immediate impulse of 
sudden passion ; and he who, at the call of false 
honour, coolly goes forth to dip his sword in the 
hlood of his friend, incurs less guilt than he, who, 
under circumstances of extreme provocation, is 
excited to a high degree of resentment and wrath., 
yet, under the influence of conscience and the fear 
of God, is restrained from executing vengeance on 
the object of his resentment. 

The fact is, that guilt or sinfulness consists not in 
temptation, but in yielding to it. This is as true 
of internal, as of external temptation. Now propen- 



84 



sity, inclination, or disposition to sin are nothing 
else, but internal temptations. They are no other, 
than modifications of the appetites, affections, and 
passions. But these, whatever be their strength, 
imply no guilt, until they are indulged in circum- 
stances, in which virtue requires their restraint. 
Thus a strong appetite for intoxicating liquor 
constitutes a propensity to intemperance. But he, 
who, restraining such appetite, is habitually tem- 
perate, though the appetite remain in all its irri- 
tating force, is in a high degree meritorious. 
Where there is extreme irritability of temper, and 
quick sensibility to wrongs, there is always a strong 
disposition to revenge. But he who is withheld by 
the fear of God from yielding to those irritations, 
to which he is constitutionally subject, and reli- 
giously abstains from acts of revenge, is not only 
free from guilt, but is even intitled to higher 
praise, than another, who, with cooler passions, 
and less propensity to violence, requires a less 
vigorous exercise of the virtuous principle to pre- 
serve him from excess. 

In the paragraph next succeeding that, which 
gave occasion to the last remarks, I am happy to 
acknowledge my obligations to Dr. Woods for setting 
me right respecting the opinion of Calvinists, as to 
the design and tendency of divine punishments. 
I am glad to be informed, that a sentiment, which I 
have sometimes heard expressed, and which, 
indeed, seemed to me to make a necessary part of 
the Calvinistic system, is generally disavowed by 
the orthodox ; and that they do " consider the 



85 



punishments of this life as disciplinary — as having 
a real tendency to reform the wicked, — a tendency 
which, in many cases, is effectual." 

But in the latter part of the same paragraph there 
occurs a singular misrepresentation of the sentiment 
I had expressed. It is said, p. 136, "We cannot 
accede to Dr. Ware's notion, that disciplinary 
punishment may be inflicted by a righteous and 
benevolent God, without real ill desert in those who 
suffer." Now, by turning to pp. 48 and 49 of my 
Letters, you will perceive, that instead of asserting, I 
expressly deny that there can be any just 'punishment, 
where there is no ill desert In the passage (p. 50) 
upon which I suppose the charge must have been 
founded, you will see that I was reasoning on the 
principles of my opponent, and upon those princi- 
ples, my express assertion w 7 as, that " suffering could 
not be inflicted by a just being as punishment." I 
admitted, that suffering might be brought upon 
beings, who had incurred no moral guilt, by way of 
discipline. Whether the term discipline was used with 
perfect propriety, is another question. But explained 
as it there is, there was no room for the most care- 
less reader to mistake the sense, in which it was 
used. What was the sentiment, that I meant to 
express, there could be no doubt ; whatever doubt 
might be raised, as to the propriety of the term, by 
which it was expressed. But it is with the senti- 
ment that I am charged, a sentiment explicitly dis- 
avowed by me in the very terms, in which the 
charge is expressed and on the page referred to. 



86 



With respect to the use which I make of the 
term discipline , as distinguished from punishment, I 
suppose it to be authorized by common usage. The 
term is applied in numerous cases, where it has 
no reference to punishment, and where no ill desert 
is implied. It is applied to all the means that are 
used in an army to produce military order, and to 
form the habits of the soldier. To all that is done 
in a place of education in forming the intellectual 
habits of the scholar, — strengthening his faculties, 
and correcting his judgment and taste. We apply 
the term discipline to all those restrictions, which a 
man imposes upon himself, his child, or his pupil, for 
the purpose of forming a useful habit, or correcting 
one that is hurtful, where ill desert and punishment 
make no part of the idea, and a moral effect no part 
of the purpose ; but a physical effect or intellectual 
improvement only is intended. Dr. Woods has 
doubtless often subjected himself voluntarily to a 
severe discipline, where he was yet not conscious of 
deserving punishment. Whv will he not then allow- 
me the privilege of supposing a discipline employed 
to effect some good purpose, where there was no ill 
desert, and where punishment could not be inflicted 
with justice ? At any rate, whether the distinction 
which I make between discipline and punishment 
be admitted to be correct or not, I must claim the 
right of having my words understood and inter- 
preted in the sense in which I expressly declare that 
they are used by me. 

At the close of this Chapter, the defence of the 
doctrine of depravity is placed upon a new ground, 



87 



viz. that it involves no greater difficulty, as 
respects the principle of the divine government, 
than the system which is opposed to it. 

The difficulty charged upon the orthodox doc- 
trine, which is intended to be removed upon this 
ground is, " that it ascribes human wickedness to 
the agency of God, and traces sin to that constitu- 
tion, which was given us by our Maker." Dr. 
Woods admits the difficulty in the terms in which 
it is stated ;* but alleges, that it is no greater, than 
is involved in the opposite system ; that is, that the 
opposite scheme, as really as the orthodox doctrine 
of native depravity, ascribes human wickedness to 
the agency of God. What he has said to prove this 
is what follows, viz. 66 Men's falling into sin at 
any period of their life is a thing, as really to be 
ascribed to the operation of their Maker, or to the 
constitution he has given them, as native sinfulness. 
For suppose that a man, influenced by strong 
temptation, at any time, fall into sin. Who gave 
him a constitution of mind fitted to be wrought 
upon by temptation ? And who ordered things so, 
that he should be exposed to temptation, and to 
those particular temptations, which prevail to draw 
him into sin ? Did not God know the result before- 
hand ? Was it not a result which naturally flowed 
from causes, which God directed and controlled, 
operating upon a moral nature, which he created, 
and according to laws, which he established ? The 

* Why he should call them offensive terms, however, at the same time, 
that he admits that they express the truth, and does not pretend that 
they express any thing more than the truth, I am unable to see. 



88 



question I would ask him to solve is, how, in such a 
case, there can be any blame ?" 

The question here asked, I hold myself bound to 
answer, and further to show, that it does not admit 
of an answer equally satisfactory, on the other side. 
I expect to be able also to show, that the simple 
foreknowledge of the Deity does not invalidate the 
answer. The question is, " how a being can 
be blameable for actions performed with a consti- 
tution of mind, fitted to be wrought upon by temp- 
tation, with things so ordered, that he should be 
exposed to temptation, and to those particular 
temptations which prevail to draw him into sin ; 
God at the same time knowing beforehand the 
result." Or, as otherwise expressed, " How can 
there be any blame in a result, which naturally 
flowed from causes, which God directed and con- 
trolled, operating upon a moral nature, which he 
created, and according to laws, which he estab- 
lished ? ?? The true answer is suggested in one 
of the terms, that is made use of in the state- 
ment of the question ; viz. 66 causes operating on 
a moral nature." To him, who is accustomed to 
reasoning on moral subjects and to distinguishing 
between moral and physical causes and effects 5 the 
answer suggested, I think, will be intelligible and 
satisfactory. It is by overlooking this considera- 
tion of a moral nature in man, and reasoning upon 
the subject, as if he were governed in his actions 
only by physical laws, that the discussion has been 
involved in so much difficulty and confusion. 



89 



The question may be resolvod into the following 
distinct propositions, in which the difficulty is 
presented in its full force, viz. A man falls into sin, 
under the influence of a strong temptation. It tvas 
God, who gave him a constitution of mind fitted to be 
wrought upon by temptation. It was God, ivho 
ordered things so, that he should be exposed to the 
temptation. And God knew beforehand what would 
be the result. Let us now see, in which of the above 
propositions the difficulty lies. 

It will not, I presume, be pretended, that any 
part of the difficulty lies in the first proposition 
taken separately. The simple fact, that sin was 
committed under the influence of temptation, I 
suppose, will by none be considered as taking away 
guilt, removing the ground of blame, or affecting 
in any way the reasonableness of his being held 
answerable in a moral view for his conduct. 

But God gaye him that constitution of mind, by 
which he was fitted to be ivr ought upon by temp- 
tation. I ask in what manner is the constitu- 
tion of man fitted to be wrought upon? If the 
meaning is, wrought upon by a physical necessity, 
and in a mechanical manner, there is, indeed, no 
room for praise or blame, and no foundation for 
moral distinctions in character. But if a moral 
influence only is intended, it will be otherwise. 
What then is the constitution of the mind in ques- 
tion, upon which temptation is to operate ? 

We are adapted to a certain state of being, 
and fitted for a certain course of action by a cor- 
poreal and intellectual organization, consisting of 
12* 



90 



the senses, and the passions and affections, on the 
one hand ; and reason, on the other, comprehending 
all the intellectual faculties. The senses, together 
with the several appetites, and also the passions 
and affections, being necessary parts of our nature, 
having each of them objects suited to them, and 
each in its original structure, purpose, and tendency, 
being directed to some good, must each, within 
certain limits in their exercise, be consistent with 
innocence and virtue. 

But in order to answer their design, they all 
exist, in their natural state, with such a degree 
of strength, that they may become the instru- 
ments or occasion of evil instead of good, to our- 
selves or to others. They may thus produce 
effects contrary to their original design and natural 
tendency, by being directed to improper objects, or 
to suitable objects unseasonably or in an improper 
degree. Still, whatever evils were.thus produced, 
and whatever disorders and disproportions were 
thus introduced into the system, no guilt could be 
incurred, and there would be no foundation for our 
being considered as proper subjects of blame, unless 
these parts of our constitution were connected in 
our make with other faculties, by which we should 
be rendered capable of perceiving the tendency 
and the moral character of our actions. Such 
faculties we have. To execute these offices, we 
have reason and conscience. By these, we are 
capable of knowing, within what limits the lower 
faculties may be followed, and when they are to be 
restrained 5 what are the bounds of right, and what 



91 



are the consequences of keeping within, or trans- 
gressing those bounds. We have thus not only a 
sense of interest connected with our course of con- 
duct, but also a sense of duty and obligation ; and 
we become the just subjects of praise or blame, 
according as we follow or neglect our light. This 
moral responsibility, however, supposes always a 
power of choice as well as a power of discernment, 
as to the tendency and the character of actions. 
It supposes, that appetite and passion are not irre- 
sistible. Were there no power of choosing between 
yielding to the impulse of sense and passion, and 
obeying the voice of reason and conscience, there 
would be no more room for praise or blame, as 
there could be no more just foundation for either, 
in good or ill desert, than in the clock obeying the 
weights or springs that are to direct its motions, or 
the ship following the combined action of sails and 
rudder, by which it is impelled and directed. 

There is then a power, not belonging to any 
piece of mere mechanism, by which man is rendered 
an accountable being. The influences by which 
his actions are governed are of another kind, and 
operate by other laws, than those, by which phys- 
ical effects and mechanical motion are produced. 
The appetites and passions on the one hand, and 
reason and conscience on the other, are not to be 
regarded merely as opposite powers operating 
against each other upon mechanical principles ; 
so that if you know the exact force of each, you 
can calculate with certainty the effect that will be 
produced. There is yet further, (and it is this, 



92 



that makes the most important point of difference 
between physical and moral causes and effects ;) 
another power to be taken into the account, — the 
agent, or being itself, who, being the subject of 
these influences, and acted upon by these opposite 
powers, is yet to be active himself in obeying the 
one and in resisting the other. 

Now an agent implies a principle of activity, — 
a power of acting — not merely of being acted upon. 
It is not like a pivot, upon which opposite weights 
are balanced, and which can exert no power over 
the weights themselves. An intelligent agent pos- 
sesses a pow r er of modifying the influences of the 
several powers, on both sides, by which it is acted 
upon, in such a manner, that with the same consti- 
tution, as respects the strength of the appetites and 
passions, and the power of reason, and knowledge 
of right and wrong ; and also in the same external 
circumstances of temptation, the course of conduct 
may not be the same. He has the power of choos- 
ing between different courses that are presented, and 
of yielding to the influence of either of two opposite 
motives, to the action of which he is exposed. The 
cause, therefore, of this difference is the moral power 
of the agent himself, or the power he has over the 
determinations of his own will. The same remarks 
apply to the next proposition also, viz. It was God, 
who ordered things so, that he should be exposed to 
the temptation. 

We have here then arrived at what I consider 
as supplying a distinct answer to the question pro- 
posed/ The sinner is to be blamed, and is con- 



95 



scious of deserving blame, though he acted under the 
influence of strong temptation, though God gave 
him a constitution of mind, fitted to be wrought upon 
by temptation, and though he ordered things so, 
that he should be exposed to the particular temptation, 
which prevailed to draw him into sin. He is con- 
scious, I observe, of ill desert, because he is conscious 
of having been not only voluntary in the sinful act, 
but free ; that he had the liberty of choosing or not 
choosing the sinful act, and the power of actually 
using that liberty by directing his choice to either of 
the alternatives. He deserves blame for allowing 
the wrong motive to influence his conduct, when, as 
a free agent, it was in his power to submit to the 
influence of either the right or wrong one. 

But can this be said with truth upon the opposite 
hypothesis ? According to the orthodox doctrine of 
depravity, the natural propensity or inclination to sin 
in man is irresistible, until his nature is changed by 
irresistible grace. The sinner, then, having no free- 
dom of choice, and no power of resisting the force, by 
which he is impelled by natural inclination, there is 
no possibility of his acting otherwise, than he does 
act ; and this impossibility is not that, which consists 
merely in the abstract certainty of the event, which, 
as we shall by and by see, would not affect either 
his freedom or his accountability ; but on a sup- 
posed necessary connexion between an appointed 
constitution of things, and the effects that are to fol- 
low from it. By this scheme, the sins of men are 
certainly ascribed to the agency of God in a sense, 
hi which they cannot hp ascribed with any propriety, 



94 

according to that, which I have now explained : 
and it is thus encumbered with a moral difficulty, 
from which that is free. 

But it may be imagined, that the force of what 
has* now been said is impaired, if not wholly 
destroyed by the consideration, that the result, i. e. 
the manner in which the sinner will act, is known 
beforehand by God. And it is accordingly objected, 
that if we admit, that the whole constitution of man, 
physical, intellectual, and moral, is the work of God ; 
that the circumstances of temptation, under which 
each individual is placed, are his appointment, 
extending to the particular temptations, which 
actually prevail to draw him into sin ; and finally, 
that what will be the result is also foreknown ; the 
difficulty of reconciling this with his being justly 
accountable for actions thus performed is as great, 
as upon the supposition, that he was created with a 
natural inclination to sin and sin only, over which 
he has no control, and which he has no power to 
change, nor can do any thing, which has any ten- 
dency to procure a change to be wrought in his 
nature. 

But between these cases there is an obvious and 
important difference. In the one case, a necessity 
is supposed as real and as absolute, as physical 
force ; in the other, there may be, for any thing 
that is expressed or implied in the proposition, no 
necessity at alt On the contrary, the powers which 
we have stated as belonging to the moral nature of 
man, clearly imply, that there is no such necessity. 

The, foreknowledge of God implies the abstract 



95 

certainty of the event foreknown, and it implies 
nothing more. Simply considered, it has no rela- 
tion to the means by which it is brought about, and 
does not imply any agency in it. God ? s foreknowl- 
edge of an event no more implies an agency of his, 
exerted in bringing it to pass, than our knowledge 
of its present existence implies our agency in it, 
or that we are the cause of it. Your knowledge, 
that I am now performing a right or wrong action, 
implies the certainty of the fact, but nothing 
more. Though it is obviously impossible for the 
fact not to be, which is thus known to exist, yet 
it is certain, that the knowledge of its existence 
implies nothing with respect to freedom or neces- 
sity in its performance. But it were as correct to 
say, that your present certain knowledge of the act 
I am performing gives you an agency in it, makes 
you chargeable with its guilt, if it be a criminal act, 
and relieves me from moral responsibility for it ; as 
to assert, that simply its being foreknown by God 
implies any such divine agency, as is not reconcile- 
able with moral freedom ; or that the agent, on that 
account, ceases to be a proper subject of blame and 
of punishment. 

There is another manner of viewing the subject, 
which may serve to illustrate it, and enable us to 
perceive more clearly, that the abstract certainty of 
a future event, which is*implied in its being fore- 
known, does not infer its necessity, or any such 
divine agency in it, as to render the human agent 
less accountable. It is this ; that upon the suppo- 
sition of that moral freedom, which I maintain to be 



96 



the true ground upon which man is justly accounta- 
ble for his actions, deserving of praise or blame, and 
a proper subject of reward and punishment ; every 
action of every human being is as certain, before it 
is performed, as afterward. Suppose men to have 
that liberty, which the scheme that I advocate attri- 
butes to them, it is as certain beforehand, how they 
will act, as upon the scheme of necessity ; that is, 
it is absolutely certain how they will in fact use 
that freedom. And speaking of it merely as an 
abstract truth, we may say, it is impossible that 
they should not use their freedom as they actually 
will use it. 

This is rendered clear and intelligible by consid- 
ering any action or event as already past. The 
murder, which was perpetrated yesterday, upon the 
supposition, that the murderer acted with perfect 
moral freedom, was as certain the day before, as 
the day after the deed was done. The certainly was 
the same, as if he were impelled by a moral or even 
a physical necessity. And if the necessity were the 
same, he would be as blameless, as the dagger, with 
which he performed the deed. I admit the consis- 
tency, while I abhor the doctrine, (and shudder at 
its immoral tendency,) of those philosophers who 
assert, that upon the principle of necessity, 4 it is as 
absurd to blame, in the common acceptation of the 
term blame, the assassin, as the dirk or pistol. Each 
was alike the necessary and the blameless instru- 
ment, and in no proper sense the agent, in no such 
sense as to be the reasonable subject of blame, or 
justly deserving of punishment. 



97 



In the just and important sentiment expressed 
with great strength and propriety by Dr. Woods in 
the concluding sentence of this chapter, I join with 
my whole soul. " The habit of attributing moral 
evil to God in such a way, as to destroy or dimin- 
ish its criminality is, in my view, one of the worst 
habits, of which the human mind is capable. It pro- 
duces alarming stupidity of conscience and hardness 
of heart, and leads to the most destructive fatalism." 

It is under this impression, that I feel the im- 
portance of establishing and rendering intelligible 
the doctrine of moral freedom both in opposition to 
philosophical necessity, and to the theological doc- 
trine of predestination ; believing it to be, notwith- 
standing difficulties with which the subject is 
confessedly encumbered, the truth. I feel the more 
earnest on the subject, because, however some may 
be able to reconcile philosophical necessity with the 
doctrine, that man is accountable for his actions, it 
does certainly lead many, and to me it seems by a 
very natural and just process of reasoning, " to the 
most destructive fatalism." This tendency of the 
doctrine is not assigned as a reason for rejecting it, 
nor for believing in the truth of philosophical liberty. 
Our acceptance of either doctrine should stand on 
its own proper evidence. But it is a good reason 
for examining very faithfully the evidences of a 
doctrine, which, to say the least, is not readily seen 
to be reconcileable with a moral and accountable 
state ; and for being willing to allow their due value 
to any considerations, which may be fairly urged in 
support ot the opposite opinion. 
13 



98 



LETTER VIII, 

Practical importance of the question respecting depravity. Moral influ- 
ence and tendency of the orthodox doctrine correctly stated by Dr. 
Woods. Moral tendency of the opposite doctrine. An incorrect rep- 
resentation of dangerous moral tendency noticed. Unitarian method 
of addressing men. Orthodox method. 

The discussion of the subject of native depravity 
is closed, in the VHIth Chapter of the book before 
me, by an examination of its practical importance. 

The practical importance of any doctrine is 
exactly commensurate with its practical tendency 
and influence. This is usually much exaggerated 
by polemic writers. Speculative opinions have 
generally far less influence upon the conduct of life, 
than those, who have employed much time and study 
upon them, as subjects of controversy, are ready to 
imagine. But as respects the present subject of 
discussion, I do not know, that the practical impor- 
tance of the question has been overstated. We may 
certainly expect, that opposite doctrines, which 
relate to points, by which the motives of conduct are 
directly affected, will have a widely difFerent influ- 
ence upon practice. We can hardly imagine, that 
a visible difference of character should not be pro- 
duced by the serious belief of the orthodox doctrine 
of human nature and the human condition, from 
that which is produced by the unitarian. 

The tendency of the orthodox doctrine I suppose 
to be truly and correctly stated by Dr. Woods in 
the following passage, (p. 141) 66 Those who seri- 
ously believe themselves and others to be the sub- 
jects of a native and entire depravity, must be 



99 



convinced, that a mighty operation of divine power 
is necessary to make them holy. They must view 
it as indispensable ; that they should be born 
again. Passing by human efforts, and all slight, 
common remedies, as totally inadequate, they must 
found every hope of moral purification on that 
energy of God, which gives men a new heart, and 
a new spirit, — which creates them in Christ Jesus 
unto good works." The tendency here attributed 
to the doctrine, next to its want of evidence, con- 
stitutes, in my mind, the most insuperable objec- 
tion to it. For it seems to me, that it must lead, 
on the one hand, to groundless expectations, and a 
false dependance, and on the other to the neglect 
of all moral exertion, and of the use of the proper 
means of recovery to holiness and the divine favor. 
For, to what course does the sinner find himself 
here directed ? Not to any exertion to deliver 
himself from the bondage of sin, and save himself 
from the wrath to come. Not a syllable is said to 
encourage such exertion ; but on the contrary, it is 
strongly implied, that all such exertion must be 
utterly useless and unavailing. The only hope he 
is allowed to entertain is in a mighty operation of 
divine poioer, which is necessary to make him 
holy. And how is he to become the subject of this 
mighty operation ? Is there any thing, that he is 
directed to do, or has the power of doing, with the 
hope, that it will be the means of his obtaining it, 
or that it will be the reason or the occasion of its 
being granted to him ? By no means. In grant- 
ing or withholding it, God is sovereign and inde- 



100 



pendent, and has no respect to any tiling, that he 
sees in the creature. No desert, and no effort of 
his, will make any part of the reason or cause, for 
which it is granted. It will be given to those, and 
to those only, who are, by an unconditional act of 
election, appointed to eternal life. Upon those, 
and only those, will that regenerating influence be 
shed, by which they are to be born again, to 
have a new heart, and a new spirit given them, and 
to be created in Christ Jesus unto good works. 
They are not directed, — they are not indeed per- 
mitted, to seek for this renovating influence, by 
which they are to be sanctified and saved, by 
prayer. For until they are renewed and sanctified 
by this influence from above, they cannot pray 
acceptably. Every prayer they utter as well, as 
every action they perform, is sinful, — an abomina- 
tion to God, and must serve to sink them still 
deeper in guilt. There is accordingly, in the 
statement above, no intimation, that the sinner 
feels himself called upon or authorized by the 
orthodox faith, to use any means, or make any 
efforts to recover himself from a state of guilt, and 
rise to holiness and virtue. The contrary, indeed, 
is too distinctly implied to be misunderstood. 
Passing by human efforts, it is said, as totally inad- 
equate, he must found every hope of moral purifica- 
tion on that energy of God, which is to give him a 
new heart, and a new spirit His hope then, and 
the only hope he is encouraged to entertain, is, 
that this will be done for him, and wrought in him. 
But he has no encouragement to pray, that this 



101 



may be done for him. It would be inconsistent with 
a fundamental principle of the system, which sup- 
poses him, until that renovating and sanctifying 
influence has actually been given, inclined only to 
evil, wholly wrong in his moral affections and 
actions, — incapable therefore of a purpose, or 
wish, or prayer, that would be acceptable to God. 
To pray then for that mighty influence, which is 
to renew and sanctify him, is among those human 
efforts, which he passes by, in the same manner as 
he does all others, waiting for it to be exerted upon 
him independently of all such efforts. 

I know that language very different from this 
was formerly held by Calvinistic divines. They 
directed sinners to pray, and called upon them to 
exert themselves, and to use the means of refor- 
mation. There are probably those, who do so now, 
not attending very accurately to its consistency 
with the speculative opinions they have adopted. 
Not so the author of the Reply. He understands 
too well what the system requires, to intimate, that 
the sinner has any thing to do, any effort to make, 
any prayer to offer, until this mighty influence has 
come upon him. All human efforts are to be passed 
by, until this has taken place. 

In thus stating the practical tendency of the 
orthodox doctrine of depravity, our author cannot 
be suspected of exaggeration or misrepresentation. 
Yet in my apprehension it is a tendency of an ex- 
tremely hurtful and immoral nature. Can it be 
otherwise, for wicked men to be allowed to think, 
that there is nothing for them to do, until some- 



102 



thing is done for them ? that no effort is to be 
-made, not even a prayer offered up by them, until 
they are conscious of being the subjects of that 
mighty energy of God, which is to give them a new 
heart and a new spirit? that the sinner should feel 
himself authorized to treat with neglect all the 
common influences of the spirit of God, as of no 
value, relying on a special influence, by which he is 
to be distinguished, and which cannot be resisted ? 

Let me request you to place in comparison with 
this the moral tendency and practical influence of 
the doctrine, which is directly opposite to it. 

According to the system, the tendency and influ- 
ence of which I wish you now to contemplate, the 
sinner is taught to regard his sinfulness, as consist- 
ing solely in his personal and acquired moral 
character. He considers himself as guilty before 
God, deserving of punishment, standing in need of 
mercy, and requiring to be renewed by repentance, 
and changed from sin to holiness ; not by the con- 
stitution of his nature, but by his voluntary viola- 
tion of the laws, which God had, in the constitution 
of his nature, imposed upon him. As the guilt of 
which he is conscious is only that, which he has 
brought upon himself by his own act or his own 
neglect, he believes, that his own act only can 
restore him ; and that he is not to expect that to 
be done for him, which it is his duty to do for him- 
self. He accordingly looks not for a mighty influ- 
ence, which, without his desire, or will, or effort, is 
to change his nature. He believes, that God has 
already done all, that was necessary on his part : 



103 



and that nothing is now wanting, but for him to 
exert the strength which is given him, and to 
employ faithfully the means, which are put into 
his hands, to do something for himself. So far is 
he from thinking it his duty, to pass by all human 
efforts, and indolently or presumptuously wait for 
that to be done for him, which he is commanded to 
do for himself, that he considers his guilt as greatly 
enhanced, and the more inexcusable, by every mo- 
ment's delay to make those efforts. He places in 
the fidelity of those efforts his whole hope of the 
favor and acceptance of God ; believing, that the 
consciousness of making those efforts will be the 
only reasonable ground he can have for expecting 
to become the subject of that change, which will 
secure them to him ; and that to pass by or neglect to 
make those efforts, is constantly to add to his guilt, 
to lessen the probability of his recovery, and to cut 
off the hope of final forgiveness and the acceptance 
and favor of heaven. 

Instead of undervaluing what God has already 
done for him, as being of no use, unless something 
more be done ; instead of neglecting that common 
grace, which is bestowed upon all, and consists in 
the means and motives of religion, and waiting for 
that special grace, by which he is to be distin- 
guished from others, and by which the great work 
is to be done for him and wrought in him ; he is 
grateful for the provisions God has made for his 
deliverance from the dominion of sin, and recovery 
to holiness and virtue ; he believes them to be 
sufficient for the purpose, — that nothing further is 

\ It* 



104 



needed, but for him to accept and use them ; that 
he shall be utterly inexcusable, if they fail to pro- 
duce the intended effect ; and that it would be 
impious for him to expect further assistance, while 
he continued in the neglect of that, which is given. 
He accordingly believes, that his salvation depends 
upon the fidelity of his own exertions, and not upon 
any thing, that is to take place independent of 
them, to which no prayers nor efforts of his can 
contribute, and which no neglect nor resistance of 
his can prevent or counteract. 

By comparing the state of mind, which has now 
been presented, with that, which we have before 
seen must be produced by the orthodox doctrine, 
you will be able to decide, which is likely to excite 
to the most earnest and faithful exertion, and thus 
to have the most favorable moral tendency, and to 
produce the greatest practical effects. 

I request you, also, not to be satisfied with a 
mere cursory reading of what follows in the same 
paragraph, from which my last quotation was 
taken, p. 141. I am confident, that a close atten- 
tion to the representation there given, will lead you 
to think it less sound and correct than it seemed to 
you at first. If, as in the passage referred to, men 
are told, that their " being distinguished by the 
most correct habits, by the most useful actions, and 
by the highest improvement of their rational pow- 
ers and natural sensibilities," is consistent with 
their being " in an unrenewed state, — finding in 
themselves that corruption of heart, which is the 
fountain of all iniquity ; and the utter want of that 



105 



holiness, without which no man can see the Lord ^ 
can it fail, if it have any practical effects, to weaken 
their sense of the value of good moral conduct, and 
to lower their estimate of the importance of a virtu- 
ous life ? There may be, no doubt, much of the 
external show of virtue, where there is nothing 
of the reality, — no good principle within,, from 
which it proceeds ; and many good actions may be 
performed from bad or defective motives, and with- 
out any sense of religious or moral duty. But the 
quotation above expresses something quite different 
from this. There is a studied strength of language, 
and a universality of expression, which seems to 
comprehend all that belongs to good conduct, and 
good feeling. It is not, for instance, a few good 
actions, nor a single good habit ; but habits of right 
conduct generally, forming a character. But can 
we suppose, that a man, distinguished for the most 
correct habits, is yet utterly destitute of holiness ; 
that is, that he exhibits all the practical evidences 
of holiness, while he is influenced by no sense of 
duty, and has no principle of religious obedience ? 
Is it credible that one should habitually 'perform 
the most useful actions, and yet in all his actions 
be influenced by an earthly, selfish, wiholy dispo- 
sition f And that, with his rational powers and 
natural sensibilities in the highest state of improve- 
ment, he has that corruption of heart, tvhich is the 
fountain of all iniquity? Or admit that all this 
might be the case in a single instance, is it credible 
that it should be a common thing? What can be the 
tendency of such representations, but to dissolve in 
14 



106 



men's minds tlie connexion between holiness of heart 
and a good life ; and to lead them to regard that 
holiness, which constitutes a christian, as something 
distinct from a principle of religious obedience 
governing the conduct of life ? Let it once be 
believed, that the best habits of life, and the most 
useful actions flowing from natural sensibility im* 
proved in the best manner, and under the direction 
of the most improved reason, are no marks of holi- 
ness ; and we may soon expect it to be believed 
also, that the entire absence of these good habits, 
good actions, and good affections is to be regarded 
as no evidence of the want of holiness. Nor can it 
be doubted, that the effect is often answerable to 
what might be expected ; that by representations 
so loosely made and carelessly expressed in general 
terms, an opinion has been produced, that there is 
at least but a very uncertain connexion between 
grace and good works ; between holiness and a 
holy life. Such cannot, however, have been the 
design of Dr. Woods. Neither he nor any respect- 
able orthodox divine can be supposed intentionally 
to inculcate such an opinion. But they are not 
sufficiently careful to guard against it. 

In a remarkable passage (pp. 142 — 146) Dr. 
Woods has ventured to describe the manner, in 
which unitarian ministers ought, according to their 
principles, to address sinners ; and he concludes 
by saying, " If I mistake not, the general conduct 
of those ministers, who hold the opinions of the 
book, to which I have undertaken a reply, cor- 
responds substantially with the representation I 



107 



have made. Such, I am persuaded, would be my 
conduct, should I adopt those opinions." 

As the passage, which closes with what you have 
now read, is too long to be quoted entire, I request 
you to read it with attention, and to satisfy yourselves, 
whether the hard censure it contains of unitarian 
ministers generally, be justified. If it be so, it will 
appear in the general strain of their preaching. It 
will be seen making a prominent feature in their 
printed discourses. It will be avowed by them in 
their writings, as the practical tendency of their doc- 
trine. If you find no such thing, but a very dif- 
ferent spirit pervading their writings and a different 
course pursued 5 you will conclude, not that Dr. 
Woods has designedly misrepresented those min- 
isters, of whose spirit, character, and conduct, he 
professes to be exact in giving an account, and 
anxious not to discolor or exaggerate ; but that he 
took the shorter course (a very common one indeed, 
but of questionable propriety at least, in so grave 
a charge,) of judging what the conduct of unitarian 
ministers actually is, by what his own would be in 
their situation ; for such, he says, / am persuaded 
would be my conduct , should I adopt their opinions. 
You have now then only to take a fair view of those 
opinions, (not as they may be gathered out of frag- 
ments of sentences, picked here and there out of a 
controversial writing — separated from their con- 
nexion, so as sometimes grossly to pervert, instead 
of expressing, what was the obvious meaning of the 
writer ;) but you are to consider the system as a 
whole, in all its connexions, and tendencies, as its 



108 



doctrines are expressed, when professedly stated 
by its sober defenders. You will then be able to 
judge, whether or not the adoption of those opin- 
ions ought to lead one to such a course. 

Dr. Woods, however, seems anxious to have it 
believed that he is perfectly sincere in averring, 
that such would be the influence of the unitarian 
doctrine on his conduct; for he soon repeats' it, and 
in each case accompanies the assertion with an 
emphasis, intended to attract attention. Upon me, 
he repeats, I am persuaded, the influence of the pre- 
vailing system of unitarians, would produce all the 
effects above described. But I will do Dr. Woods 
a justice, which he is not willing to do himself. I 
am not only fully persuaded, but morally certain, 
that with the good sense, and moral feeling, and 
true piety which I cannot doubt Dr. Woods pos- 
sesses, the belief of the unitarian system would pro- 
duce far other effects, than those, which he has 
described. Did the few scraps, which he has 
quoted, contain the whole of his faith, such might be 
his conduct ; and as many scraps, I doubt not, 
might be selected out of the creed of a sound Cal- 
vinist, which would leave him at liberty to pursue 
a similar course. But is Dr. Woods so little 
acquainted with the unitarian faith, as to believe, 
that those extracts contain the whole of it, or all 
that is practical in it? If he is, instead of indulg- 
ing such a strain of levity and sarcasm upon a sub- 
ject which he has not examined, — or of which he 
lias overlooked essential parts,— -and presuming 
that pious and faithful ministers actually do, what 



109 



he thinks he should do in the state of mind, in 
which he supposes them to be ; let him endeavour 
to ascertain what that state of mind actually is, — 
by taking into view, the great and leading doc- 
trines, which they profess. Let him think, whether 
he should treat the hopes and fears, and everlasting 
interests of sinful, suffering, dying men, quite so 
lightly ; if he believed, — as he might know that 
unitarians do believe, — that they are destined to 
an immortal being after death, a state of righteous 
retribution, in which every one shall receive, in 
happiness or misery, according as his works shall 
have been ; that the present life is a state of dis- 
cipline and probation, and that the effects of a right 
or wrong course of conduct in it, will be followed 
with consequences in a future life, both in degree 
and duration, important beyond our conception; that 
during this state of trial we have the earnest and 
affectionate calls of our heavenly Father to that vir- 
tue and holiness, which will secure his favour ; that 
these calls are perfectly sincere, addressed to all, 
with which all have the power of complying, but 
which any one may resist ; none being precluded 
from the possibility of accepting the offer by a 
previous decree, nor by an irresistible necessity of 
nature ; and no one having his salvation insured by 
an absolute election, and an influence, in procuring 
which he has no agency, ; that the salvation or con- 
demnation of every one, therefore, is depending, in 
the most proper sense, upon himself; depending upon 
the choice he shall make, and a choice which he has 
the power of making. That although all men were 



110 



created innocent, — all have become sinners, — all 
need repentance, all need forgiveness, all have 
reason for solicitude and watchfulness — all have 
temptations within and without, against which 
they must guard and strive. That we owe entire 
subjection to the will of God, and the entire devo- 
tion of all o\ir faculties, and affections to his service ; 
that it is then through the mercy of God only, re- 
vealed to us in the gospel, that we can hope, that 
any thing short of perfect unsinning obedience will 
be accepted to our salvation ; that the salvation, 
therefore, of the best and holiest, is to be acknowl- 
edged as wholly an act of grace, and that this grace 
will be extended only to those, who are truly pen- 
itent, and faithful in their endeavours to possess 
true holiness. 

If, with such views of the human condition, and 
of human duty and prospects, Dr. Woods could 
find in his heart to treat the subject in the manner 
that he represents, I can only say, his heart is 
very different from what I am willing to believe 
it ; and should he still assert it, my charity would 
still compel me to judge better of him, than he does 
of himself, and to say that his assertion was not 
made with due deliberation. 

But justice to my cause requires me, and I am 
sorry it does, to say something more respecting the 
representation which Dr. Woods has given of the 
course pursued by unitarian ministers. It consists, 
you perceive, in the application of several words, 
and parts of sentences, in my Letters, as Dr. 
Woods supposes I would apply them, in the several 
cases imagined. 



Ill 



Of the propriety and discreetness of such a mod J 
of proceeding, you will be better able to judge, 
and so perhaps will Dr. Woods himself, by a similar 
method of proceeding on the other side. Following 
the example then, and adopting the manner, of my 
author, I ask, " What is the scheme of practical 
religion, with which the belief of innate depravity 
is associated ? If I believe as a general truth, that 
all men are totally depraved, that is, if I believe 
them to be by nature, enemies of God, inclined only 
to evil, whose dispositions and affections are wholly 
wrong, I must treat them accordingly. I must 
hate them, and treat them as enemies ; for it is my 
duty to hate, what God hates, and to be the enemy 
of his enemies. If I see in any of them, what 
seems to me to be amiable traits of character, such 
as kindness, justice, love of truth, I must beware 
how I allow myself to be seduced into any good 
opinion of them, or kind feelings toward them ; for 
all this, and even the best habits of life, and most 
useful actions, flowing from the kindest sensibilities 
and under the direction of cultivated reason, may 
flow from a heart that is evil only. If I address 
sinners either in public or private, I may apply 
to each individual what is said of the worst enemies 
of God, of man, and of religion, — of Pharaoh, of 
Jeroboam, and of Judas, that he is a thief, a mur- 
derer, and a betrayer of innocent blood. I may 
represent his condition, too, as most awful and 
wretched and hopeless, while he remains so. But 
I must not so far forget myself, as to exhort him to 
repentance, for this would imply that he could 



112 



repent. I must not encourage' him to inquire, 
what he shall do to be saved, for he can do nothing. 
I must not suffer him to hope for any benefit, though 
he seek, and strive, and pray for a new heart and 
a new spirit ; because God will grant this only to 
those, who are elected to eternal life, and that 
election, which ensures the salvation of those, who 
are the subjects of it, is wholly without reference 
to any thing, that they can do to deserve or to pro- 
cure it ; so that those, who are elected, will have 
this renewing and saving influence, whether they 
pray or not ; and to those, who are not elected, 
it will be denied, however earnestly they may 
seek, and pray, and strive. I shall say then to 
the wicked, there is no reason why you should 
afflict yourselves, or deny yourselves any of the 
pleasures of sin ; for you are as likely to become 
the subjects of regenerating grace in the haunts of 
profligacy and vice, in the act of theft or perjury, 
or murder ; as in a church, in the midst of domestic 
duties, or in the act of prayer, or in performing 
the most useful and virtuous deed. 

If any one, anxious and distressed under a sense 
of guilt, were disposed to break off from the habits 
of sin, and to practise temperance, truth, and 
righteousnes, and to perform the duties, which he 
has neglected, with the hope that such efforts will 
be pleasing to God ; I should say, beware how you 
presume thus to take God's work out of his own 
hands. He only by his irresistible grace can 
renew your heart, and till he has done it, all your 
desires, and efforts, and thoughts, and actions are 



113 



but adding to your sin ; and such efforts will 
increase in a peculiar manner, your danger, because 
they have a tendency to make you rely on your 
own works. You had better, therefore, abstain 
from them. It is safer for you not to perform any 
good works, than to place any dependence on them, 
or to think them of any value. To both, saints and 
sinners, I ought to say, in order to relieve them 
from needless labour and useless solicitude ; your 
cares and exertions to regulate your temper and 
lives are ill placed and wholly useless. For if you 
are not elected to eternal life, nothing that you can 
do will have any tendency to promote your salva- 
tion, so that it is clearly your interest to sin with 
as little fear, as little restraint, and as little remorse 
as possible ; since it can add nothing to your 
future doom. You are by nature totally wicked, 
and you cannot make yourself more so. 

If, on the other hand, you are elected to eternal 
life, your final salvation is sure to you without your 
exertions ; for the eternal purposes of God cannot 
be frustrated. And besides, the whole work of 
salvation is wrought for those, who are to be saved. 
Whatever they may do, it can be of no use to 
them, as respects the forgiveness of sin and their 
final salvation. For we must rely on the atoning 
blood of the Son of God as the sole ground of the 
forgiveness of sin ; and for no purpose, — certainly 
not in any connexion with our salvation, — must any 
works of righteousness, or any accomplishments or 
dispositions we possess, be ever named in his presence 

15 



114 



Had I, in my answer to Letters addressed to 
Unitarians, indulged myself in such a representa- 
tion, many Unitarians and some Calvinists would 
have assented to it, as a just account. But from 
the author of those Letters it would probably have 
drawn forth epithets like those, which he bestows 
upon a passage from Wesley in another case (p. 
174) — he would have so far forgotten his usual tone 
of moderation and urbanity, as to call it, a strain 
of violent misrepresentation, scurrility, and outrage* 

For although all the consequences inferred above 
have been admitted by those, who maintained the 
fundamental doctrines of Calvinism, and their 
preaching has actually been of that tenor and ten- 
dency ; and although I am unable to perceive, that 
any violence is offered in drawing these conse- 
quences ; yet, not believing that Dr. Woods, or 
the orthodox generally, do actually use such a 
mode of address, I should have been justly liable 
to severe rebuke, had I asserted, that the conduct 
of orthodox ministers generally corresponds with 
the representations which I have given. Dr. 
Woods, however, is not liable to the same re- 
buke, because he believes, that such as he 
stated is the conduct of ministers, who hold the 
opinions contained in the Letters addressed to 
Trinitarians and Calvinists. I only ask him to 
recollect again what are the grounds of that belief. 



115 



LETTER IX. 

Election. Statement of the doctrine by Dr. Channing defended. Charge 
against Wesley considered. Dr. Woods' reasoning examined. Distinc- 
tions between Foreknowledge and Predetermination — between physical 
and moral events — between certainty and necessity. Cases of Paul 
and Mary Magdalene. Appointment to means and privileges — not to 
holiness and salvation. Inconclusive reasoning, and inconsistency. 
Another instance. Doctrine of Election and Philosophical necessity 
entirely distinct. 

I am quite unable to perceive, why, in the begin- 
ning of the IXth Chapter, Dr. Woods should refer, 
with the sensibility he expresses, to what Dr. 
Channing had said in relation to the doctrine of 
election in the sermon, which was the occasion of 
these discussions. That the glowing eloquence, 
and force of language, with which he expresses his 
feelings in regard to the doctrine, should give pain 
to one, who believes it to be the truth of the gos- 
pel, I can easily conceive ; but that is a very dif- 
ferent thing from being chargeable with giving a 
false account of the doctrine itself. It is nothing 
more than expressing, in strong terms, his opinion 
as to the character of the doctrine. 

Turning to the passage in the sermon, which I 
presume was referred to, I see not with what pro- 
priety it can be said, that the orthodox do not 
maintain the opinions there stated, and that the 
charges there contained are untrue. The offensive 
statement of the doctrine, is the following.* " This 
system also teaches, that God selects from the 
corrupt mass of men a number to be saved, and 

* Dr. Channing's Sermon, 2d. edit. p. 30. 



116 



that they are plucked by an irresistible agency 
from the common ruin, whilst the rest are com- 
manded under penalty of aggravated woe to make 
a change in their characters, which their natural 
corruption places beyond their power, and are also 
promised pardon on conditions, which necessarily 
avail them nothing unless they are favoured with a 
special operation of God's grace, which he is pre- 
determined to withhold." 

I ask you to what part of this statement Dr. Woods 
can object as untrue ? Not to that which says, 
" that God selects from the corrupt mass of men a 
number to be saved/' — for this is the very essence 
of the doctrine, — that a number, a certain definite 
number, is chosen from among mankind ; so certain 
and definite, that it can neither be increased nor 
diminished. Not that those thus selected are 
" plucked by an irresistible agency from the com- 
mon ruin." For the necessity of regeneration, and 
that it is effected solely by a mighty energy of God, 
which the sinner can do nothing to procure, and 
the efficacy of which he cannot prevent ; is a part 
of the system, which no one, pretending to ortho- 
doxy, will call in question. Is it then, " that the 
rest are commanded under penalty of aggravated 
woe, to make a change in their characters, which 
their natural corruption places beyond their pow- 
er ?" But you will surely not deny, that all the com- 
mands of the gospel to repentance, holiness, new- 
ness of life, are addressed to the wicked, i. e. to 
those, who need to repent, to be renewed, and to 
become holy ; nor will you deny, that upon the 



117 



principles of orthodoxy, such is their natural cor- 
ruption, that it is not in the power of any one to 
obey the command, without an influence exerted 
upon him, which he can do nothing to procure. 
The false charge then must consist in saying, that 
they are promised pardon on conditions, which neces- 
sarily avail them nothing, unless they are favored 
with a special operation of God's grace, which he is 
predetermined to withhold. You must then say, 
either that the conditions of pardon can be com- 
plied with without a special operation of divine 
grace, or that the sinner can do something to pro- 
cure this special operation ; or that the election to 
salvation is not so certain, but that one, who is not 
elected, may yet possibly have that renovating 
influence exerted upon him, by which he may be 
enabled to comply with the conditions of pardon. 

There is a passage also quoted, with a sim- 
ilar complaint, from the writings of John Wesley. 
But it seems to me with as little reason. Dr. 
Woods, however, thinks, that human ingenuity 
could not make a representation of the doctrine, 
more uncandid, distorted, or false. These are 
strong expressions, and arrest our attention to the 
grounds of the charge. The sum of all, says Wesley, 
is this ; — one in twenty (suppose ) of mankind, are 
elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The 
elect shall be saved, do what they will; the reprobate 
shall be damned do what they can. There is in the 
form of expression here an air of flippancy, which 
one does not wish to see used on serious subjects ; 
but I do not perceive, to what part of the statement 



118 



a Calvinist can object, as giving a false view of the 
doctrine. The elect shall be saved, do what they 
will. Will you say, that any one of the elect ever 
will do, what will cut him off from salvation ? Is 
not the decree of election certain? Can the 
purpose of God in it be frustrated by the will of 
the creature ? Suppose he be guilty of all manner 
of crimes, and even after he has been regenerated 
by the grace of God, relapse into the most wicked 
course of life ; is it not yet absolutely certain, that 
he will be finally saved ? On the other hand, the 
reprobate shall be damned, do what they can. Will 
you say that any one of the nonelect, upon the 
principles of orthodoxy, can do any thing, by which 
he can obtain salvation ? If he can, then he can 
frustrate the purpose of God in election. Then he 
can oblige God to do, what he had determined not 
to do. To say that one, not elected to salvation, 
can do any thing by which he may obtain eternal 
life, is to say, that the purpose of God is not im- 
mutable, and to reduce it to that state of contin- 
gency, which orthodoxy abhors. I presume it can- 
not be merely the proportion, one in twenty, which 
gives offence. If the principle in the statement be 
correct, whether the proportion be one in twenty, 
one in twenty thousand, or twenty thousand to one, 
will be of little consequence. This, however, we 
have some reason to think, was actually Dr. Woods' 
ground of objection to the statement, from what 
occurs, p. 156. It is " a manifest error," he says, 
" to state the doctrine thus," viz. that the doctrine 
of election implies, that only a small part of 



119 



mankind are chosen to salvation ; iC and any one 
who justifies the representations often made of our 
doctrine in this respect, justifies what may justly 
be called religious calumny." 

But I am reminded here to ask, if the orthodox 
really hold the opinions they profess to do, in the 
common meaning of the terms, in which they are 
expressed in their creeds and writings, why do 
they manifest such strong sensibility and complain 
so loudly of being misrepresented, whenever other 
language is used in reference to them, which ex- 
presses no more, than what is necessarily implied, 
or clearly follows from the terms they actually 
make use of. Can we want better evidence than 
this, — that the language, in which they are ex- 
pressed, is used in some technical sense, and not 
in its common acceptation ? Is it not rendered 
probable, that in the use of the terms, native deprav- 
ity, election, atonement, and divine influence, some 
technical meaning is concealed, as different from 
their common meaning, as used in other cases, — 
as the term person is, as applied to the doctrine of 
the Trinity ? 

In that case, as we are now informed, the term 
person does not mean, what it does in all other 
cases, — does not mean any thing intelligible, any 
thing that can be defined, or be so expressed, as 
to convey any distinct idea, by other words. If 
the same is true, as the circumstance I have men- 
tioned renders probable, as to the other orthodox 
terms, there may be less real difference of opinion 
than is imagined ; it may consist more in words 



120 



and technical phraseology, which has no definite 
meaning, than in real opinion. I am led the more 
readily to think this to be the case from another 
fact ; viz. that Episcopalians generally understand 
the strong Calvinistic language of their articles in 
a very different sense from that, which it conveys 
in its obvious meaning. So that with articles ap- 
parently expressing the same faith with the West- 
minster confession ; that which they profess, in 
intelligible language, is widely different. 

I proceed now to the elaborate and ingenious 
defence of the doctrine, which follows ; and will 
endeavour to point out to you, wherein the defect 
of the reasoning, and the fallacy in the conclusions, 
consist. I observe, in the first place, that the 
whole reasoning proceeds upon the assumption of 
the doctrine, which is to be proved ; and it leads 
to false conclusions by constantly confounding 
together terms, which have different meanings. 
I may admit, as is stated (p. 151,) That God had an 
eternal purpose respecting human salvation, — that the 
purpose of God corresponds with what actually takes 
place, — that is, God's purposes respecting man's 
salvation correspond with his administration. But 
I enter my objection, when it is added (p. 152) in 
order to lay a broader basis for some following 
conclusions, — that there can be no unforeseen occur- 
rence, — no event not predetermined. Here terms of 
very different import are confounded together as 
if they were synonymous. I admit that no unfore- 
seen occurrence can take place ; but does it hence 
follow, that 7io event not predetermined can take 



121 



place? That may be foreseen, respecting which 
there is no predetermination. God may foresee 
how I will act, without having determined that I 
shall so act. 

This assumes again one of the important points 
at issue, i. e. that the foreknowledge of an event 
implies, that it is decreed. It also goes on the 
assumption, that the foreknowledge of God is 
inconsistent with free agency. For, in whatever 
it is predetermined, that the agent shall do, he 
can have no liberty of choice. He can only choose, 
what it is decreed he shall choose. But it has not 
been shown, and I think it cannot be shown, that 
an omniscient Being may not know infallibly, what 
choice a being will make in a case, where it has 
the perfect liberty of choosing either of the alter- 
natives presented. The fact is, that the simple 
foreknowledge of God has no influence in producing 
the event foreknown. It has no relation to the 
causes, whether physical or moral, by which it is to 
be produced ; but only to the certainty of the event. 

But our author proceeds to the assertion (p. 152) 
u that the purpose of God extends to all events of 
his administration." This might be admitted with 
certain explanations ; but to the explanation, which 
soon follows, (p. 153) — " that God determines all 
his own acts, and all that shall result from them" 
we object, that this is again assuming the whole 
question at issue, which is, whether or not God 
does so predetermine all things, that are to take 
place. It may be admitted without hesitation as to 
the first part of the sentence, as relates to hi§ own 
1G 



122 



acts, properly so called ; but as to all, that shall 
result from them,— the very question between us 
is, whether they are or are not predetermined. 

So far as respects the material world, and the 
physical laws by which it is governed, the result of 
every act of the Deity, following by a physical 
necessity from the act itself, may be considered as 
involved in it, and the particular result may be 
considered as predetermined in the act, of which 
it is the result. But, with respect to the whole 
moral system, the case, we think, is essentially dif- 
ferent. The purpose of God here, we contend, is 
different. It is not a purpose, that beings endowed 
with certain moral powers shall perform certain 
specific acts ; but that they shall be exposed to 
certain influences, to the operation of certain 
motives, and that certain consequences shall follow 
the choice, they shall freely make, and the course, 
they shall freely pursue. It is not, that Peter or 
Judas shall actually make this choice, pursue this 
course, and be thus rewarded or punished; but 
thus, Peter shall have the power of choosing and 
pursuing this or the opposite course ; and accord- 
ing as he shall pursue the one or the other, be 
shall be rewarded or punished. How he will in 
fact conduct himself in the alternative may be 
perfectly known to him, who has access to the 
human heart; but the particular result foreknown, 
was not a subject of predetermination ; that is, it 
was predetermined that the being in question 
should act freely and be dealt with accordingly ; 



123 



not that it should perform the specific act, which it 
did perform. 

This distinction, it seems to me, is recognized 
more clearly and certainly, than almost any other, 
throughout the bible. What else is meant in all 
the commands, intreaties, exhortations, expostu- 
lations, alternatives proposed to us ? What else, 
when we are so often and constantly told, — this do 
and live, that and die, — that if we are obedient, 
such will be the consequence, — if disobedient, the 
contrary? What else is implied, when the sinner is 
reproached with the choice he has made, — but that 
it was in his power to have chosen otherwise than 
he did ; when he is charged with having brought 
upon himself the ruin, which has come upon him 5 
but that he might have avoided it by a different 
course ? Especially, what else could be intended, 
when we are told, that if the inhabitants of ancient 
Sodom had enjoyed the advantages, which were 
rejected by the Jews in the time of our Saviour, 
they would have repented ; and in those contingent 
predictions, when the event foretold is suspended 
on the contingence of another event ; and that not 
happening, the predicted event did not take place? 
As in the case of David and the men of Keilah, 
Jonah and the inhabitants of Nineveh. 

The author proceeds (p. 154) from the considera- 
tion of what is applicable to the general doctrine of 
predestination, to what relates particularly to that of 
personal election. The reasoning is, " God does in 
fact save a certain definite number of individuals, 
who will appear at the right hand of God at the 



124 



judgment day. As bis purpose must agree with 
what he actually does, he must have designed 
to save that same definite number of individuals.'' 
Here again, as before, we must distinguish between 
the proper act of God, and that of his creatures. 
To save men, or to confer upon them the rewards of 
a future life, is the act of God ; and the definite 
number of individuals, whom he does thus save, 
he undoubtedly designed to save. But that con-, 
duct of moral beings, by which they become the 
proper subjects of this salvation, is not his act, 
and not predetermined by him. It is the object 
of his foreknowledge, and upon that foreknowledge 
is grounded his determination respecting their 
salvation. But this foreknowledge has no influ- 
ence in producing the course of conduct thus 
foreknown ; and their salvation is to be attrib- 
uted not to an arbitrary purpose and appoint- 
ment of the Deity, but to their own free acts. 

It is correctly said, (p. 155) si If we take care 
first to learn from scripture and observation what 
God actually does, and in what manner he does it, 
we can have no difliculty in passing from this to a 
correct and satisfactory view of his purposes." 
Yet are we in great danger of passing to a wrong 
conclusion, from not distinguishing correctly, what 
are the proper acts of God, and what are the acts of 
his creatures. And in proceeding, I shall show, how 
this is actually done by the orthodox, by attribut- 
ing to God those actions of men, upon which their 
salvation depends. For our author proceeds to 
say, (p. 157) " that salvation may denote the 



125 



regeneration, or first conversion of sinners ;" and 
this is wholly the act of God. Man has no choice, 
and no agency in it. " Whenever God makes men 
holy, he must do it without regard to any good- 
ness in them," (p. 158.) The first formation of a 
holy character, 66 or the commencement of real 
goodness in the heart, is wholly unconditional" 
u It seems perfectly clear, that God did not deter- 
mine to regenerate men or make them holy from 
any foresight of repentance, faith, or good works, 
as conditions or causes moving him thereunto." 
And finally this unconditional grant of regen- 
erating grace, " is distinguishing, i. e. it is so dis- 
pensed, that of those equally unworthy of favor, 
and equally deserving of punishment, some are 
renewed, and others not." 

After this account of the purpose of God in elec- 
tion, and the manner in which that purpose is 
executed, we are not a little struck with the 
defence of its justice, which follows. It is justi- 
fied upon the ground, that no wrong is done to 
those, ivho are passed by, though others equally 
guilty and undeserving are taken from among 
them, and by special grace are made holy and 
saved, while they are left to remain in sin, and 
perish. There might be some weight in this de- 
fence upon some other hypothesis, as to the ground 
of their guilt and ill desert. But none upon the 
orthodox hypothesis. It might be urged with a 
semblance of justice, were the sinfulness in question 
their own act, and not the act of God ; their condi- 
tion, one into which they had brought themselves; 



126 



and not one in which they were placed by their 
Maker ; and were the common grace granted to all 
sufficient to render it possible for them to become 
holy and thus be saved. But the reverse of all 
this, the orthodox faith teaches. They are, as 
they came from the hand of the Creator, totally 
depraved, inclined only to evil, and incapable of 
any good, till renewed by the irresistible influence 
of the spirit of God ; and that influence is withheld 
from them. Besides this, their everlasting doom 
was appointed irreversibly before they were 
brought into being. 66 For (p. 152) the purpose of 
God extends to all events in his administration. " 
It extends then to the continued sinfulness and 
final loss of those, who perish, in the same sense, 
as it does to the renewal to holiness and final salva- 
tion of those who are saved. If God makes men 
holy, in such a manner, that the act is wholly his, 
it must be wholly his act, that they are left in a 
state of unholiness ; and if it is perfectly clear, 
that " God did not determine to regenerate men, 
or make them holy from any foresight of repent- 
ance and good works, it must be equally certain, 
that he did not appoint the unregenerate to perish 
in their sins, from any foresight of their impenitence 
and sins." You will judge then, with what propriety 
our author could deny the charge urged against the 
orthodox system, (p. 162) " as representing, that 
God appoints men to everlasting misery without 
any regard to their conduct by saying, " it is a 
tiling as far from our belief as Atheism." The 
inconsistency of saying in one sentence, that they 



127 



are ordained to wrath for their sins, and because 
they have been workers of iniquity ; and in another, 
that the elect are chosen without any foresight of 
faith or good works, as conditions or causes mov- 
ing to the choice ; and that no others but the elect 
are redeemed, sanctified and saved, is not the less 
real, nor the less obvious for having been stated by 
the Westminster divines. 

But the justice of making an arbitrary distinc- 
tion, where the desert is equal, is defended on 
another ground. It is said (p. 159,) " If it be 
unjust, it cannot be admitted that God would do it 
in a single instance. But it has been made in 
some extraordinary instances, as in that of Paul 
and Mary Magdalene." But it is denied that 
these are cases in point. We have not a particle 
of evidence, that either of them was converted 
from sin to holiness by an irresistible, and an irre- 
spective influence. The former was converted by 
a miracle to the christian faith, but not by a mir- 
acle to the christian character. He might or 
might not still have remained a wicked man. His 
not remaining so was to be attributed to the moral 
influences of Christianity upon his life, not to an 
irresistible influence of God upon his heart. Not- 
withstanding all that was miraculous in his conver- 
sion, but for this moral influence of the gospel upon 
his heart, he might have been found at last among 
those, who, in the great day, could make the 
appeal, " Lord, have we not prophecied in thy 
name, and cast out demons, and done wonderful 
works ?" — but to whom it will yet be said, " I know 



128 



you not ; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity.''* 
In the latter case, still less reason is there to im- 
agine any distinguishing grace in a conversion 
from sin to holiness. Mary Magdalene had been 
the subject of a distinguished miracle, and became 
afterward a pious and faithful follower of Jesus, 
and persevered in her fidelity to the end. But we 
have no intimation, that the miracle was the direct 
and immediate cause of her subsequent piety, 
much less, that it was accompanied with an irre- 
sistible influence upon her mind. The probability 
is, that it was the occasion of her future good life, 
by bringing her to the knowledge of the Saviour and 
an attendance upon his instruction, which yet she 
might have attended, as many others did, without 
receiving from it the impression, influences, and 
direction of the conduct of life, which she did. 

In my Letters I had said (p. 64,) 66 that in the 
appointment of men to privileges, means, and ex- 
ternal condition, God has exercised an absolute 
sovereignty." This, Dr. Woods thinks, is attended 
with as formidable difficulties, as the orthodox doc- 
trine, because the whole value of these consists in 
their influence on character. The design of supe- 
rior advantages is to give opportunity for higher 
attainments, than could be reached with those that 
were inferior. If privileges are granted to some, 
in distinction from others, which are designed to 
produce, and do in fact to a certain extent produce, 
a sanctifying influence upon their character $ where, 
it is asked, is the difference, as to the general dif- 



129 



iiculty, between this, and the direct and immediate 
appointment to holiness itself? 

The answer, I think, is clear and decisive, that 
the difference is the greatest possible ; the one being 
entirely consistent, the other utterly inconsistent, 
with moral accountability. The difficulty on our 
side would be indeed insurmountable, if privileges 
and means produced their effects by an irresistible 
influence, and attained their object by a necessary 
tendency ; and that holiness, which is connected 
with salvation, could not be attained without them. 
But according to our system (and in this point it is 
certainly supported by all our experience and 
observation) holiness, and of course final salvation, 
is not exclusively the result of any particular privi- 
leges and means ; but depends wholly on the use 
and improvement of means. It is not the number 
of talents, whether one, or ten, or ten thousand, 
but the degree of fidelity with which they have 
been employed. Higher privileges give opportu- 
nity for higher attainments ; at the same time, 
they involve higher duties and increase respon- 
sibility. He who possesses them may rise higher, 
or he may sink lower, in consequence of the distinc- 
tion, according as he shall improve or neglect his 
advantages. On the other hand, the lowest grade 
of moral advantage does not place its possessor 
below the notice of his Maker, nor beyond the reach 
of his mercy, and the possibility of attaining that 
holinesss, which is connected with salvation. The 
christian, in an enlightened country and age, has 
undoubtedly cause to be grateful for the advanta- 
17 



130 



ges, religious and moral, by which he is distin- 
guished from the ignorant and degraded savage in 
a pagan country. But the latter, we contend, upon 
our principles, has no reasonable ground of com- 
plaint; since his acceptance or rejection by his 
Maker and final Judge will be grounded, not upon 
his positive attainments, but upon the degree of 
fidelity, with which he shall have improved his 
opportunities. He will be judged by that rule of 
equity, according to which, " much is required of 
him, who has received much," and less of him, who 
has received little. Connected with this principle, 
upon which the final judgment is to proceed, the 
moral difficulty, we think, arising from the variety 
there is in the allotment of privileges, means, and 
external condition, however arbitrary it may be, 
if not wholly removed, bears no resemblance and 
no proportion to that, which arises from the ortho- 
dox doctrine, that of an absolute and unconditional 
appointment, not to means, by which holiness and 
happiness may or may not be attained ; but to 
holiness itself and consequent salvation, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, to having it withheld, 
and the impossibility of attaining that salvation, for 
which it is the qualification, and of which it is the 
condition. 

Dr. Woods seems wholly to overlook the real 
efficacy of privileges and means, and not to dis- 
tinguish them from the ends, to produce which they 
have a tendency. His argument proceeds upon the 
assumption, which is contradicted by all experi- 
ence, that the actual attainments of men are 



131 



exactly, as their privileges and means ; that men 
are holy in proportion to their advantages for 
becoming holy ; that every person living in a 
christian land, and enjoying the light and institu- 
tions of the gospel, has of course the christian 
character ; and that he, who has not those external 
advantages, cannot possibly have true holiness, and 
is cut off from the possibility of securing the favor 
of heaven. He indeed surprises us with the asser- 
tion, (p. 166) " that the previous determination to 
give men the christian revelation is, in effect, a 
determination to make them holy." Also, u that 
the truths and precepts, and promises of scripture 
are the only medicines which can cure the moral 
diseases of men so that, " to withhold the scrip- 
tures is to leave men to the fatal influence of those 
moral diseases, thus rendered incurable" In these 
sentences, our author has distinctly expressed, what 
the whole of his argument required, that all who 
have the light of the gospel are made holy by it, 
and saved ; and that all, from whom its light is 
withheld, must remain in sin, and are left to perish. 
Nor can we perceive, that one, who receives the 
orthodox doctrine of election, need to feel any 
reluctance at this, as a part of it. There is no more 
difficulty in fixing upon that division of the human 
race, which is made by the circumstance of enjoy- 
ing, or not enjoying, the light of the gospel, than 
upon any other. 

But this opinion, though expressed so distinctly 
in the sentences quoted, seems to be held with some 
degree of doubt and reservation. For in the pre- 



132 



ceding sentence, in each case, that is expressed 
with limitation, to which afterwards a universal 
expression is applied. It is first said, that reve- 
lation contributes, in many cases effectually, to the 
formation of a holy character; implying, con- 
trary to what the next sentence asserts, that it may 
not be effectual in all cases. So also, to " with- 
hold the sacred oracles and other means of religion, 
is to leave men without any reasonable prospect of 
heing brought to repentance ; not cutting off, as the 
next sentence does, its possibility, and harshly pro- 
nouncing the moral diseases, under the influence of 
which they are left by this dereliction, absolutely 
fatal and incurable. The occurrence of two such 
striking instances of inconsistency in the compass of 
four short sentences, in a writer usually so guarded 
and careful, is a remarkable example of the vacil- 
lation of mind produced by the conflicting struggles, 
of sound sense, and correct moral feelings, with an 
article of faith, with which they are at variance. 

In the following page (p. 167,) an instance occurs, 
not very dissimilar, of an attempt to fasten upon 
the author of the Letters to Trinitarians and Cal- 
vinists an inconsistency, in admitting the absolute 
sovereignty of God in the grant of privileges and 
means, and denying, that the same sovereignty is 
exercised, in appointing men to holiness, and in 
fixing their final condition ; since it is said, these 
are inseparably connected. " Means are given for 
the very purpose of producing an effect on char- 
acter, and character thus formed, determines the 
condition of men in the future world." The con- 



133 



liected series stands thus, — u means of moral culture, 
formation of character, condition in the future 
world. Condition in the future world depends on 
character ; character on the enjoyment of means ; 
and the enjoyment of means, confessedly on the 
absolute sovereignty of God." It must be confessed 
this sentence stands, at first sight, very logically, 
and has a very imposing aspect. But the reader, 
who recollects so much of his logic, as that a par- 
ticular, and even a general proposition is not quite 
broad enough to support a universal conclusion, 
will demur at the reasoning, and require, in order 
to admit the conclusion, what I am apprehensive 
it will not be found very easy to produce, the 
proof, that character is always in fact exactly 
answerable to means ; that men are actually holy 
in proportion as they have the means of being 
holy ; and that there is no difference in the fidelity 
with which they make use of the means they enjoy. 
When Dr. Woods shall recur to a point, which he 
seems so singularly to have overlooked, he will be 
able himself to answer the question, which he asks 
with so much apparent surprise, why I object to 
the notion of the " appointment of God relating 
either to men's character or to their future condi- 
tion, while I admit that it relates to privileges and 
means." 

The objection which lies against a large propor- 
tion of the reasoning in the chapter under consid- 
eration is, that it confounds the doctrine of partic- 
ular election, with that of philosophical necessity, 
as if they must stand or fall together ; whereas no 



134 



two opinions are more entirely distinct and inde- 
pendent of each other. Philosophical necessity is 
common to the Calvinism of Edwards, the Unita- 
rianism of Priestley, the Scepticism of Hume, and 
the Atheism (if it may be properly so denominated) 
of Hobbes and of Godwin. I have chosen to state 
my objection to the orthodox doctrine of election^ 
and to defend that objection, upon the ground of 
moral freedom, as distinguished from philosophical 
necessity, because I believe it to be the truth, 
notwithstanding the metaphysical objection that 
lies against it ; which I think is of less force, than 
the moral objection to the opposite scheme ; but 
whether I have succeeded or not in that point, the 
question of particular personal election is not 
affected. The doctrine of philosophical necessity 
may be true, and yet that of personal election, as 
maintained by the orthodox, be without foundation. 

I am not insensible, as I have before intimated, that 
the doctrine of moral freedom, as opposed to phi- 
losophical necessity, is attended with a metaphys- 
ical difficulty, a difficulty, which I do not expect to 
remove to the entire satisfaction of those, whose 
minds are turned more to metaphysical, than to 
moral speculations ; and as my controversy with 
Dr. Woods relates to the Calvinistic doctrine of 
election, and has no necessary connexion with that 
of philosophical necessity, my design in this pam- 
phlet does not require me to say any thing more, 
than what you find in Letter VII, and the preced- 
ing part of this, on the subject To the brief 
statements which I have there given of the grounds 



135 



upon which my opinion on the subject rests, I refer 
you as furnishing the answer I would give to a 
large proportion of the reasoning in this chapter* 
Wishing not to swell this pamphlet unnecessarily 
by repeating the arguments which were there used., 
I will satisfy myself with this general reference, 
and a few further remarks upon some particular 
passages. 

I trust there are few, if any of my readers, 
who can have so wholly misunderstood the force 
and design of the passages of my Letters, which 
are noticed by Dr. Woods (pp. 171 — 173) as the 
remarks of Dr. Woods imply that he has done. 
I wish you to read the pages referred to by him, 
and see if you find any thing to justify the follow- 
ing singular remark. " The position of our oppo- 
nents, if well examined, will evidently amount to 
this, — that God's determining that men shall act 
from motives, hinders them from acting in this 
manner ; that his determining that men shall be 
moral, accountable agents, makes it impossible they 
should be so. Whereas we have been very much 
inclined to think, that God's determination, if it 
has any influence, must tend to accomplish the 
thing determined, not to prevent it." I believe no 
intelligent reader will doubt, that we are as much 
inclined, as Dr. Woods, to think, that God's deter- 
mination must not only tend to accomplish, but must 
certainly accomplish the thing determined. And I 
presume that no reader, except Dr. Woods, has 
failed to perceive, that the whole of our reasoning 
is founded upon the supposition of the certain con- 



136 



nexioii between the determination of God and the 
event ; that his purpose cannot be frustrated, his 
decree cannot fail. The question between us 
relates to the fact, whether certain things are 
subjects of the divine decree, not whether, being 
decreed, they will or will not take place. 

Now my reasons for saying, that the orthodox 
doctrine of election is inconsistent with all those 
passages of scripture, which imply the influence of 
motives, reasons which I thought were sufficiently 
clear and intelligible before, may be stated more 
largely thus : — 

When it is said, that to address motives of con- 
duct to a person implies, that he is capable of 
being influenced by motives, the meaning is, not 
only that he is so constituted, as to act under the 
influence of motives ; but that when different mo- 
tives of conduct are presented before him, he has 
the power of choosing, by which of them his con- 
duct shall be governed. He can choose, for 
example, between following the impulse of passion, 
on the one hand, and the suggestions of reason, or 
the motives presented by the word of God, on the 
other. Now according to the orthodox doctrine, 
men act indeed under the influence of motives, but 
not freely ; since what particular motive shall gov- 
ern each action of life is a matter of absolute and 
irreversible appointment. In no case then can 
any motive addressed to the sinner, influence his 
conduct, but that, which it was determined from 
eternity, should influence it. I ask then, whether 
God's determining that the sinner shall act from a 



137 



particular motive does not hinder him from acting 
from all other motives, — does not render it impos- 
sible for him to be influenced by any other motives, 
and does not make it inconsistent with sincerity 
in the author of his being, to urge other motives 
upon him, to press him with inducements to holi- 
ness, which he has determined shall not prevail ; 
to complain that they do not prevail, and to solicit 
him by promises, threatenings, ivarnings, admoni- 
tions, exhortations, and entreaties, to do that, which 
he had determined from the first he never should 
do ; to do that, which he had no ability to do 
without a mighty influence from himsefif, which he 
. was always determined not to grant him ? 

Nor am I able to perceive, how the instances of 
Pharaoh and the murderers of our Lord (p. 172) 
furnish any real support to the argument. If the 
actions of those men, as is repeatedly asserted in 
this and the following page, were free and volun- 
tary ; if they acted as free moral agents ; if they 
were capable of being influenced by motives in such 
a manner, that promises, threats, warnings, were 
proper and useful, as Dr. Woods asserts, then their 
actions were predetermined in no other sense, than 
any unitarian will readily admit. That God has 
purposes to accomplish, that he employs human 
agents in accomplishing them, that he employs the 
sinful actions of wicked men in effecting the most 
important ends in his moral government, makes a 
part of the unitarian faith. The treachery of Judas 
and the malice of the Jewish priests were employed 
in bringing about the crucifixion of our Lord, and 
18 



138 



thus accomplishing what the counsel of the Lord 
before determined to be done. Now in this, and, in 
all similar cases, we say, God did not predestine 
these men to that wickedness of heart and charac- 
ter, which led to this act ; but he determined to 
employ that wickedness, in which they were free 
and voluntary agents, in accomplishing his purpose. 
And this, as far as I can see, and nothing more, 
must be the meaning of Dr. Woods ; and if it be 
so, you will perceive it comes short of giving any 
support to the orthodox doctrine. 

He speaks of them as voluntary and free. 

A man imprisoned and in chains is not free. It 
is not in his power either to leave the prison or 
remain, as he chooses. He has no freedom of 
choice with respect to departing or staying in his 
present situation. Yet his act of remaining may be 
perfectly voluntary ; that is, he may remain wil- 
lingly. He may prefer to remain, though he had 
the power of leaving the place. A man may then 
act voluntarily, though he cannot act freely, under 
a physical necessity. The same distinction between 
free and voluntary action may exist, where there is 
no reference to physical restraint. The sinner acts 
voluntarily, but not freely, if the orthodox doctrines of 
depravity and election be true. But in the present 
case, there can be no reference to physical freedom or 
necessity. The subject relates, only to moral action. 
The meaning then must be, if the meaning comports 
with what the words properly express, that they 
act with moral freedom. But the moral freedom of 
an action consists in its being performed by one, 



139 



who had the power of choosing the action or not. If 
he had the power only of choosing the action, but 
not of refusing it; he acted from moral necessity. 
If he chose what he had the power to choose or not 
to choose, he acted with moral freedom. 

It is asserted again, that they were free moral 
agents. The very use of this phrase shows, that 
there was in Dr. Woods' mind the distinction 
which I have made. That there is a distinction 
between a free moral agent and a necessary moral 
agent* Else why does he add the term free ? 
And it is observable that his assertion is, that the 
murderers of our Lord were free moral agents. 
There was then no such absolute predetermination 
of their actions and volitions, as to render them 
morally necessary ; but they were performed with 
moral freedom. 

But the whole of this receives strong confirma- 
tion by the decisive expressions which follow. It is 
asserted, that " they were capable of being influ- 
enced by motives, in such a manner, that promises , 
threats, learnings, &c. were proper and useful. 

Now, when we say a man is capable of being 
influenced by motives, as I have before observed, 
we mean, that he is capable of judging and choos- 
ing between the motives upon both sides, which 
relate to a particular action, a course of life, or 
actions in general. We can with no propriety say, 

* Dr. Woods will not misunderstand me as admitting by this, that there 
can be any such thing, as a necessary moral agent. Moral agency im- 
plies freedom, as it implies that the being of whom it is predicated is 
accountable for his actions, and he only can be accountable for his 
■actions, who is free. 



140 



that he is capable of being influenced by motive's, 
who is absolutely bound by necessity or a previous 
decree to be governed by the motives on one side, 
whatever motives may be presented on the other. 
He acts indeed under the influence of motives, 
and voluntarily ; but he acts not freely, because 
he is not capable of being influenced by any 
other motives, which may be offered in opposition to 
them, however high and strong, however clearly 
stated, and however tenderly urged. But it is 
further said, he is capable of being influenced in 
such a manner, that promises, threats, warnings, &c. 
were proper and useful. But promises &x. are 
proper to be urged only upon those, who are capa- 
ble of being influenced by the motive thus offered, 
and they can be useful only to such. It is certainly 
something more than absurd, it is mockery for that 
Being to urge upon sinners all the motives to holi- 
ness, that consist in promises, threats, exhortations 
and warnings, who, having an absolute and entire 
control over them, has previously determined 
that none of those motives shall prevail ; and 
who has by the constitution of their nature and 
his eternal decree, made it impossible for any 
other motives to prevail, but those which lead to 
sin. 

If any of the sinful actions of wicked men, by 
which they accomplish the purposes of heaven, are 
performed in pursuance of a decree, or under a 
necessity, which takes from them the liberty of 
which I speak ; with respect to those actions, 
though they may be voluntary in performing them, 



141 



yet not being free, they cannot be morally account- 
able. They incur no just blame, and are not 
deserving of punishment. 

I think it unnecessary to notice in detail all the 
reasoning that follows in the remainder of this 
chapter. The single remark, before made, which 
is sufficient to invalidate its whole force, is, that 
Dr. Woods proceeds all along upon the idea, that 
the orthodox doctrine of election is the same, as 
that of philosophical necessity ; and all his conclu- 
sions, as I have before shown, depend upon its 
being so. All depends upon its being a fact, that 
it is by the influence of the promises, exhortations, 
warnings, and other means of religion, that men 
are made holy ; whereas, if the doctrines of total 
depravity, and personal election be true, the means 
of religion can produce no such effects. Whatever 
means are employed, they can produce no effect. 
No expostulations, no warnings, no hopes or fears 
addressed to sinners can have the smallest ten- 
dency to renew and sanctify ttiftn. Nothing but 
that mighty influence, which is imparted to the 
elect, and to them only, can produce holiness. 
And in those, to whom it is imparted, it cannot fail 
to produce it. The hopes and fears, the exhor- 
tations and warnings of religion can have no influ- 
ence upon the non-elect; and the elect, though no 
such means were used, will certainly be regen- 
erated, made holy, and be saved by that mighty 
influence, which is independent alike of all human 
efforts, and all external means. 



142 



With respect to the argument to be drawn from 
several passages of scripture, I am willing to leave 
it without any further remark. By comparing the 
explanation of those passages, which was given in my 
former Letters, with what is here urged by Dr. Woods 
in reply, you will be able to judge, whether they 
furnish satisfactory proof, that the orthodox doc- 
trine of election is a doctrine of scripture ; or 
whether those few passages of scripture, which are 
relied on in the argument, admit of a fair interpre- 
tation, which will give a meaning, that has no rela- 
tion to the doctrine ; and which is perfectly con- 
sistent with the general language and obvious 
import of the scriptures, in what relates to the duty 
and destiny of man, as a moral and accountable 
being. 

I have one word only to say more, as to the 
moral argument upon the question in discussion. 
The author of the Reply has very naturally con- 
fined himself chiefly to metaphysical reasoning. 
The fallacy of tha^reasoning, I think, I have shown 
with a sufficient degree of clearness. The moral 
considerations, which seem to me to be of irresis- 
tible force in opposition to the doctrine, are very 
obvious, and may be stated in few words ; or rather 
they suggest themselves immediately upon the 
statement of the doctrine itself. 

God is represented by this doctrine, as bringing 
into being all the descendants of Adam, on account 
of his sin, with a nature totally corrupt, inclined 
only to evil, with dispositions and affections wholly 
wrong, hating him that made them, his laws and 



143 



every thing good. It is declared, that men are by- 
nature wholly incapable of any thing morally good, 
till their nature is changed ; that this change can 
be effected only by the direct and immediate influ- 
ence of the spirit of God ; that the sinner can do 
nothing, which shall be a reason with God for grant- 
ing this influence. On the contrary, whenever it 
is granted, it is done in a perfectly arbitrary man- 
ner. It is granted only to those, who were elected 
from eternity, without any reason, but the will of 
God, for distinguishing them from among others, all 
of whom were equally undeserving. This election 
extends to a certain definite portion of mankind ; 
all the rest, no more undeserving than they, and no 
more sinful, than they were created, are passed by, 
and left to hopeless, remediless, everlasting ruin. 

I believe that no part of this statement will be 
objected to as giving an unfair or distorted view of 
the orthodox faith. But we find it not easy to 
bring our moral feelings to acquiesce in the doc- 
trine, as it is thus presented. Something more is 
required than a few detached texts so interpreted, 
as to express a meaning, that is irreconcileable with 
the general import and uniform tenor of the scrip- 
tures ; fortified by a metaphysical argument of a 
very subtle and abstruse nature, the force of which 
has always been a subject of controversy, without 
any reference to its connexion with a doctrine of 
religion 5 and which, were its force unquestionable, 
has no necessary connexion with the doctrine of 
religion, which it is brought to support. 



144 



LETTER X. 

Atonement. Analogy of God's government in the present life. Civil 
government. Dr. Woods' objections considered. Moral influence 
of the two systems. Reasoning in the Letters to Trinitarians kc. 
incorrectly stated. 

Upon the doctrine of the atonement, which 
comes next under consideration, I wish to call your 
attention only to a few remarks, suggested by some 
of the exceptions offered to my statement and 
defence of my opinions upon this subject in my 
former Letters. 

To what is said (pp. 199, 200) respecting the 
judgment to be drawn from the analogy of God's 
government in the present world, as to the efficacy 
of repentance, the short and satisfactory reply is, that 
this analogy, had we no other knowledge on the 
subject, would certainly leave us, as we find it always 
has left men, unenlightened by divine revelation, in 
some doubt on the subject. It would leave us in 
uncertainty w hether repentance would be accepted 
alone, or some expiation be required. That uncer- 
tainty and doubt I have shown, revelation has 
removed, and has taught us, what reason, and our 
experience of the present operation of the divine 
government, could not teach — " that if the wicked 
will turn from his wickedness, he shall live" — that 
pardon is sure to the sincerely penitent. 

And as to the analogy of civil government ; there 
are circumstances of difference in the case, extremely 
obvious, which are sufficient to invalidate all con- 
clusions drawn by reasoning from the one to the 



145 



other. Thus, when we are asked (p. 200) whether 
human government "holds out to criminals the 
prospect of pardon, in case they repent, and what 
would be the consequence of their doing it it is 
sufficient to say, that the reasons why they do not, 
are such, as do not apply at all to the divine gov- 
ernment. It is wholly from the imbecility and im- 
perfection of human government, that it is obliged 
to inflict the punishment, which has been incurred 
by guilt, upon him, who, sincerely penitent, has re- 
turned to virtue and obedience. At human tribunals, 
from which the dispositions and purposes of the heart 
are concealed, where there is no infallible judge 
to determine, when repentance is sincere, and 
reformation unfeigned and effectual, it may be im- 
possible to avoid the fatal consequences, that would 
follow from admitting the principle, of allowing 
repentance to expiate guilt. But at the tribunal of 
Him, whose knowledge is perfect, and who can see 
the whole of the case, there can be no such danger ; 
and " what more dreadful consequences still would 
follow the admission of such a principle*' 5 in the 
government of a Being, who has no occasion to 
resort to expedients in his administration, from want 
of power or defect of knowledge, it is not easy to 
imagine. 

When it is asked again (p. 200) "If the attri- 
butes of God demand, that the punishment should 
not outlive the crime, on what ground are the dis- 
pensations of the present life to be justified," the 
reply is grounded on the obvious distinction between 
the final retributions of the future life, which are 
19 



146 



those in question ; and those dispensations of the 
present, which make part of a state of discipline 
and trial, and upon which the final retributions 
are to be grounded. It may be very reasonable 



course of vice should continue to follow a man in 
this life, and make a part of the trial of his virtue, after 
he has sincerely repented, and wholly corrected the 
habit ; when a principle of the divine adminis- 
tration would be neither reasonable nor just, that 
should pursue him with those consequences into a 
state of final and eternal retribution. 

Upon the objection (p. 202) to my sense of 
redemption and sacrifice, I think it sufficient to refer 
you to the Letter in which it is contained. You 
will then judge, whether, as I had clearly shown 
that the term redemption was used in the two most 
important cases of deliverance, to which it was 
applied in the Old Testament, in a certain sense ; 
it be not consistent with sound principles of inter- 
pretation to suppose, that it was meant to be applied 
in a similar sense in the New ; and whether, as the 
most orthodox will not pretend, that the term 
sacrifice, as applied to Christ, is to be understood in 
its literal sense, the account which I have given of 
its use and meaning be not satisfactory ; and whether 
the reasons I have assigned be not sufficient to 
show, that it is used in the sense which I have given 
it. I am willing also to rest the third objection, 
(p. 203) relative to the mode of interpretation of 
several passages of scripture, on the exposition of 
those texts in my Letter ; reminding you only* that 



and just, that the 




a 



147 



while unitarians give a distinct and intelligible 
meaning to those texts, the orthodox in reply, 
though they deny that meaning to be the true one, 
and affirm, that " those texts teach the doctrine of 
the atonement, as it is commonly held ; and that they 
assert it in language as plain, express and emphatic, 
as any which can be imagined yet do not tell us, 
though they have been called upon to do it, what 
the doctrine is, that they so expressly assert, and 
plainly teach. 

Dr. Woods complains (p. 204) of unitarians put- 
ting a forced construction upon scripture, and that 
there is no likeness between those passages of scrip- 
ture, which relate to the work of redemption, and 
the unitarian doctrine, as expressed in my Letters. 
He has been careful to guard against the possibility 
of the charge being retorted by putting it out of our 
power to institute the comparison for the purpose, 
as to the orthodox doctrine ; not having given us in 
the present or the former publication any distinct 
statement of that doctrine. 

With what reason, let me ask, can it be said, as 
the fourth objection states, that the unitarian scheme 
M takes away the difference, which the scripture 
uniformly makes*between the sufferings of Christ 
and of his apostles P Will it follow, because we deny 
the sufferings of Christ to be properly vicarious, that 
they were therefore of no more importance, than those 
of the subordinate agents in accomplishing the pur- 
poses of his mission ? We certainly do attribute a value, 
and importance, and efficacy to the sufferings and 
death, as well as to every part of the life and char- 



148 



aetcr of the Saviour, which we allow to those 
of no other person. Instead of believing, as Dr. 
Woods seems to intimate, (p. 204) that excepting 
this vicarious suffering, we are at least as much 
indebted to Paul as to Jesus Christ ; we regard the 
distinction between them as of the utmost im- 
portance. Is it no distinction, that one is the Lord 
and master, the other the servant ? That Jesus was 
the direct and immediate messenger of God to 
men ; to reveal to us his will and his purposes ; 
while Paul was only the ambassador of Jesus, to 
declare to us the doctrine, in which he had been 
instructed by him ? Is there nothing in the number 
and splendor of the miracles, by which Jesus proved 
his peculiar relation to the Father and commission 
from him to men, to distinguish them from those, 
by which Paul and the other apostles confirmed 
the authority, which they professed to derive from 
Jesus as their master, and head ? Jesus taught as 
one having authority, — -an authority derived imme- 
diately from the Father ; Paul and Peter, and 
James, and John, as those, who derived their 
authority and received their doctrine from Jesus. 

As to the comparative moral influence of the two 
systems, it must be judged of bytother marks than 
those, which Dr. Woods has mentioned, and from 
those marks you will probably doubt, whether his 
conclusions are correct. Is it "that scheme of 
atonement, which gives the highest view of the 
evil of sin, and of the displeasure of God against 
it," or that which gives the most just, rational, and 
scriptural, that " will have the most powerful ten- 



149 



dency to lead men to repentance P' Will men be 
more seriously and practically affected by a system, 
which so aggravates the guilt of every sin, as to 
leave no room for degrees of wickedness, and no 
proportion between sinners, and condemns all to 
equal degrees of ill desert, and of divine wrath; 
than by that, which leaves room for different degrees 
of guilt ? (p. 207.) And can it be supposed, that sin- 
ners are more likely to be brought to repentance by 
the thought, that an innocent being has suffered for 
their sins, instead of the guilty ; than that repentance 
only can secure their pardon, and that repentance 
only is required by a merciful God ? Especially can 
it be thought, that the " evil of sin and the abhor- 
rence with which God regards it, are better dis- 
played by the punishment of the innocent instead of 
the guilty, than by granting pardon to the guilty 
upon their repentance ? Nor can I perceive how, by 
the doctrine of atonement, (p. 208) a " more glorious 
display was made of the divine love." Was there 
more love manifested in requiring the punishment of 
sin, than in freely remitting it to the penitent ? In 
refusing to forgive the penitent, till an innocent 
person had voluntarily taken the punishment in his 
stead, than in accepting penitence and future good 
conduct, as a reason for freely forgiving the past f 
Is it a less display of the love of God to men, if he 
effected our salvation by Jesus Christ by making us 
fit subjects of his favour by his whole ministry on 
earth, than if he effected the same by inflicting 
upon him all the punishment, which sinners had 
deserved ? 



150 



In p. 214, a fair statement is not given of my 
reasoning. I should not notice it, as it is in itself 
of very little consequence, but that every instance of 
this kind, which the reader does not detect, serves 
to impair his confidence in the soundness of the 
writer, and thus to affect the credit of the cause he 
supports. I am represented as reasoning thus : — " The 
scriptures in many places speak of God as merciful, 
and ready to forgive the penitent without expressly 
referring to any atonement ; therefore forgiveness 
rests solely on the mercy of God and the repentance 
of sinners, and the atonement has nothing to do 
with it, except as it may be conducive to repent- 
ance." Such a conclusion would evidently be 
unwarranted by the premises, too large for them to 
support. But the fact is, the representation is not 
correct, and you find no such reasoning as is stated, 
and nothing, that a reader of common understanding 
and tolerable attention could be supposed so to 
misunderstand, as to believe that it meant, what is 
attributed to it. I request you, however, to exam- 
ine the passage referred to ; where you will find, 
that my argument was directed against this asser- 
tion of Dr. Woods in his Letters to Unitarians, that 
" God has told us, that we must rely upon the 
atoning blood of his son, as the sole ground of for- 
giveness. I challenged Dr. Woods to inform us 
where God has told us this. But he has not done it. 
I then proceeded, not to state generally, as I am 
represented to have done, "that the scriptures, in 
many places, without any reference to any kind of 



151 



atonement, refer the forgiveness of sin solely to the 
mercy of God but specifically, that this is done by 
Isaiah, by David, by John the Baptist, by our Saviour, 
and by Peter, in texts, which are quoted. And these 
quotations you will perceive are made for the purpose 
of repelling the assertion, " that the atoning blood of 
Christ is the sole ground of forgiveness." And you 
will find it accompanied with no such reasoning as is 
alleged. No inference is drawn. The language of the 
sacred writers is left to speak for itself, and the read- 
er is left to draw his own conclusions. The reasoning 
is not mine, but Dr. Woods'. You will judge, there- 
fore, where the ridicule ought to fall, when he pro- 
ceeds to show its absurdity, by its application in 
analogous cases. 

LETTER XL 

Divine Influence. Love to Christ. Inconclusive reasoning. What is 
due from the Orthodox and Unitarians to each other. 

In the concluding Chapter of Dr. Woods' Reply, 
I find little occasion for any further remarks. So 
far as relates to the doctrine of divine influence, I 
would only recal your attention to the point at issue 
between us. It is the more necessary, as it is not 
kept sufficiently in view by Dr. Woods in his 
Reply. I had stated it very explicitly in the Vlth 
Letter of my former publication i and the correct- 
ness of that statement is not called in question. 
But if, as is virtually admitted, the statement there 
made is correct, if the orthodox doctrine of divine 



152 



influence is, — *that it is confined to the elect- — 
granted to them in a perfectly arbitrary manner — that 
its effects take place, without any agency or co-opera- 
tion of theirs, they being wholly passive in it — that it 
is the irresistible, unaided work of God, which man 
can do nothing either to assist or prevent — that it is 
never granted to the non-elect, in consequence of 
which, they can never be regenerated, and their final 
salvation is impossible ; I ask, with what propriety- 
it can be said, (p. 218) that the divine influence 
effectually directs and regulates the liberty and activity 
of those ivho are saved, and induces them to use their 
voluntary and moral powers in a right manner ? I 
ask what is the liberty of a being, who is impelled 
by an irresistible influence, which he can neither 
assist nor prevent, and what is his activity, who is 
under an influence which produces its effects, with- 
out any agency or cooperation of his, and in which he 
is wholly passive ? I ask also how he can be said 
to be induced to the right use of his voluntary and 
moral powers, when he is impelled by an influence, 
which produces its effects without his agency or 
cooperation ? And with what propriety the use of 
moral powers can be spoken of, where the agent is 
declared to be wholly passive ? 

I think it unnecessary to follow Dr. Woods in his 
further remarks on this subject. By recurring to the 
discussion of the subject in my former Letters, you 

* I speak of that divine influence which is peculiar to Calvinism, as 
distinguished from that, which Unitarians admit. For it is with the 
former only that I have any concern, as it is that only about which there 
Is any controversy. 



153 



will be able to perceive how the argument stands, 
and whether any thing, that has been said in reply, 
serves to support that special divine influence in 
changing the nature of him, who is the subject of it, 
which is the only point of controversy. And with 
respect to the several other topics, which fill up 
the remaining pages of the Reply, I am satisfied 
with referring you to the corresponding passages 
in the last of my former Letters. 

You will perceive, I think, without difficulty, the 
fallacy that runs through the reasoning on page 221. 
If our love to Christ depends on the nature and 
value of the benefits we receive from him, will it 
follow, as Dr. Woods intimates, that we may owe no 
higher love to God, than to a perfect man ? Will 
Dr. Woods say, that we can have received the 
same benefits from any man, or any finite being, as 
from God ? that we can be as dependant on him ? 
Will it follow also, as is further asserted, that 
the mother of Jesus, and departed saints are as 
proper objects of our highest religious affections as 
the Saviour? Have we received from them the 
same benefits ? are they the messengers and instru- 
ments of God for conferring upon us as great 
and important blessings ? Besides, you will remark 
that other terms are introduced with other very 
different additional meanings. Not only love, but 
confidence, veneration and worship, we are told, 
will be due in the same manner to inferior beings, 
as to the supreme God. You will probably think 
it follows not very clearly and certainly, that a 
dependant finite being is entitled to our worship, to 
20 



154 



our supreme religious worship, because it is the 
instrument of God in conferring upon us such bles- 
sings, as entitle it even to a high degree of love and 
gratitude and veneration. Nor that we can put the 
same trust in a being, all whose power of protecting 
us.or doing us good, is derived ; as in that infinite 
and independent Being, from whom it derives its 
power. But if Dr. Woods' reasoning is to be 
relied upon, all this, and more than this, will follow 
from the single proposition, that our love to the 
Saviour will depend on the nature and value of the 
benefits we receive from him, and not upon the rank 
he holds in the scale of being. 

I have only a few remarks to make on the subject, 
which occupies the paragraph preceding that, 
which closes the book before me ; relating to the 
spirit, disposition, and conduct, which are due from 
unitarians and trinitarians to each other. In 
some of the sentiments expressed I cheerfully 
accord 5 but I think that Dr. Woods himself can 
hardly fail to perceive, how utterly inconsistent 
they are practically, with some others, which are 
pretty distinctly avowed. I think he will hardly 
expect, that two great bodies of men, each profess- 
ing the christian faith, each receiving their 
doctrines from the same books, and each sincerely 
believing that the doctrines which they profess are 
those that are taught in those books ; can mutually 
deny the christian name to each other, withhold 
from each other all ofliees of christian communion, 
and consider each other as idolaters, enemies of 
truth, and deniers of the Lord ; and yet maintain 



155 



a uninterrupted, the advantages and pleasures of 
civil, social, and literary intercourse, the offices of 
kindness, and the feelings of benevolence." We 
have seen for a few years past, and daily see more 
and more distinctly, what are the effects of an 
approach to the state, which Dr. Woods seems to 
contemplate with complacency, as that which ought 
to take place. The progress toward such a state 
of separation, and consequent alienation, unitarians 
contemplate with regret and grief, but without 
alarm and without anxiety. They have no fears 
and no doubts respecting the final result. They 
have been faithful and uniform and constant in 
their endeavours to avert it. But if it is forced 
upon them, they are ready to meet the exigence. 
But they will still not cease from their endeavours, 
in the spirit of forbearance, gentleness and chris- 
tian charity, to prevent a schism, in their appre- 
hension so causeless, so unworthy of the professed 
disciples of Jesus Christ, and so fatal, as they 
helieve it to be, should the efforts of those who 
attempt it succeed, to the spirit and the interests 
of the religion of Christ. 

We are not insensible, that the difference of 
opinion upon important points of christian doc- 
trine is great. We probably think it as great, 
and of as much practical moment, as does the 
writer of the Reply ; but we think it not sufficient 
to justify such a separation, as has for several years 
heen openly advocated, and strenuously attempted 
by some, — we are willing to believe honest, but 
certainly very violent and indiscreet, orthodox 



156 



divin.es. We believe there is still a foundation of 
christian faith, which we hold in common, broad 
enough for all honest men, who have any consid- 
erable portion of the christian spirit, to stand 
together in peace, to worship together, and to hold 
fellowship in all the ordinances of the gospel. For 
we believe the proper grounds of this fellowship to 
consist, not in articles of speculative belief only, or 
chiefly, but in the temper, spirit, and life of the 
gospel. This we are confident too is the sentiment 
and feeling of the great body of orthodox chris- 
tians, as well as unitarians. Whatever importance 
they may on either side attach to their particular 
views of certain distinguishing doctrines, they are 
yet willing to allow the christian name, and to 
extend their christian fellowship to all those, who 
profess the common faith, and manifest their sin- 
cerity in it by the spirit of the gospel in their lives. 
The sentiment intimated by Dr. Woods with suffi- 
cient clearness to be intelligible ; that trinitarians 
are considered as idolaters by unitarians ; and that 
the faith, which they profess, on the other hand, is 
regarded by trinitarians as another gospel, in such a 
sense, as to render it inconsistent with their allegiance 
to Christ, to have any fellowship with them in the 
peculiarities of their faith and worship, we believe is 
not well founded. Unitarians may believe, as some 
of them have expressed, that to render supreme reli- 
gious ivorship to Jesus Christ, and to the Holy Spirit, 
as a person distinct from the Father, is idolatry ; 
and yet may be far from charging trinitarians with 
being idolaters, who render such worship 5 because 



they have no doubt of their doing it with a pure 
conscience, and with the full conviction of their 
minds, that it is what their christian faith and 
profession require. They think, therefore, that 
what, considered abstractly, is idolatrous worship, 
is not so to them, they believing it to be that, which 
the gospel prescribes. On the other hand, we are 
unable to imagine what part of the unitarian 
worship can be offensive to a trinitarian, or that 
it is possible for a trinitarian to think it incon- 
sistent with his allegiance to Christ to unite in 
it. That it does not contain all that he thinks it 
should, is surely no good reason for refusing to join 
in what it does contain that is pure. The writer of 
this has had occasion to worship in orthodox assem- 
blies and to attend the ministrations of orthodox 
divines. He has attended such worship with great 
satisfaction; very seldom has he known a respectable 
orthodox minister to introduce any thing into an act 
of worship in which a unitarian could not unite with 
him. The same, it is believed, is true with respect 
to unitarian ministers. They never have occasion 
to introduce any sentiment or language into their 
acts of worship, in which an orthodox worshipper, 
who should be present, could not cheerfully join. 
Very few are found on either side, who think it 
necessary, so far to depart from the examples of 
scriptural worship, and violate the decorum due to 
fellow-worshippers, as to intrude the peculiarities 
of their faith into their acts of worship, and substi- 
tute a creed for a prayer. And as respects the 
religious instructions of the pulpit, no man, who is 



158 



himself a fair inquirer, would be unwilling to hear 
the reasons which may be offered in support of 
opinions opposite to his own, as often, as a faithful 
minister would think it his duty to urge them in 
his public discourses. 

We are as much disposed to revere conscience as 
Dr. Woods can be ; but we do not suppose it 
requires us to separate ourselves from those, who 
profess the same reverence for conscience, and who 
give reasonable evidence of their sincerity in it ; 
evidence that it is indeed conscience by which 
they are guided, and not passion, pride, or party 
spirit. It is our w T ish and endeavour also to be 
faithful to the truth. We deem it an important 
duty. We think that no considerations will justify 
us in any kind of disguise or concealment, or in with- 
holding any exertions in our power to promote the 
knowledge of the truth. But we revere also the 
same fidelity to the truth in others ; and do not 
feel ourselves authorized to withdraw from them, 
because their speculative opinions differ from ours,— 
because that which is truth to them is not so to us. 
We think that the agreement in the great principle 
of the love of truth and sacred regard to it and 
fidelity in its pursuit, forms a stronger and more 
reasonable bond of union, than any agreement in 
opinions could do. 

I might make some remarks on what is implied 
in the last sentence of this paragraph, when it 
is said, " we request them, (the unitarians,) to 
extend to us the same indulgence and candour, 
and to suffer us, without reproach, to serve God 



159 



according to our own consciences." I might 
ask, whether a disposition has ever been discov- 
ered by unitarians, to interfere with the reli- 
gious rights, or to disturb the consciences of 
the orthodox, as is here intimated. The insinua- 
tion is certainly not very consistent with another 
charge, with which, till very lately, we have been 
constantly assailed, viz. that we are indifferent 
whether truth or error prevail ; that we think it of 
little importance what men believe, and lay no 
stress even on our own opinions. But each of 
these representations is equally erroneous. 

It is, however, of little importance for Dr. Woods 
or myself to speak of what is in fact the general spirit 
and conduct of unitarians and of the orthodox, in 
relation to each other. The religious community have 
fortunately the means of judging of it from other 
sources of information. The spirit that pervades 
their respective publications ; the principles which 
they defend, the measures they respectively pursue, 
the language which they think it proper to apply ; 
especially the treatment they bestow upon individ- 
uals, where they have the power ; these will form 
the grounds of judgment, and the public judgment, 
we doubt not, will eventually be correct. When 
Dr. Woods can refer to the most respectable uni- 
tarian writers as declaring, that they do not con- 
sider the orthodox as christians, and holding them up 
to public odium, as preaching another gospel, and 
denying the Lord that bought them ; ranking them 
in a class with deists and atheists, Jews and 
Mahometans, and declaring them to be no better 



160 



entitled, than either of them, to the name of chris- 
tians, — and denouncing them, as deists in disguise ; 
when he can point us to associations of unitarian 
ministers expelling from their body, and withdraw- 
ing all ministerial intercourse and christian fellow- 
ship from members, of good character and exem- 
plary lives, because they have exchanged unitarian 
for trinitarian sentiments ; — to unitarian churches 
excommunicating their members for the same 
reason ; — to individual unitarians refusing to have 
fellowship in christian ordinances in a trinitarian 
church, — and to the Principals of unitarian theolog- 
ical seminaries, expelling serious and conscientious 
pupils for the expression of opinions, to which they 
have been led by honest inquiry, with the harsh 
declaration that such opinions are not to be toler- 
ated ; — when he can tell us of the exertions of 
unitarian ministers for a course of years to excite 
alarm in the public mind, to raise opposition 
against the orthodox, and to destroy the influence 
and usefulness of orthodox ministers, and to excite 
in others a fear to allow themselves in free reli- 
gious inquiry, lest they should find themselves 
obliged to adopt orthodox views and thus expose 
themselves to the loss of reputation, of usefulness, 
and of the christian name, — -to excommunication, 
and all the civil and social inconveniences which 
higotry and violence have it in their power to inflict 
in an enlightened age and under a free government ; 
when he can do this, he may, with some reason, ap- 
peal, in behalf of his injured brethren, not to our 
candour and indulgence only, but to our sense of 



161 



decency and justice, and " request, that he and his 
friends may be suffered without reproach/' and 
without being subjected to still more serious evils 
than reproaches, " to serve God according to their 
own consciences."* 

It was not my intention to notice any other 
instances, in which Dr. Woods has found a meaning 
in my words different from what I presume readers 
in general disoovered ; but the last paragraph of 
his Reply contains one, which is of such a nature, 
that I am unwilling it should pass unnoticed. He 
quotes me as saying, not only that the moral influ- 
ence of the unitarian doctrine is far more certain, 
and powerful, and salutary, and purifying than the 
influence of orthodoxy, (which is not correctly 
stated, as the reference is to a single doctrine only 
and not to the whole scheme) ; but that the virtue 
of unitarians is of a more pure, generous, and 
elevated kind, than that of their opponents. You 
will probably be a little surprised, on turning to 
the passage referred to, to find that the words I 
actually made use of, instead of those just cited, 
were the following : The virtue that is produced by 
cheerful views, and by the contemplation of kindness, 
benevolence, and mercy in God, is of a more pure, 

* In connexion with the paragraph above, the reader is invited to turn 
to the files of the Panoplist for a few of the last years of its publication, to 
the discourse of the Rev. Lyman Beecher at the ordination in Park street, 
to Dr. Spring's Tribute to New England, to Dr. Mason's farwell sermon, 
to Dr. Miller's Letters on unitarianism, to the Letter ~efDr. Mason to Mr. 
Dewey on his expulsion from the Theological Seminary at New York, to 
the transactions of councils and consociations at Coventry, Deerfield, 
Brooklyn and Wareham, and of associations in the vicinities of Weymouth, 
Hadley, Deerfield, Pelham, Charlemont, &c. 
21 



162 



generous, and elevated kind, than that which arises 
from cold, austere, and gloomy views, and the con- 
templation of severe, unrelenting, vindictive justice, 
and the execution of eternal wrath. After quoting 
me in the manner stated, he adds, / cannot bring 
myself to contest this last point with unitarians. 
Had I used the words which he has represented 
me as using, the censure implied in thus declining 
the contest would have fallen with some force. As 
it is, the reader will judge of its force. 

In the discussions, which I have now brought to 
a close, as in my former Letters, it has been my 
wish and endeavour to give a correct view of the 
religious opinions maintained by myself, as I sup- 
pose, in common with unitarians generally, upon the 
several subjects which have been brought into 
view ; and of the mode of reasoning by which those 
opinions are to be defended. 

It has been also my faithful endeavour to do 
justice to the highly respected author of the Reply 
to those Letters, in the notice which I have had 
occasion to take of his book. The remarks, which 
I have thought myself obliged to make, have in some 
cases not been such as I could have wished to find 
a place for. Whether they are fair and just is sub- 
mitted to the judgment of the reader. I shall 
extremely regret the circumstance, if any of them 
shall appear to have been made under a misappre- 
hension of the meaning of the writer, or are of such 
a nature as to give a false impression ; and shall be 
grateful to him, who will correct the error, and 
remove the wrong impression. 



163 



Having now completed my design in these Let- 
ters, I take my leave of those whom I address, 
and of the subject, with the devout prayer to the 
Author of light and of love, that the labours which 
have been employed on both sides may not be 
fruitless. And if they shall serve in any degree 
to give to readers on each side of the controversy- 
more distinct and satisfactory views upon the sub- 
jects to which they relate, and a clearer understand- 
ing of the reasons upon which they are grounded ; 
some benefit will be derived to the cause of chris- 
tian truth ; and in proportion as the views of 
christians are enlarged and rendered more clear 
and distinct by discussions conducted with serious- 
ness, and with a spirit of moderation ; it is to be 
hoped, that better feelings will prevail, and chris- 
tian charity be promoted ; and that christians, 
instead of being driven asunder by differences of 
opinion inseparable from a state of imperfect 
knowledge, will allow themselves to be drawn 
together by the kind spirit of the gospel, which is 
common to true christians of all sects, and of everv 
denomination. 



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